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Preface

AMERICAN LOCAL HISTORIES have traditionally focused upon the
origins and early growth of communities while occasionally examining later periods of relative stability or renewed expansion. But
many localities, particularly in rural areas, have undergone long
periods of stagnation followed by decline and disintegration. These
aspects of community existence have received much less attention
and remain relatively unexplored. This is particularly true in the
realm of agricultural history which in the United States has tended
to steer away from the local history approach, especially when
dealing with the dynamic changes of the twentieth century. The
present volume represents a tentative effort to explore this void,
examining the processes of socioeconomic change in an agricultural
region of the Great Plains.
Perhaps the first question that arises whenever a local history
appears concerns how the author happened to choose a particular
geographical area as his subject and whether it accurately represents a significant sector of the broader national society. In this
instance the author spent his childhood and adolescence in the
region surveyed and thus developed a personal familiarity with it.
Hopefully I have avoided the twin pitfalls of romanticizing
"the world we have lost" on the one hand and expounding on "the
horrors I have escaped" on the other, while minimizing the degree
of distortion arising from personal bias. At the same time I have
occasionally unearthed evidence of developments which lack printed
documentation. Thus the methodologically demanding will discover
to their displeasure that certain elements of intuitive interpretation
have found their way into these pages. As for the typicality or
representativeness of the area, this depends upon the specific phenomenon under consideration. For a further discussion of this point
the reader is referred to the Conclusions.
In the process of researching and writing this work I have
become indebted to numerous individuals in various positions and
places. I wish particularly to thank Professor Earl Pomeroy of the
University of Oregon and Professor John C. Hudson, now of the
Geography Department at Northwestern University, for encourage-
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ment during the initial investigation of the topic. The staffs of
the Extension Division of the University of Nebraska College of
Agriculture and of the Nebraska State Historical Society proved
very helpful. County officials in the courthouses at Ord and
Greeley deserve praise for the patience with which they put up
with their peculiar intruder over the course of several years. Professors Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., and Maris Vinovskis of the University of Michigan read early drafts of the manuscript and offered
helpful criticisms and encouragement. Finally, an expression of
gratitude is due Professor Allan G. Bogue of the University of
Wisconsin, who provided counsel and reassurance on numerous
occasions when the project appeared on the verge of dissolution.

xu

1. The Formation of an
Agricultural Region

ON A WARM JUNE DAY in 1871 four travel-weary figures reached the
summit of a hill overlooking the North Loup River valley in the
plains of central Nebraska. The four had been dispatched in
search of new farm lands by the members of a Seventh-Day Baptist
colony in Waushara County, Wisconsin. After surveying the landscape before them they decided not to proceed any farther upstream
since the area appeared too isolated to justify settling there. The
disheartened travelers then returned to Wisconsin and formally
reported their findings to their church brethren. However, C. P.
Rood, the youngest and most impetuous of the four, vigorously
dissented from the majority opinion and strongly advocated moving
to the Loup country. Later in the year he returned to the region
accompanied by several other young Baptists and examined the
land in greater detail. The following spring those enthusiasts and
a number of their coreligionists moved permanently to Nebraska
where they settled near the site of the future village of North Loup.1
Earlier that spring five Danish immigrants had arrived in the
same vicinity. Niels Anderson, Christian Frey, Jeppe Smith, George
Miller (Moeller), and Peter Mortensen had become acquainted in
the state of Missouri where they formed a partnership to try their
luck at settling farther west. Under the leadership of Miller, a
veteran of the Australian gold rushes, they acquired several teams
of oxen and a wagon together with breaking plow and other farm
implements and moved to Nebraska. Initially they halted near St.
Paul in Howard County, the center of a large Danish settlement.
On finding the best lands there already taken up they decided to
move northward along the North Loup River. As the five prepared
to settle near the location chosen by the Baptists they learned of
the latters' plans and again moved northward, ultimately settling
on Dane Creek just west of the North Loup River near the present
site of Ord. Shortly thereafter several families of homesteaders
moved into the Springdale vicinity on the east side of the river
across from the Danish group and the settlement process began
in earnest. 2
1
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The Loup valley region to which these early pioneers came lies
one hundred and fifty miles west of Omaha in the transition zone
between the central prairies and the Great Plains. To the north
and west stretch the seemingly endless Nebraska sand hills, today
a sparsely populated area of rolling, grass-covered hills and large
cattle ranches. To the south and east the hills give way to the
Platte River valley, a flat prairie region that extends westward
across the state. The Loup country itself includes over nine hundred square miles of hills, rolling uplands, and river valleys. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the region, even today,
consists of its complete rurality and isolation from any urban
center. The largest town in the area does not exceed twenty-five
hundred souls while no city of more than fifty thousand inhabitants
lies within a driving distance of over a hundred miles. The chief
urban center serving the area, the city of Grand Island, lies near
the Platte River forty miles south of the region. s

Figure 1. The Loup Valley Region, Nebraska.

Virtually all of the original land surface of the Loup country
lies buried beneath a thick mantle of Peoria loess. This is a gray,
limy silt whose derivative soils produce good crops but erode easily.
Although at one time the terrain consisted of a nearly level plain,
centuries of continued wind and stream erosion have carved an
uneven landscape of hills, rolling uplands, terraces, and bottom
lands. In upland areas of low relief, farmers generally cultivate the
soil while in hilly areas they leave it in pasture. Sandy soils occupy
about one-tenth of the surface and are generally left in grass. These
sandy patches occur chiefly along the river bottoms and in Eureka
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precinct in the northwestern corner of Valley County. The bottom
lands, which vary in width from a half mile to three miles or more,
consist largely of black soils rich in nitrogen due to the presence of
organic matter accumulated from decayed grass roots. Such soils
retain moisture well and are easily penetrable, thus prove ideally
suited for the production of corn. These bottom lands and the
terraces which lie a short distance above them cover about 15 percent of the total land area and, owing to their flatness, experience
little erosion. Consequently farmers continue to crop them heavily
save for the sandy areas left in grass. 4
WHEELER COUNTY
GARFIELD COUNTY

LOUPCOUNTY

Sargent

Cornn

Elyna

Eureka

Noble

":",,
ElynaVil..
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Vd
SHERMAN COUNTY
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Figure 2. The Loup Country.

The North Loup and Middle Loup River systems flow through
the region in a southeasterly direction and provide most areas with
good drainage. These rivers flow along wide, shallow channels
studded with numerous sand bars and small islands and bordered
by low, grassy banks. The North Loup River has an exceptionally
even flow the year round owing to the fact that both it and its
major tributary, the Calamus River, rise in the sand hills where
they are continuously fed by large underground springs. Broad
areas of the adjacent bottom lands lie only a few feet above the
river levels. These lowlands average from eighty to one hundred
and fifty feet below the level of the rolling uplands. 5
Like the rest of central Nebraska the Loup country experiences
a distinctly continental climate with hot summers and cold winters.
The mean annual temperature at North Loup averages 49.2 degrees,
rising from a monthly low of 21.8 degrees in January to a high of

4
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75.4 degrees in July. The record extremes reported at the same
station include an all time high of 114 degrees and a record low of
-39 degrees. The average growing season of 147 days suffices for
the production of corn, wheat, and other cereal grain crops. Annual
precipitation normally totals slightly over twenty-three inches of
which about 80 percent takes the form of rain that falls during the
growing season from April through September. Although the
spring months usually bring considerable amounts of moisture, dry
spells commonly occur in the critical months of July and August
while dry autumns facilitate the harvesting of corn and sorghum.
Snowfall averages from twenty-two to twenty-five inches annually
but varies widely from year to year as does total precipitation. 6
This variability in precipitation has strongly influenced agriculture in the region from the period of initial settlement. Because
the mean average rainfall closely corresponds to the minimum
amount needed to produce fair crops, a deviation of as much as
five inches may significantly affect local yields-much more so than
in the relatively humid regions to the east. Variations of this
magnitude occurred during thirty of the eighty years represented
in figure 3. In thirteen instances a subnormal amount of mois~ure
fell while in seventeen others precipitation exceeded the average.
Hence we find normal years frequently interspersed with years of
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Figure 3. Precipitation by Year, North Loup, Nebraska, 1890-1969.
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abnormal wetness or drouth. This variability also appears in local
crop yield records which fluctuate widely from year to year. Longterm variations in rainfall also occur although the use of the term
wet and dry cycles misleads the reader by implying a degree of
regularity that does not exist. Thus, although precipitation during
the 1920s averaged two inches per year above the long-term average,
four of the years included in that decade saw subnormal rainfall.
Even during the exceptionally dry decade from 1934 through 1943
one year experienced five inches more rainfall than normal. Furthermore, wet and dry cycles do not regularly recur in the sense of
periodic cycles a certain number of years in length. One should
also bear in mind that these figures do not necessarily indicate the
actual moisture conditions present during a given year. First, the
rainfall may occur at the wrong time of the year. A three-week
dry spell in July or August may devastate a corn crop even though
total rainfall that year exceeds the average. In addition, much of
the rain takes the form of sudden, brief thundershowers which
produce a rapid runoff with minimal soil penetration. The only
visible result of such a storm may lie in the heavy erosion effected
and in the accumulation of small pools of water in low-lying places.
Clearly then, the problem of water supply is a crucial one for local
agricultural enterprises. 7
When the first white settlers appeared in the region they found
the landscape covered by a sea of native grasses among which the
big and little bluestem and the grama varieties dominated. Needle
grass and sand grass flourished in the sandy upland areas, and
buffalo grass also grew in some profusion. Myriad varieties of wild
flowers added a touch of color to an otherwise monotonous scene.
Trees rarely appeared in the grasslands but clustered in groves
along the watercourses and in some of the canyons in the area. Red
cedars proved of particular utility for firewood, fencing material,
and building construction, but the first comers quickly denuded the
cedar canyons of their timber. Common varieties of broadleaf trees
included the ash, elm, willow, cottonwood, and box elder together
with a sprinkling of oak and hackberry.s
Animal life abounded both in the grassy uplands and along the
various streams. The presence of a variety of fur-bearing animals
including the mink, beaver, muskrat, and otter encouraged trapping
activity on the part of early settlers. Game animals appeared in
large numbers, making the region a hunter's paradise. Numerous
deer roamed the area including members of the red, white-tailed,

6
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and black-tailed varieties. Pronghorn antelope were also common
while large herds of elk grazed peacefully in the wilderness. Herds
of the latter frequently reached three hundred or more in number.
Buffalo rarely appeared even during the seventies for by then the
major herds had already begun to disappear. The prairie teemed
with numerous species of fowl, and wild geese, quail, and prairie
chickens appeared on many a frontiersman's dining table. Although
an occasional wildcat or wolf might invade the area the coyote
remained the chief predator.9

II

Prior to the appearance of white settlers the Loup country
formed part of the holdings of the Skidi branch of the Pawnee, a
sedentary Indian tribe long dominant in central Nebraska. Early
French explorers translated the name Skidi as loup} or wolf, thus
giving the rivers and the region their present name. During the
nineteenth century a series of epidemics, particularly smallpox,
decimated the Pawnee villages, and in 1857 the tribe ceded most
of its lands to the federal government. After that date relatively
few Indians appeared in the region although early settlers encountered occasional individuals or hunting parties on their way to the
Niobrara hunting grounds to the north. Despite an Indian scare
set off by a minor skirmish in Garfield County in 1873, Indian-white
conflict never materialized in the area.lO
White settlement in central Nebraska got under way during the
early seventies following the construction of a railroad bridge across
the Missouri River in 1872. The Union Pacific had completed the
Omaha to Cheyenne segment of its transcontinental line in 1867
while the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad reached Kearney
from Lincoln in 1872. The town of Grand Island lay astride the
Union Pacific track some hundred and fifty miles southwest of
Omaha and served as the point of departure for most persons
seeking land in the Loup and North Loup River areas. To a lesser
degree Kearney served a similar function for homesteaders bound
for the Middle Loup valley.u
As noted above homesteaders began arriving in the North Loup
valley in 1872. White settlement in the Middle Loup valley began
the following year as land seekers advanced along the river from
Loup City in Sherman County. By 1874 half a dozen families had
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settled near the river, and in that year the government established
a post office to serve the farm community in what is now Arcadia
township. Those traveling to the Middle Loup region left Kearney
or Grand Island and moved overland until they reached the river,
then turned northwestward and advanced along the stream via
Sherman County. Others left Kearney and traveled directly to their
claims in the area west of the river in Custer County. Homesteaders
bound for the North Loup region usually reached Grand Island by
train, then traveled overland to St. Paul in Howard County. There
they forded the Loup River and advanced to the northwest along
the west bank of the North Loup River. As the Baptist elders had
foreseen, the necessity for hauling in all goods and shipping out all
farm produce over a fifty-mile wagon route greatly retarded the
economic development of the region. Half a dozen years after
pioneers had filed the first land claims the population of Valley
County stood at less than one thousand. 12
Other factors also operated to discourage migration into the
area. An Indian scare swept the region in 1873 although no attacks
ever materialized. Even more discouraging, a series of drouths and
grasshopper infestations plagued the area from 1873 through 1876.
The most critical period followed the arrival of great clouds of
Rocky Mountain locusts in the summer of 1874. During the next
two years locusts and drouths again curtailed most crops, but
although times were not prosperous the widespread destitution of
1874-1875 did not recur. The population of Valley County which
rose by only twenty persons from 1874 to 1875 advanced more
rapidly thereafter, reaching 809 in 1877. 13
The natural disasters of the mid-seventies ended with the onset
of a series of wet years in 1877. During the next five years the
population of Valley County rose by nearly four hundred persons
annually. With the arrival of the Union Pacific Railroad spur at
North Loup in 1882 the rate of increase leaped to a thousand per
year. By 1885 Valley County had nearly six thousand residents and
the region as a whole included nearly nine thousand. This phase
of rapid expansion ceased two years later owing to a variety of
factors including unfavorable agricultural prices, a decline in rainfall, and the fact that settlers had taken up most of the available
land. The census of 1890 revealed a relatively modest population
growth of about 20 percent for the preceding five years. More than
half of this figure came from natural increase while the remainder
represented the last influx of pioneers. 14

8
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Most of the native-born settlers who migrated into the region
during the seventies and eighties came from the north central states.
About half of the total came from the tier of states extending from
Ohio to Iowa, including Michigan and Wisconsin. The leading
source of migrants farther east was New York which furnished
one-fifth of the native-born although many of these probably moved
into the region from intermediate states. With one exception immigrants from abroad did not appear until the eighties. Several Danes
appeared in 1872 and others joined them soon thereafter, reflecting
the presence of a large Danish colony in Howard County just south
of the region. The Danes settled near Ord and in 1890 accounted
for about one-ninth of the foreign-born in Valley County. The
Germans, most of them protestants, included more than one-sixth
of the immigrants and settled in the southern and southeastern
parts of the region. The largest single ethnic group consisted of
the Bohemians who settled near Ord and in the uplands of northwestern Valley County. They remained the most cohesive of the
various ethnic groups-scarcely any of them settled outside of northwestern Valley County and northeastern Custer County. The Poles
arrived last and scattered among the Bohemians west and north of
Ord. In number they about equalled the Danes. The remaining
immigrants came from a wide variety of backgrounds but did not
include more than about one-fourth of the foreign-born, the Bohemians accounting for more than one-third of the total.1 5
As agricultural settlement progressed a network of villages
sprang up to serve the commercial and political needs of the
population. North Loup, Arcadia, and Sargent developed slowly
as trade centers in the period prior to the arrival of the railroad
and then experienced considerable growth. Scotia and Ord began
their careers as county seats for Greeley and Valley counties respectively, although Scotia later lost this function and declined to the
status of a regular agricultural marketing center. Comstock and
Elyria materialized following the completion of the Union Pacific
and Burlington spurs in the North Loup valley in the mid-1880s
and the Burlington spur in the Middle Loup valley in 1899. Elyria
never grew beyond the hamlet stage but Comstock had become a
thriving small town by 1910. 16

III
Following the period of initial settlement during the seventies
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and early eighties the agricultural economy of the Loup country
underwent several basic modifications which appear in the census
statistics for Valley County in table 1. The most significant change

TABLE 1
AGRICULTURE TRENDS IN VALLEY COUNTY

1880-1910
Census Year
Number of farms
Acres per farm
Acres of corn per farm
Acres of wheat per farm
Acres of oats per farm
Milk cows per farm
Other cattle per farm
Swine per farm
Tenancy rate (%)
Value of machinery
per farm ($)

1880

1890

1900

1910

467
182
6
9
3
1.5
4.3
2.1
4.3

990
233
42
12
4.5
11.4
36.4
30.0

1085
287
49
62
9
3.9
15.9
26.6
32.7

1272
269
77
20
16
4.9
20.4
43.1
35.4

78

155

177

302

11

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910, Agriculture.

involved the shift from a semisubsistence economy based upon
wheat to a commercialized corn-livestock production pattern. As
early as 1881 a local newspaper correspondent had pointed out the
advantages offered by the latter type of farming. These included
reduced transportation charges, lower seed costs, less demand for
expensive machinery, avoidance of labor shortages at the peak of
harvest season, and, of course, increased profitability. The argument
apparently convinced many and by 1890 a transformation had taken
place. The agricultural census of that year revealed that the corn
acreage had risen to four times that of wheat whereas a decade
earlier the wheat acreage had exceeded that of corn. The number
of livestock on local farms more than tripled during the eighties,
further underscoring the growing orientation of the regional
economy toward corn-livestock production,l7
This movement toward increased livestock raising faltered momentarily with the onset of a series of dry years after 1887. Particularly disastrous drouths brought widespread destitution in 1890

10
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and 1894. Farmers sold many of their cattle for lack of pasturage
and stopped raising hogs for lack of feed. In the late nineties the
rains returned and by 1900 the number of cattle in the area had
reached a new high. The swine population remained below the
level of 1890 due chiefly to a series of outbreaks of hog cholera
which devastated many herds and discouraged any further hograising activity. During these trying times farmers temporarily
shifted back to wheat production at the expense of corn. This
movement stemmed from the fact that wheat ripened in July and
could usually be harvested in a dry year whereas corn matured in
late August or September and thus remained susceptible to drouth
for a longer period. Moreover, even at their worst, wheat prices
remained substantially higher than corn prices which sank to new
lows during the decade. 1S
Other changes also affected the agricultural scene during the
dry years of the nineties. Farmers supported the construction of
two irrigation canals, one in Douglas Grove township in Custer
County and the other in North Loup township in Valley County.
Other irrigation projects won voter approval, but the return of
rains after 1894 induced widespread apathy and the other proposed
developments never passed the planning stage. The two canals
which did go into operation watered an area of about thirteen
thousand acres for several years. Due to faulty construction they
soon lapsed into a state of disrepair and disuse and efforts by
various groups to revive them proved unavailing. Nonetheless,
they did provide an inspiration for farmers in later decades when
recurring drouth revived interest in irrigation.19
Drouth conditions also stimulated experimentation with new
crops. During the nineties farmers near North Loup began growing
significant amounts of popcorn. This product fetched a premium
price because its dryness made it immediately usable in contrast to
most popcorn which required storage and drying. By the turn of
the century Valley County growers had several thousand acres of
this crop under cultivation. Experimenters also tried their hand at
growing potatoes and sugar beets, but the latter attempt proved a
complete failure and potato production generally sufficed only to
meet local demand. Farmers also grew limited amounts of flax,
millet, and sorghum. More significantly, alfalfa, which had first
appeared locally in 1882, came into its own as the major tame hay
crop in the region just after the turn of the century.20
Two other indicators of agricultural change during this period
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deserve consideration at this point. First, the average value of
machinery per farm rose substantially. The figure doubled in the
eighties due to the shift from localized production to commercial
activity following the arrival of the railroad. During the nineties
the value of machinery rose only slightly although this resulted
primarily from the general price deflation of the period. The first
decade of the twentieth century, however, brought an average increase of 71 percent. While many farmers acquired their first
small-grain binders and cream separators at this time, most of their
expenditures for machinery reflected the purchase of additional
equipment such as wagons, cultivators, and the like rather than the
adoption of new inventions. 21
The final two decades of the nineteenth century also brought a
sharp rise in farm tenancy. To some degree this development arose
as a consequence of the disappearance of cheap land and the increasing capital costs of farming. Hard times during the late eighties
and early nineties caused a considerable degree of mortgage foreclosure activity which also contributed to the rise in tenancy. Furthermore, a considerable proportion of the landowners in the region
reached retirement age and rented their holdings to sons or other
relatives. Altogether by 1910 nearly a third' of the farm operators
in Valley County rented their farms, a proportion which remained
stable during the next decade. About half of these tenants appear
to have been relatives of the actual landowners, judging from the
sample examined below in chapter 7. 22

IV
Over the course of four decades the Loup country completed
the transition from a virtually unpopulated wilderness to a moderately productive agricultural region. By 1910 it boasted a population of more than fourteen thousand persons, a third of whom
resided in the villages scattered along the North Loup and Middle
Loup valleys. The remaining two-thirds occupied the two thousand
farmsteads that dotted the countryside. The large white farmhouses,
red barns and other improvements bore witness to the prosperity
that marked rural society. The booming towns, too, included their
quota of new structures, both residential and commercial. Following a decade of prosperity and substantial population growth the
region appeared headed for a golden future.

12

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

Among the area's inhabitants the local community commanded
a high degree of loyalty and concern as the region experienced a
substantial degree of autonomy in terms of those functions impinging on the everyday life of the average person. County government
handled the problems of welfare, tax assessment, bridge maintenance, law enforcement, and the like. The township bore the
responsibility for maintaining rural roads, and the even smaller
school district provided education for farm children under the eyes
of their parents and neighbors. The role of the federal and state
governments remained limited. In an era of relative international
stability questions of foreign policy or of military affairs appeared
remote and far less relevant to daily life than the operation of the
post office. Likewise the activity of the state government in providing welfare institutions, prisons, and a system of higher education had only an indirect impact upon the community.
A similar degree of autonomy characterized most of the other
institutions in rural society. The churches in the countryside and
in the villages drew their ministers from the ranks of farm and
small-town natives and geared their services to the needs of the
individual congregation or parish. Links with national church
organizations remained tenuous and generally concerned such remote matters as the operation of foreign missions and the like.
Although lodges and other formal social organizations maintained
linkages with state and national hierarchies, such connections
rarely led to participation beyond the local or district level. The
schools remained in the hands of community residents who continued to operate them in time-honored fashion. Thus to the outsider rural society in the Loup country might well have exemplified
stability, conservatism, and autonomy-a relatively self-contained
and self-regulating social order.
Such a description might also have applied at the subregional
level. Even within the region ethnic enclaves existed apart from
each other. The Bohemians, Irish, Poles and old stock Americans
rarely intermingled and even within the ethnocultural group localism pervaded the individual consciousness. The basic unit of
social identification for the farmer revolved about the farm community, usually coterminous with the elementary school district.
Competition between different neighborhoods for county funds for
road maintenance and bridge construction provided the major
issues in county politics. Thus one might describe the early twentieth-century rural dweller's conception of society as a hierarchy
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the reverse of that apparent to the outsider. That is, the home
community appeared the most significant unit of society and the
county the dominant political unit, whereas state and national institutions receded into the background as less directly meaningful
or influential.
Such a picture distorts to some degree the actual conditions that
characterized the area, however. For while certain elements of local
autonomy did exist in the political and social spheres, relationships
with national economic institutions directly influenced the day to
day life and activity of the individual citizen, farmer, and townsman
alike. Because of the partially commercialized nature of the agricultural economy no one remained entirely independent of national
economic currents. This basic fact received daily confirmation in
the operation of three major economic forces affecting farmers and
merchants-commodity prices, the availability and cost of capital,
and the cost of transportation.
In romantic legend and occasionally within his own imagination
the farmer appeared as an independent yeoman who owed no man
and who lived unaffected by the economic forces about him. In
times of depression when the urban masses wandered the streets in
search of food and shelter he had a roof over his head and could
provide his own food supply. In reality such idealized conditions
rarely existed. The typical farmer owed money either to banks or
other financial institutions or to individuals and could not withstand adverse price conditions for more than a few years. He must
have cash profits or he stood to lose his farm. He also required
certain types of manufactured goods even in the hardest of times,
a condition which further necessitated the availability of cash. The
village merchant likewise found himself susceptible to price changes
which could ruin his business. Deflation could result in large losses
at the inventory level. Inflation might price his goods out of the
market. Should farm prices rise less rapidly than industrial prices
his sales potential would shrink correspondingly. Thus the retailer
proved susceptible not only to general price trends but also to
shifts in the relationship between farm and industrial commodity
prices.
Since most farmers and many merchants owed money they
naturally took a strong interest in the conditions affecting the
national credit system. Circumstances in New York City ultimately
determined western interest rates and these rates in turn could make
the difference between owning or renting a farm. Farmers needed
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short-term loans to see them through the harvest season but they
also had an interest in long-term borrowing, a type of credit which
they found difficult to obtain from most banks. Merchants also
followed the financial market closely, for the inability to obtain a
short-term loan at the critical juncture when one could acquire a
new inventory at favorable prices could make the difference between
profit and loss for the entire year's operation.
Transportation facilities and shipping rates had always played
a key role in the economy of the Loup country. Early settlers had
issued bonds to help finance railroad construction, recognizing its
importance for economic development. But the railroads came to
possess what seemed to many a stranglehold over the agricultural
economy. Should rates rise sharply or even moderately they might
eliminate any prospect of profit for farmer and villager alike. The
recognition of this fact combined with real or imagined abuses by
the railroads themselves resulted in considerable support for the
political crusades that aimed at railroad regulation in the state.
As in other economic conflicts antagonism against the railroads led
to a coalescing of regional sentiment against the outside-i.e., the
economically dominant forces centered in distant cities. It was in
this sphere that the omnipotence of forces beyond community
control became the most evident and resentment of the fact most
acute.
Obviously the forces emanating from national economic institutions had a powerful and poteniially disruptive influence within
the farm community. In the social and political spheres such influences remained potential rather than real. But should conditions
develop which favored the strengthening of supraregional institutions in those areas they could easily take on the same attributes
and exert the same type of impact as did economic institutions.
Such a change would signal a further shift in the location of
decision-making power to centers outside of the region. Decisions
would be reached according to principles characteristic of the rising
urban centers whose interests often directly opposed those of rural
areas. This meant an intensification of political conflict over the
issue of local autonomy versus an increasing degree of centralization.
A general institutional shift in this direction would also lead to a
closer integration of the region into the national society with a
subsequent decline in regional distinctiveness. Hence while the
rural society of the Loup country may have exhibited the outward
appearance of stability in 1910, it contained within it the seeds of
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rapid change of a drastic order. The story of this society in the
twentieth century is that of the realization of those potentials for
change.

2. Directions in Agriculture, 1910-1930

DURING THE SECOND and third decades of the twentieth century the
agricultural economy of the Loup country experienced only minor
changes in its broad outlines. Over the twenty-year period the
acreage devoted to cereal grain production rose by about 3 percent
while animal numbers remained relatively stable. During the teens
farmers increased small-grain production at the expense of corn
although the shift was not very great, involving about a 10 percent
decline in the regional corn acreage. The increase in wheat acreage
partially antedated the outbreak of World War I while barley and
rye production, both relatively minor, grew during the war under
the stimulus of unusually favorable prices. The output of oats
remained fairly stable as most of this grain went to feed horses and
other livestock in the area. With the collapse in prices following
the war small-grain acreage declined by three-fourths and the corn
acreage rose by one-third as the movement toward specialized cornlivestock farming gained new impetus. 1
The rise in small-grain production directly influenced the pace
of mechanization and the pattern of farm labor demand during the
wartime years. Since the level of mechanization in small-grain
production had advanced beyond that for corn, particularly in the
harvesting stage, the shift toward small grain stimulated investment
in farm machinery. At the same time the farm tractor "made its
debut in the region, thereby providing a further incentive for
mechanization. By 1918 enough tractors had come into use in the
area north of Grand Island to encourage officials of the International Harvester firm to sponsor a tractor demonstration school at
St. Paul, just south of the region. In 1920 Valley County farmers
reported a total of forty-six tractors in operation on their farmsteads. 2
As a result of the growing acquisition of farm equipment the
average value of machinery per farm rose sharply during the teens.
The increase from $302 in 1910 to $1,153 in 1920 represented a
74 percent gain when adjusted for inflation. Despite the hard times
of the early twenties the value of machinery and implements per
farm advanced a further 4 percent in constant dollars by 1925. The
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number of farm tractors in Valley County rose by an average of ten
per year from 1920 through 1927. Then, as a certain degree of farm
prosperity returned, the total rose by eighty in 1928 and fifty in
1929. By 1930, 273 farms or 21 percent of the Valley County total
had tractors in operation. The previous year the county agent at
Ord had reported that horses were disappearing from local farms
as their owners expanded the acreage under cultivation and developed tractor farming techniques. The over-all number of horses
in the county declined from an average of 8.8 per farm in 1910 to
6.4 per farm in 1930. Due largely to the growing acquisition of
tractors the value of machinery per farm rose 27.6 percent during
the last half of the twenties even while the general wholesale price
index declined by 16 percent. While this fact offered a clear indication of future trends in the region, the impact upon agricultural
productivity remained limited due to the incomplete utilization of
this power source. Once large-scale tractor-drawn implements began
to appear, however, then a significant revolution in farm productivity could occur.3
Short-term increases in small-grain farming also led to changes
in the pattern of demand for farm labor. Small grain requires
immediate harvest when the plant matures or much of the crop
may be lost. Thus each year a peak labor season of several weeks
duration develops during which the labor force must expand
rapidly. After the outbreak of the war farmers utilized various
methods to secure this essential help. Town residents who had
free time volunteered to assist in harvesting. Some merchants closed
their stores early in the afternoon to help farmers in shocking and
threshing operations. But the continued labor shortage also gave
rise to the adoption of other methods of recruitment. The Custer
County farm extension agent reported that
the sheriff and the police force were busy watching all the trains, seeing that
NONE of the itinerant wanderers were being overlooked. It was also a quite
common occurance at the county agent's office to see the sheriff and the police
force marching in from five to TWENTY so CALLED "Hoboes". Those who
were willing to go to work were given an opportunity and those who refused
were usually given free lodging in the county jail and fed on light diets.

This type of labor did not prove very useful to the farmer. The
editor of the Scotia Register echoed their sentiments when he noted:
"Farmers don't take very kindly to the idea of farm boys going to
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war and town bums being sent to work on the farms ... lots of city
fellows did not know whether alfalfa grew on trees or whether they
dig it out of the ground like potatoes. Experienced labor is needed
on the farm as well as elsewhere." Although the military draft
system provided exemptions for agricultural laborers, not enough
of these were granted to satisfy local demand. However, despite
the multitude of complaints no serious crop losses occurred in the
area during wartime on account of a shortage of harvest hands. 4
During the teens the farmer experienced a degree of financial
well-being which exceeded anything within living memory. The
early part of the decade saw one of the more prosperous periods in
the history of American agriculture. Then came the exceptionally
affluent war years. The new found wealth manifested itself in
various ways. During the war the automobile became the usual
mode of transportation in the region and by 1920 the 1,295 Valley
County farm operators owned 974 of them. Some used their new
crop of dollars to finance improvements in farm buildings or to
buy electric light plants and other household improvements. The
increase in farm mechanization has already been noted. Clearly,
however, these channels did not absorb all surplus farm profits. 5
While some farmers engaged in stock market ventures at this
time, the major avenue for investment lay closer to home in the
form of farm real estate. Prior to the war land values rose substantially although not excessively in view of their income potential. But with the war boom restraint evaporated and prices soared.
Immediately after the war a speculative mania broke out and Valley
County farm prices reached $375 per acre in some instances. Those
who doubted the wisdom of this trend received a strong rebuke
from one booster who wrote: "Twenty years ago men in Valley
County said that land was too high and it could be bought at that
time from ten to fifteen dollars per acre. Now it is a hundred to
a hundred and fifty and more and the same men are saying it is too
high. In ten years it will be worth two hundred and three hundred
dollars per acre .... Why do we always have to have a bunch of
kickers, holding back on the rig of progress?" Shortly thereafter a
real estate agency advertised twenty-six farms for sale on easy credit
with 10 percent cash down, 15 percent due the following March,
and the rest on terms to suit individual needs. The precipitous
drop in farm commodity prices which began midway through 1919
pricked the speculative bubble, however, and land values collapsed.
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The average value of land and buildings in Valley County which
had risen from $42.42 per acre in 1910 to $99.11 in 1920 (after the
decline had already begun) fell to $60.70 in 1925. With this price
decline many of the tracts which had gone for astronomical sums
reverted to their original owners who had taken mortgages from
the purchasers. A high proportion of those farmers who managed
to retain possession of the land which they bought at this time did
so only by acquiring burdensome debts which they could not liquidate before the end of the following decade when the entire agricultural economy collapsed. 6
Late in 1919 farm prices began to tumble and wartime affluence
disappeared even more rapidly than it had come. Between July
and December of that year hog prices fell from $20.40 to $12.20
per live hundredweight, and by the end of 1920 they had sunk
further to a mere $8.00. Corn prices for the corresponding dates
fell from $1.72 to $1.24 and then to $0.42 per bushel. The farm
purchasing power index (see Appendix) dropped from an average
of 113 in 1919 to 102 in 1920 and a mere 72 in 1921. The latter
was the lowest for any year of the twentieth century up to that
time, and coming as it did at the end of the boom it appeared even
more severe. Many farmers who had recently acquired land found
themselves in an untenable situation and went under. As a consequence, the tenancy rate for Valley County which had risen by
about 3 percent in the two previous decades jumped from 38.2
percent in 1920 to 45.5 percent in 1925. 7
Conditions remained hard for the farmer until 1924 when agricultural commodity prices began rising rapidly. By 1925 the worst
had passed and a five-year period of moderate prosperity ensued.
During these years the farm purchasing power index averaged 96
compared with a figure of 100 during the five prewar years of
1910-1914. The new influx of profits went to finance mechanization, the purchase of new automobiles, and additional farm and
home improvements. At the same time certain fundamental weaknesses in the regional agricultural economy remained evident. The
tenancy rate remained at a high level while the mortgage load
burden continued virtually unchanged. Farmers who paid off
their mortgages during these years generally did so by acquiring
new ones. So long as prices remained favorable all seemed well.
But should the price situation suddenly deteriorate the basic fragility of the farm economy would become only too readily apparent. s
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II

At the time of World War I the concept of diversified farming
gained an increasing degree of support among residents of the Loup
country. Shortly after the postwar collapse in farm prices a local
writer warned against over-dependence on a one-crop economy. In
his words, "The Cow, the Sow and the Hen offer emancipation from
present grueling business conditions." The crop and livestock statistics for the region in the teens and twenties reveal that a trend
toward diversification within an increasingly specialized corn-based
economy did develop. That is, while the relative acreage of crops
other than corn diminished, at the same time farmers expanded
their output of dairy and poultry products. The development of
dairying proved to be the most significant element of this movement toward diversification. Prior to this time gathering stations
for creameries in distant cities had bought cream from Loup country farmers but the volume of business had remained limited for
a number of reasons. Major changes must occur in the production
process and in the marketing sphere before the region could develop a substantial dairying interest. Although specialized dairy
farming of the type common in states to the east never developed,
cream production did become a major income producing sideline
on most farms in the area for some decades. 9
Prospective dairymen faced several major obstacles in their
efforts to establish profitable operations. The first involved the
quality of their livestock and the necessity for improving the dairy
animal itself. Most of the cows milked in the region prior to 1930
belonged to the major beef breeds. Consequently their yield of
butterfat per unit of feed consumed ran substantially below that
of specialized dairy animals since much of the feed was converted
to meat. Farmers who milked these animals may not have realized
any actual profit when feed costs were taken into account, but
milking did produce a regular cash income, an item greatly in
demand among the farm population. As late as 1930 the dual
purpose cow accounted for 79 percent of the animals milked in
Valley County. At that date numerous farmers still preferred these
animals to dairy breeds. As one of them explained, the cow raised
chiefly for beef purposes provided "extra" income by producing
milk. The dual purpose animal also reputedly consumed much of
the rough feed that went to waste when only dairy animals were
kept. This conception of dairying as a basically supplementary
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activity prevailed on most general and livestock farms in the vicinity. Nonetheless, a number of dairy enthusiasts did seek to
remedy the situation. 10
Obviously the solution to the problem of low-producing cows
lay in the substitution of better animals. Owing to the absence of
a dairying tradition in central Nebraska farmers had to import
their purebred animals from the established dairying regions of
Minnesota and Wisconsin. A variety of dairy breeds came into the
area-Holstein-Friesian, Guernsey, Jersey, Ayrshire, and Brown
Swiss among them. The county extension agents made annual trips
to dairying regions to buy animals for local farmers. The rural
press also carried numerous suggestions for improving herds. A
leading dairy farmer in the area advised prospective dairymen to
acquire one or two purebred cows or heifers and a purebred bull,
keeping his red cows while he gradually produced his own purebred herd. In a few years he could sell off his red cows, replacing
them with his own dairy animals. However, the fact that most
farmers kept scrub bulls for breeding purposes rendered the problem of improvement more difficult. Even if the farmer acquired
purebred dairy cows, by breeding them to inferior bulls he greatly
reduced the production level of their offspring. The simplest solution to this problem lay in the importation of purebred dairy bulls,
but this rarely happened. Not until the late thirties did major
progress come in this sphere. l l
In order to evaluate the performance of individual animals for
culling and breeding purposes dairy operators established several
testing associations. The rural press also carried numerous items
explaining the proper procedures for testing. The common beef
cow tested from 2.5 to 4 percent butterfat compared with Jersey
cows which averaged from 4 to 6 percent. At this time the average
milk cow in the state produced about 120 pounds of butterfat
annually, a figure which was probably close to that of the Loup
country animals. The dairy cows that the Custer County agent
imported from other states averaged a minimum of three hundred
pounds annually which he estimated produced a profit equal to
that from ten average Nebraska COWS. 12
Dairy farmers and creamery managers recommended a variety of
feeding programs to maximize milk production in cows of all
breeds. Various individuals utilized different combinations of
ground corn, bran, alfalfa, and oil meal in their operations. But
the most widely discussed development in dairy livestock feeding
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revolved about the construction of silos and the use of chopped
ensilage. Silos first appeared in the region about 1910 in a variety
of shapes and forms. Implement dealers offered wooden upright
silos for sale while some farmers constructed trench silos and others
adapted old cisterns for silo purposes. Several obstacles combined
to prevent the general adoption of this practice, however. One
difficulty stemmed from the fact that corn must be cut at the proper
time of the year to avoid spoilage. Farmers eventually determined
this date by the trial and error method, but other problems persisted. Although ensilage provided a relatively cheap feed its production involved considerable initial expense. The farmer must
construct a silo, purchase equipment including a stalk binder, field
cutter, and engine, and must hire the labor to fill the silo. In
addition, the best time for filling silos coincided with the optimum
time for sowing winter wheat. This made it impossible for a
farmer to do both. Consequently acceptance of the silo remained
limited during most of the teens and twenties and only thirty-one
of the structures appeared in the agricultural statistics for Valley
County in 1930.13
The farmer who had resolved the immediate problems of acquiring good dairy cows and providing them with a proper feeding
regimen next faced the difficulty of getting his cream to a buyer
before it spoiled. As much as a week might elapse between the
time he milked a cow and the time when the cream arrived at the
local creamery or gathering station. Cooling equipment remained
virtually unknown with an occasional milkhouse the only concession to progress on this point. Milking equipment in general remained primitive with most farmers possessing only a few pails and
a separator. Consequently creamery managers raised an unending
stream of complaints about the quality of the cream that they
received. The Sargent manager in 1912 reported that only 4 percent
of local cream tested as grade one, 35 percent tested fair, and 61
percent was bad. Several years later his Comstock counterpart complained that his firm could have paid an extra four cents per pound
for butterfat to producers and still realized additional profits if all
cream received at his plant had arrived in good condition. 14
Limited marketing facilities early in the twentieth century
further hampered the expansion of dairying in the area. Before
the war centralized creameries in Omaha and other cities had established gathering stations in most of the Loup country villages.
These stations provided a limited market and farmers considered
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their prices unreasonably low. Early in the teens farmers and villagers established co-operative creameries in Arcadia, Comstock,
North Loup, Ord, and Sargent. All of them failed within a few
years and for much the same reasons. One problem lay in the difficulty of securing competent management in an area that lacked
any kind of established dairying tradition. More significantly, the
available supply of cows proved too small to sustain operations.
Farmers compounded this difficulty by dividing their patronage
between creameries and gathering stations. Not until they came to
adopt the basic co-operative principles of the Rochdale system
could co-operative creameries flourish in the area. 15
In the mid-twenties the proponents of home-town dairy processing finally achieved success, and creameries sprang up in most
villages in the region while a cheese factory began operations in
North Loup. The career of most of these firms paralleled that of
the largest, the Ord Co-operative Creamery. Earlier failures in Ord
had reduced interest in such an enterprise but by 1926 conditions
appeared propitious for a new undertaking. The initial impetus
for establishing a creamery came from both farmers and merchants.
The farmer anticipated higher prices for his cream should a village
processor appear while merchants felt that a creamery would bring
more money into town. In the spring of 1926 a creamery building
firm's representative arrived in Ord and met with farmers and
members of the Commercial Club to discuss business prospects.
The sale of shares in the creamery began in June and by early
September the necessary funds had been accumulated. In the middle of that month a hundred persons, chiefly farmers, met and set
up the business organization of the firm. Construction of the
creamery plant began later in the month and the first shipment of
finished butter left for New York in December. During its first year
of operation the co-operative churned nearly three hundred thousand pounds of butter, paid out dividends of more than ten thousand dollars, and retained a fifteen thousand dollar profit. Business
continued to prosper for the remainder of the decade in this as in
most other creameries in the region. 16
Poultry and egg production offered another alternative to the
farmer seeking to diversify his sources of income. Receipts from
these operations in Valley County nearly tripled in terms of constant dollars between 1909 and 1929. For the most part poultry
growing remained in the domain of the farm housewife, and the
agricultural census of 1930 reported only three poultry farms in
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the entirety of Valley County that year. Several factors accounted
for this lack of interest in specialized poultry production. A poor
system of grading eggs resulted in low prices. Various poultry
diseases infected local flocks with cholera proving particularly
severe. Also, many housewives delayed culling well past the proper
season, thereby increasing feed costs and creating the impression
that poultry raising lacked much profit potential. Most farmers
did not consider it worthwhile to put additional time and effort
into increasing productivity, and the possibility of profitable largescale poultry operations did not gain general recognition.17
Because of deficiencies in the agricultural census data for these
years one cannot determine precisely the changes in th~ relative
significance of different sources of farm income during this period.
It appears, however, that the over-all share derived from the sale
of livestock products rose from about 7 percent in 1909 to about
14 percent in 1929. In the latter year Valley County farmers received about 70 percent of their cash income from the sale of livestock and the remaining 16 percent from crop sales. The figures
for production and sales further reveal an important shift toward
commercial production on the part of dairy and poultry operations
during this period. In 1909 farmers churned more than half their
butterfat production at home and sold about one-third of this
butter to stores or to individuals. By 1919 the proportion of butterfat churned at home had fallen to one-third of which only about
one-tenth was sold. With the rise of local creameries during the
twenties home churning fell to less than one-eighth of the butterfat
produced in 1929 and the sale of home-churned butter virtually
ceased. Among poultry growers the proportion of chickens and
eggs produced which actually went to market rose more slowly. The
proportion of eggs sold inched upward from 56 percent in 1909 to
59 percent in 1919 and to 64 percent in 1929. The proportion of
chickens marketed remained unchanged during the teens but rose
from 22 to 34 percent during the twenties. 18
Despite the growing interest in dairy and poultry production
the raising and finishing of livestock for slaughter remained the
primary source of income among Loup country farmers throughout
the teens and twenties. Hog production which rose by nearly half
during the first decade of the twentieth century experienced a
severe decline during the teens and early twenties owing to outbreaks of hog cholera. The first major epidemic since the nineties
erupted in the summer of 1913. The outbreak coincided with a

26

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

heat wave which caused unusually heavy losses. The situation
worsened when many farmers found it impossible to obtain the
serum necessary for inoculating uninfected animals. The vaccine
shortage and the high cost of inoculation-ninety cents per animal
plus a fee for each farm visit-aroused considerable hostility toward
the veterinarians. The fact that vaccine easily deteriorated and
sometimes proved ineffective added further to the farmer's resentment. Following an outbreak in 1919 the local incidence of hog
cholera subsided and throughout the twenties the number of swine
remained close to the 1909 level,19
Hog production remained a sideline operation on most farms
in much the same way as dairying. Some farmers did specialize in
swine growing, however. One such individual near Ord received
fifteen hundred dollars for a purebred Poland China boar in 1918,
and another sold Poland China breeding stock to buyers in other
states. Generally speaking, however, local hogs were heavy, lardtype animals weighing over three hundred pounds. The Lutz
brothers who lived near Arcadia operated a specialized hog farm
typical of those in the area. In a normal year they farrowed a
hundred sows in the spring and rebred half of these for fall litters.
They scheduled breeding so as to allow the handling of pigs in
lots of a hundred to hundred fifty animals. Following this procedure they usually produced twelve to fifteen hundred pigs annually. Brood sows ranged through the fields with access to alfalfa
stacks in the spring while receiving corn for grain. The farm operators weaned their pigs at eight or nine weeks of age and vaccinated them shortly thereafter. These pigs reached marketable size
after an average of six to eight months. The owners estimated that
with this type of operation an individual farmer could raise from
five to seven hundred pigs annually with his own labor. Specialized
farms of this type proved relatively uncommon, however. 2o
Although the sale of finished cattle remained by far the largest
single source of farm income in the region the number of animals
rose by less than 3 percent during these decades. A few individuals
worked hard to improve the quality of their livestock but progress
came very slowly. The major advances that did occur came in the
area of disease prevention and control. Blackleg posed the major
disease threat to cattle in the teens. At first prevention proved
difficult because the vaccine lacked long-term effectiveness. Consequently an animal had to be reinoculated four or five times until
it reached the age where it acquired lifelong immunity. In 1919
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a new vaccine which conferred permanent immunity came onto the
market and within four years had come into general use in the
region. 21
Other diseases also posed threats to the cattle grower's operations. An outbreak of contagious abortion occurred in 1922. Shipping fever remained endemic in the area but in the mid-twenties
scientists developed a vaccine for the disease which came into
general use later in the decade. The most difficult problem by that
time concerned bovine tuberculosis which reached the Loup region
late in the teens. Following the initial appearance of the disease
in the state in 1914 the legislature adopted measures which provided for testing animals and compensating owners of those found
to be infected and subsequently destroyed. In 1927 a group of
farmers launched a drive to establish Valley County as a tuberculosis test area. Part of the official testing procedure required that
60 percent of the farmers in the county must petition in favor of
the program before it could be instituted. The signatures proved
difficult to obtain, however, particularly when the state lacked the
funds with which to compensate owners of infected animals. In
Custer County farmers voted down an attempt to initiate such a
program and actual tuberculosis testing in the region did not get
under way until the middle of the depression. 22
Changes in crop production during these decades revolved about
the adoption of new seed varieties. Corn growers devoted much
time and energy to the search for better methods of selecting and
testing their seed corn. "Seed Corn Special" trains sponsored by
the railroads passed through the towns bringing agricultural experts
to demonstrate the newest techniques. Certainly at the beginning
of the teens local seed corn was of such poor quality as to make
some improvement necessary. After ten years of educational campaigns on the part of numerous individuals and governmental
agencies local seed samples still had an average germination rate
of less than 70 percent. Progress came very slowly and Valley
County corn yields remained stagnant, averaging 24.4 bushels per
acre in 1914-1917 and 24.3 bushels per acre in 1926-1929.23
Somewhat more impressive advances came in the area of smallgrain production. Many farmers adopted new varieties of seed
which raised yields enough to offset the effects of declining soil
fertility in the area. By 1920 wheat yields had declined substantially from earlier levels due to this factor and to the spread of rust.
In that year the Valley County agent imported a carload of the new
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rust-resistant Kanred strain of wheat. Within two years nearly 80
percent of all wheat sown in the county belonged to this variety.
Similar if less rapid changes occurred in barley and rye production.
In the three years after 1919 most farmers adopted the Rosen
variety of rye while later in the twenties a number of farmers
adopted the Comfort strain of barley. Oats production remained
virtually unchanged throughout the entire period with no major
advances in productivity.24
Some farmers also experimented with new crops but achieved
no major success. Various enthusiasts sought to promote vegetable
production in the hopes of stimulating the growth of a local canning industry, but to no avail. Sugar-beet growers found themselves
hamstrung by their inability to obtain crop quota and processing
agreements. Thus by default popcorn remained the major specialty
crop of the region. Popcorn production remained relatively limited
for several decades after its introduction but the acreage devoted to
the crop rose from less than a thousand in 1917 to nearly seven
thousand in 1919. Initially one firm in Chicago handled virtually
the entire output of the area. Early in the teens, however, disgruntled farmers formed a Popcorn Crowers Association at North Loup,
the center of popcorn production. This group worked actively to
develop alternative market outlets for the crop. By the early twenties the popcorn acreage had declined by nearly half. At that time
the growers produced about half of their crop on contract with
local dealers who set prices before spring planting. These prices
ranged from one to three and a half cents per pound depending on
the quality. Late in the decade the crop again grew in significance
and the popcorn acreage expanded to more than eight thousand.
The entire business collapsed with the prolonged drouth of the
thirties, however, and never regained its former significance. 25
Despite a general lack of interest in soil conservation during
these years some farmers did practice crop rotation as a means of
combatting declining soil fertility. Usually they alternated alfalfa
or sweet clover with grain crops. Advocates of this system claimed
that it boosted wheat yields by as much as eight to twelve bushels
per acre. They also credited crop rotation with increasing the
amount of organic matter in the soil, thus improving moisture
retention and increasing resistance to baking, blowing, and cracking. Sweet clover enjoyed a momentary vogue late in the teens but
alfalfa remained by far the most important legume crop used in
rotation schemes. 26
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TABLE 2
FARMS BY TYPE, VALLEY COUNTY,

Type of Farm

General
Cash Grain
Crop Specialty
Dairy
Animal Specialty
Miscellaneous &
Unclassified
Type of Farm

General
Cash Grain
Crop Specialty
Dairy
Animal Specialty

Type of Farm

General
Cash Grain
Crop Specialty
Dairy
Animal Specialty

1930

Number

Average Size
(Acres)

Average Value Average
Land and
Value
Buildings
per Acre

248
174
32
27
730

226
239
179
216
292

$13,305
16,821
17,581
13,480
17,568

S59
70
98
62
60

89

***

****

****

Average Value
of Machinery
& Implements
S 835
983
1,091
787
1,156

Average Proportion of
Products Consumed at
Home, by Value
21.5%
10.0
9.7
16.1
8.5

Sources of Cash
Receipts (%)*
C
32
68
75
10

7

L
38
18
14
32
80

LP
30
14
11

58
13

Average Value of
Products Sold
per Farm
$1,789
2,085
3,861
1,843
3,661

SOURCE: 1930 Census, Agriculture, Vol. III, pp. 931, 939, 951.
.. C: sale of crops; L: sale of livestock; LP: Sale of livestock products.

The nature and scope of individual farming operations varied
widely as the figures in table 2 indicate. The agricultural census
takers in 1930 classified a total of 1,247 of the 1,300 Valley County
farms by type of operation, specialized farms being defined as those
receiving 40 percent or more of their cash receipts from a single

30

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

source-i.e., crop sales, livestock sales, etc. Thirty-six of the specialized farms belonged to the minor categories of stock ranches,
poultry farms, and self-sufficient enterprises. Of the classified farm
operations about one-fifth consisted of general farms whose occupants derived their income from the sale of crops as well as from
livestock and livestock product sales. About one-seventh engaged
in cash grain farming while nearly three-fifths specialized in the
production of livestock, primarily beef cattle. Only about 5 percent
of the farms specialized in dairying or specialty crop production.
General and dairy farmers had much in common with each
other in contrast to the grain and livestock specialists. They farmed
poorer land, particularly in the hilly areas and in the sandy regions
along the rivers. They invested less heavily in machinery and implements than did other types of farmers and the products which they
sold had a much lower value. Families residing on these farms consumed a high proportion of the agricultural commodities which
they produced-more than a fifth in the case of the general farmers
and one-sixth on the part of the dairy farmers. The major difference between the two lay in the limited volume of crop farming
and sales carried on by the dairy producers who fed most of their
limited grain output to their own animals.
Crop specialty and cash grain producers tended to occupy the
best farm land. Most of these farms lay along the fertile river
terraces and bottom lands or in the less rolling upland in the south
central part of the region. The cash crop specialists invested more
heavily in machinery than did general or dairy farmers and the
scale of their operations was considerably larger. Among the crop
specialty farmers cash receipts per farm averaged more than double
the figure for general and dairy farm operators.
Animal specialty producers completely dominated the regional
farm economy. They included three-fifths of all farmers and received three-fourths of all farm income in Valley County in 1929.
Livestock producers grew most of the feed for their animals and
invested more heavily in machinery and farm implements than did
even the crop specialists. Their farms were the largest in size of
any major category and occupied all types of land, particularly in
areas which combined terrain suitable for cropping with ample
pasturage. Cattle sales provided the major source of income with
the number of cattle per farm more than double the average for
general farms. Although livestock products accounted for only one-
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eighth of the total receipts on these farms they provided more than
one-half of the total income from the sale of these products in the
county. So great were the feed demands of these operators that
even before 1920 the region had become a grain importing area. 27
Despite the specialized census classifications most farm enterprises in the region derived their income from diverse sources-the
sale of crops, of livestock, and of livestock products. The general
farming practices of these individual units obscured somewhat the
continuing movement toward corn-livestock specialization. Much
of the income from the sale of crops came from the sale of corn
while the rise of the dairying stemmed chiefly from the dual utilization of beef cows. Thus the seeming contradiction between
growing specialization and increased diversification proved unreal.
Another significant change during the period lay in the declining
proportion of agricultural products consumed at home by the farm
family. That is, farm enterprises became more highly commercialized as a higher proportion of products grown went to market.
This movement proceeded at a slow pace but perceptible progress
had occurred before the onset of the depression brought a complete
collapse in the market for farm commodities. 28

III
If farming practices changed slowly during these decades it was

not for lack of effort on the part of agricultural educators. The
country press continually supplied readers with reports from innovative farmers who described the practices which they had tried
with varying degrees of success. National farm magazines attained
a considerable circulation in the region. During the twenties radio
provided a new medium for spreading farm information, and by
1930 most radio stations scheduled regular programs of farm market
news, weather forecasts, and talks by various agricultural experts. 29
Farmers' institutes and local short courses offered by the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture provided another channel for the flow of farming information. These institutes operated
prior to the advent of the county extension agent during the war.
At such meetings trained specialists discussed such topics as controlling hog cholera, selecting and breeding beef cattle, and the
problems of winter wheat production. The College of Agriculture
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also furnished speakers for short courses held during the winter
months. In addition, the extension division offered rural youth the
opportunity for correspondence study under the guidance of neighborhood farmers who provided on the spot instruction. Railroads
ran special trains to the agricultural villages to serve their lines in
order to stimulate productivity and to improve their public relations. Such trains carried exhibits dealing with seed corn testing,
methods of hog raising, and similar subjects.3o
Unfortunately the effectiveness of these media in supplying the
farmer with current research findings was limited by the sporadic
and unco-ordinated fashion in which they operated. The arrival of
the county extension agent, however, allowed the development of
a permanent organization for providing information and technical
assistance to farm operators. Agitation for the establishment of a
farm bureau in Valley County began in 1914 when the Ord Journal
ran a front page editorial calling for the hiring of a county agent
in order to raise the level of efficiency and profitability of local
agriculture. County residents took no action on the matter for the
next three years since most farmers had lukewarm feelings on the
subject. As one of them noted, the more progressive farmers didn't
feel that they needed the help of an agent while the less progressive
type wouldn't learn from one. The adoption of federal legislation
providing funds for the support of agents in each county in 1918
provided the necessary catalyst for action. The Valley County
board met in March, 1918, and allotted fifteen hundred dollars for
the support of an agent. Later in the month a temporary farm
bureau organization began taking shape. By the end of April an
agent had arrived and opened an office. During the same year another agent began operations in Custer County under similar circumstances. Apathy prevailed in Greeley County which did not
establish a farm bureau until after the adoption of major federal
agricultural programs during the thirties. 31
After establishing himself in the county seat the agent performed a variety of different services. The first major operation
involved setting up labor exchanges to assist farmers in getting
their small grain harvested. Another major project concerned
disease prevention in animals with strong emphasis on vaccination
against hog cholera and blackleg in cattle. Vigorous activity by
the county agents in this area led to the development of considerable animosity on the part of local veterinarians who felt that their
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rights had been encroached upon. The agents also carried on an
extensive seed corn testing program and introduced new varieties
of small grain. Despite these and other useful activities, however,
many farmers continued to dispute the agents' usefulness and
accused them of hobnobbing with a few rich aristocrats.
Localistic and ethnocentric attitudes and rural animosity toward
the towns in which the county agents maintained their offices contributed further to the antipathy which they encountered. Although
the Valley County Farm Bureau reported more than five hundred
members in 1924, the membership did not accurately reflect the
composition of the farm population. The northwestern townships
which contained most of the Bohemian and Polish residents and
included more than a third of the county's farmers accounted for
only one-eighth of the bureau's membership. Thirty percent of the
members lived in North Loup and Ord townships while fewer than
5 percent lived in Arcadia precinct. Thus the services of the agent
gravitated toward the old stock American and German-American
farmers living along the Ord-North Loup axis and in the south
central part of the county .. His practice of maintaining all his
office hours in Ord also aroused opposition among residents of the
other villages in the county.32
With the collapse of farm prices after the war farmers sought
new ways of reducing their property taxes and soon a number of
them launched an effort to abolish the county agent's position. Each
election year opponents of the agent circulated petitions to abolish
this office, while the farm bureau regularly circulated petitions supporting its continuation. The major campaign on this issue came
in 1924. In a move to gain support in the villages the agent announced plans to maintain offices in North Loup and Arcadia as
well as in Ord. This gesture undercut much of the opposition in
those two towns. In the fall election the city of Ord turned in a
three to two majority for retaining the position. North Loup township favored retention by nearly three to one and Arcadia township
supported continuation by about four to three. The thirteen farm
precincts favored abolition of the post by a margin of 778 to 716.
Only five of those precincts favored retention whereas the Bohemian
and Polish areas of small farmers returned heavy margins in favor
of abolition. The decisive votes came from the villages whose
businessmen felt that the continued presence of the agent might
raise farm income and would in any case bring farmers to town
more often.3s
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IV
While they disagreed as to the desirability of retaining county
agents, Loup country farmers unanimously recognized the necessity
for improving the public roads. From the earliest times transportation problems had posed a major obstacle for the farmer seeking
to market his products. The arrival of the railroads only partially
resolved this difficulty for it remained almost impossible to haul
farm produce to town during much of the year. Tales of the difficulties encountered in trying to get to town reached gargantuan
proportions. For their part the village merchants acting through
their commercial clubs advocated road improvement in order to
lure more customers to town.
As farmers acquired automobiles in the teens they soon discovered that these vehicles fared no better than horses on bad roads.
The actual nature of road problems varied from one type of terrain
to another. The Mira Valley road from Vinton township to Ord
lay beneath a foot or more of dust for much of the year. Roads to
the east of the Ord river bridge rested on a bed of sand and the
bottom fell out each spring when the water level rose. Roads to
the southeast of North Loup remained impassible beneath a layer
of mud or deep ruts during most of the summer. Where roads
received more regular maintenance farmers complained of excessively narrow and steep grades which caused their cars to slide off
the road into the ditch after rains. As a consequence of dissatisfaction with these conditions several good-roads clubs organized in
the region during the teens. 34
The decentralized nature of the county road system precluded
any rapid solution to the problem of impossible roads. Although
county bridges came under the jurisdiction of the county board,
township overseers bore the responsibility for maintaining most
roads. The farmers who served as overseers had other things to
do and paid little attention to their official duties. Advocates of
improvement sought to overcome this obstacle in 1916 by substituting a Valley County engineer for township overseers. Proponents
of the reform argued that farmers failed to maintain their roads
and that they would not move their own or their neighbors' fences
back to widen roads. An engineer would operate free from local
prejudices and could supervise a unified maintenance system in the
county. The proposal soon foundered on the rock of localism, however, and voters rejected the proposed change by a two to one
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margin. Although both the state and federal road assistance programs required county level supervision of roads as a condition for
aid, this requirement was circumvented and the formal adoption of
a single county-wide road system did not come for another forty
years. 35
Despite these disagreements and the vicissitudes of county politics actual road improvement began in the late teens. In the summer
of 1917 the Valley County board established a "Black Hills Route"
west of the North Loup River running through North Loup, Ord,
and Elyria. This route later became a part of Nebraska II. Also
in 1917 the board laid out an east-west route which later became
part of Nebraska 70 between North Platte and South Sioux City.
By 1920 the main river road from Scotia to Ord was reported to
be in perfect shape for a dirt road and the stretch north of Ord
was dec!ared the equal of federal roads. The collapse in farm prices
in 1919-1920 delayed further improvement activity until late in the
following decade although the state did gravel part of the route
from Ord to Arcadia in the mid-twenties. 36
Opposition to higher taxes provided only one obstacle to road
improvement efforts. As early as 1914 speakers at a good-roads
meeting in Sargent hinted that Comstock merchants opposed road
improvement out of fear that a good road would divert trade to
Sargent. Over a decade later roads to Sargent received a gravel
topping and Comstock merchants watched their business melt away.
After the Christmas buying season of 1928 the village editor
warned that Comstock must get a highway within the next year in
order to avoid a recurrence of the poor sales of recent months.
Intervillage rivalry also influenced new road construction. When
Greeley County established a new road parallel to the county line
west of the new Scotia bridge across the North Loup River, North
Loupers suspected a plot to steal trade away from their stores.37
Such squabbling paled into insignificance compared with the
blasts fired at proposals for state highway building programs during
the twenties. In 1925 the Nebraska legislature considered a measure
that would impose a gasoline tax and redistribute auto license funds
to support the construction of two paved roads across the state. A
Sargent writer summed up the prevailing local view of the matter
when he argued:
Your interests lie in Custer county. . . . We shall be more interested in
having year 'round roads in Custer county so that the farmers of the country
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can market their products ... then we are in having two main highways across
the state hard surfaced at state expense for the benefit of the big towns and
the tourists. This may be jealousy and if it is lets have more of it, and you
will find that it's going to keep us from being eliminated by the backwash of
the great highway systems which build up the big centers to the detriment of
the smaller towns. We are for good roads, but to our way of thinking, the way
to have good roads is to have them at home.
.

Similar responses greeted later legislation proposals on the same
subject. This sentiment reflected one element of the larger distrust
between the rural and urban worlds-between town and country.
And, in the teens and twenties, this antagonism exploded into open
hostility and political conflict.3s

3. Farmers and Villagers

EVEN BEFORE THE DAWN of the twentieth century a number of
social and economic cleavages had divided the ranks of society in
the Loup country. Conflicts between various groups persisted in
one form or another throughout the region's history. Wide divisions
developed between Roman Catholics, chiefly of Bohemian, Polish,
and Irish stock, and Evangelical Protestants of British, German, and
Scandinavian origin. Neighborhood identification remained strong
and played a dominant role in county politics. The most fundamental division in local society, however, lay in the distinction
between town and country. This remained the case from the rise
of the villages in the eighteen-eighties down into the mid-twentieth
century. The antagonism between these two sectors reached an
early peak during the Populist era of the eighteen-nineties and
again flared into promience during the second and third decades
of the twentieth century.
This hostility stemmed from the different and often conflicting
roles performed by the farmer and the townsman. The farmer raised
a crop or livestock which he sold to the villager for shipment to
distant processing centers or for local resale. Price changes originating in distant terminal markets first manifested themselves locally in the prices paid the farmer by village buyers. Consequently,
whenever farm commodity prices happened to fall the small-town
elevator operator or livestock buyer bore the brunt of farmer dissatisfaction. Villagers also engaged in the urban function of retail
distribution. In so doing they exposed themselves to further hostility from the countryman because of the generally rising costs of
manufactured goods which the farmer must buy. In essence, the
position of the villager immediately adjacent to the farmer made
him the contact point for the current of rural antipathy toward
the urban dominated marketing system.!
Despite the basically urban nature of the villager'S economic
role his own interests often conflicted with those of the larger city
as well as with those of the farmer. Like the farmer he suffered
from the price fluctuations in urban markets. The urban centers
also offered direct competition with the village retailers. As early
as the 1880s the small-town businessman battled the big city mail-
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order house together with traveling salesmen who sought to lure
away his customers. Later, with the widespread acquisition of the
automobile city retailers directly threatened their small-town counterparts. Farmers and townsmen alike could now drive to Grand
Island, Kearney, Lincoln, or Omaha to shop at city stores. The
latter firms carried larger stocks of merchandise, often at lower
prices than home-town merchants could afford to charge.
Loup country businessmen faced competition from the mailorder house at an early date. During the teens the problem threatened to become even more serious as Congress began considering
proposals to establish a parcel-post system. Prior to this time the
individual who patronized a mail-order house had to travel to
town in order to obtain his package at the railroad depot. Once
direct delivery to his door began he might cease going to town
entirely, ordering whatever he needed from a big city firm and
receiving it in his own mail box. Merchants feared that such a
development foreshadowed the doom of the small-town businessman
and ultimately of the small town itself. Village editors warned that
the innovation would result in the elimination of small-town jobs,
forcing local girls to move to the cities where a fate worse than
death awaited them. On the other hand most farmers favored the
proposed service. As one of them remarked, the parcel-post system
would boost the level of prosperity in the country by enabling the
producer and consumer to reach each other more directly, thus
eliminating the middleman's profit and reducing the cost of living.
This view received a predictably unenthusiastic reception from the
village business community.2
Once the parcel-post system began operating business competition tightened and the doomsayers found ample evidence to support their forebodings. The North Loup Loyalist revealed that during the month of October, 1913, nearly three hundred parcel-post
packages passed through the village railroad depot. Four years
later the Ord postmaster published statistics which further illustrated the extent of the mail-order business. The four R.F.D.
routes operating out of Ord provided service to a total of 499 families. During the month of August, 1917, mail carriers delivered an
average of 1.8 packages per family on these routes. Village spokesmen blamed the increase in mail-order house patronage for the
relatively limited expansion of business opportunities in the small
towns during the teens and twenties. 3
Despite their agreement that competition from mail-order houses
was on the rise and must be dealt with village retailers disagreed
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over how to handle the problem. Many merchants made the galling
discovery that village residents including their fellow businessmen
patronized the mail-order houses almost as readily as did the
farmers. It soon became clear that regardless of the origin of those
patronizing out-of-town firms they must be educated into buying
at home. This necessarily involved a major public relations campaign on the part of the business community.4
Village retailers developed and endlessly expounded several
basic arguments designed to lure customers away from the orbit
of the mail-order house. First they criticized the latter institution
for its conservative business practices, particularly the requirement
of prepayment in contrast to the long-term credit available from
local merchants. In addition, they charged that purchasers had
difficulty in obtaining refunds or making exchanges for items acquired from mail-order firms. The deceptively low prices listed in
the mail-order catalog did not include the cost of postage, while any
remaining cost differential between the locally available article and
the mail-order item stemmed from the inferior quality of the
latter. Again and again merchants told their neighbors that they
would find superior bargains at home if they would but open their
eyes and look about them. Such arguments fell upon skeptical
ears and the mail-order business showed no signs of falling off.
As one Custer County farmer wrote:
I see in one item where you say the mail order houses fool part of the people
all the time. I wish to differ with you, because I am one of those fools you
have reference to. For example, I sent to Omaha for a pair of trousers. They
cost me $3, postage and all. I got them back in two days. If I had waited until
I had gone to Sargent, I might have frozen to death. I went to Sargent and
priced them. A poorer quality than I bought were $4.50. . . . Oh, yes, this
me..hant said his were far better quality. What was the use of lying? Don't
we farmers know anything? . . . The merchants say they compete with the
mail order house, but do they, or could they? We don't expect it of them.
All we ask is a square deal.

Faced with such recalcitrance the merchant developed other arguments emphasizing community loyalty and the mutual dependence
of farmer and townsman. 5
The mail-order house, so the merchant reasoned, operated in a
distant city, did not require large amounts of capital and did not
pay taxes where it carried on business. The reverse characterized
the small-town retailer. In order to set up business he accumulated
capital, thus increasing the wealth of the community. Once he had
established his firm he became a regular taxpaying member of the
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community with a direct interest in its continuing development.
Money received by the merchant remained in the area and helped
it prosper. Thus the merchant community provided the foundation
for the country town. Should out-of-town buying force them out
of business the village would fade into oblivion. This in turn
would adversely affect the farmer by removing his market, educational facilities, and part of his tax base. Such appeals to local
loyalty remained in vogue well into the twentieth century.6
Loup country businessmen employed somewhat similar tactics
to meet the problem of competition from other towns. Commercial
clubs took a keen interest in the routing and improvement of country roads as a means of attracting customers from the trade areas
of other towns. However, with the development of state highways
it became feasible for the more adventurous driver to travel to
Grand· Island or Kearney in a few hours. There he could shop at
the larger stores and take in the sights. Although the cost of transportation might more than offset the amount saved by buying
there, as home-town boosters invariably pointed out, the appeal of
taking such a drive outweighed the expense in the minds of many
potential shoppers. Thus appeals to local patriotism proved no more
efficacious in the campaign against out-of-town buying than in the
one against mail-order houses. 7
Faced with rising competition and a stable number of potential
customers village retailers developed new business techniques de-'
signed to increase their sales and reduce expenses. The most significant change came with the elimination of long-term credit. The
old credit system, described by one merchant as "that Godforsaken
method of allowing people to carry off my goods and never pay
for them," gradually gave way to a regular system of thirty-day
accounts. The owner of one Comstock firm which shifted t1!J a
cash and short-term credit basis in 1911 reported that under the
old system his credit accounts had averaged double the figure that
he could safely afford. The following year most stores in Sargent
changed over to the new arrangement by common agreement. By
1921 when Scotia merchants made the transition most stores in
the region operated on a cash (including thirty-day credit) basis.
Many retailers further reduced expenses by eliminating the home
delivery of goods for customers residing in town. The growing
acquisition of automobiles facilitated this trend since in most cases
town customers could now carry their own purchases home. In
some instances village merchants also reduced the size of their
labor force, particularly during the twenties. Given the small size
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of most stores, however, this did not have a very great impact upon
the overall retailing business. 8
Increased competition for customers also led to the development
of new sales techniques. Hard-headed merchants sought to attract
farmers to town and to persuade them to buy when they came. In
Ord and Comstock they began arranging to hold their seasonal
sales on identical dates. By simultaneously offering sale prices in
a number of stores they hoped to drawn more people to town to
shop than if only one store held a sale at a time. Retailers found
these widely advertised "dollar-day" sales sufficiently successful
to repeat them at fairly regular intervals during the twenties. Such
sales expanded to include price specials on more expensive items
and the "dollar days" gradually became "bargain days." The
success of individual sale days remained largely dependent upon
weather and road conditions but on the whole they proved helpful to village retailers. 9
Even if the small-town entrepreneur overcame these problems
he still had to contend with competition from farmer-owned business enterprises. Farmers' Union organizations sprang up in the
Loup country during the first decade of the twentieth century and
in the teens and twenties a number of co-operative firms began
operations. These businesses sought to eliminate the middleman's
profit that most farmers held responsible for high consumer prices.
Certain co-operative firms such as the creameries bought raw commodities from the farmer and processed them, shipping the finished
product to eastern distributors. These enterprises received substantial support from village businessmen as noted in the previous
chapter. But when farmers sought to enter the retailing sphere
by opening up nonprofit elevators and general merchandise stores
such a harmony of interests quickly dissipated. 10
The Farmers' Grain and Supply Company of Ord provides the
best example of this type of firm's operations. Members of several
farmers' clubs in the Ord vicinity organized the company in January, 1915, and two months later acquired a vacant grain elevator
in Ord. The company's officers sold one hundred shares of stock
to farmers interested in the business. Actual operations began that
spring and at the first annual meeting the directors declared a 20
percent dividend. At the same time stockholders voted to limit
future dividend payments and to issue patronage dividends to
future customers. The company later expanded its initial grain
and coal operations to include general merchandise when the directors bought a vacant building in Ord and converted it into a
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store. By 1920 the Farmers' Grain and Supply Company boasted
more than 650 stockholders and claimed to be the largest co-operative business in the state. Branch operations began with the acquisition of a store in Arcadia and a store and elevator in North Loup.
The over-all company sales figure continued to climb during the
decade, reaching nearly $895,000 in 1929. 11
Numerous other co-operative ventures appeared during the
teens and twenties although none enjoyed such spectacular success
as the Farmers' Grain and Supply Company. A co-operative shipping association formed in Comstock to handle shipments to terminal markets while Farmers' Union stores in Comstock and Sargent
sold farm implements. During the twenties co-operative oil stations
appeared in most of the villages. Not all of the new firms enjoyed
financial success, however. A co-operative insurance company formed
at Ord in 1917 proved short lived. Efforts by Sargent area farmers
to establish a grain elevator failed because of their inability to
raise the necessary funds. These and other failures occurred for a
variety of reasons including deficient management, a lack of farmer
patronage, and the shortage of available capital during the early
twenties. 12
Small-town businessmen viewed the appearance of these rival
concerns with acute distaste. The co-operative firm generally offered
its customers price reductions in the form of patronage dividends.
The storekeeper could respond to this tactic only by lowering his
prices, a practice which he believed would eliminate any hope of
profit. Few businessmen dared to openly attack the co-operatives
for fear of driving away their own farm patrons but privately they
expressed bitter feelings. For their part the farmers suspected the
village retailers of plotting against them and saw the commercial
clubs as conspiracies designed to break up farmer-owned businesses. 13
Out-of-town buying and competition between private and cooperative business firms did not constitute the only economic sources
of antagonism between farmer and villager in the early twentieth
century. The existing tax structure provided another major source
of conflict. Until 1967 the state of Nebraska possessed neither a
general sales nor income tax. Virtually all state and local revenue
came from the property tax. By the very nature of his occupation
the farmer owned most of the real estate in the state and county.
He considered himself at an even greater disadvantage when it
came to personal property. Such property included the farmer's
livestock, machinery, and feed inventories-capital investments re-
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quired for the production of income. In the villages capital accumulation often took the invisible form of investment in stocks and
bonds or in bank deposits. Thus while the tax assessor could count
the farmer's cows he had only the word of the village resident as
to the value of his intangible property holdings.
It came as no surprise to farmers that most villagers failed to
report any intangible property holdings whatever to the county
assessors. The farm bureau sought to remedy the situation by requiring the publication of individual tax returns, but this rarely occurred. The state legislature did seek to curb underreporting by
enacting a measure which taxed intangible property at one-fourth
of its actual value. But as a local editor wrote, "It worked about
as successfully as a bribe to a scarlet woman to induce her to refrain
from practicing her profession." Faced with this situation the major
farm organizations in the state advocated the passage of an income
tax in order to relieve the property tax burden. The farm bureau
also lobbied for the passage of a constitutional amendment that
would allow the legislature to classify tangible property for tax
purposes. Under this arrangement certain types of property such
as livestock or feed inventories might become tax exempt. These
efforts proved unavailing and scarcely any changes in the tax system occurred until the mid-sixties. Thus town-country friction persisted as the old abuses continued to rankle in the mind of the
farmer. He easily persuaded himself that the merchant passed on
his tax burden by raising his prices, something that farmers could
not do. Even with the eventual adoption of state sales and income
taxes, county and local government remained dependent upon the
property tax for revenue so that tension in this area still remains
evident.14
II

The long-standing antipathy between town and country involved
a social as well as economic dimension. To some degree both
farmer and villager identified the small town with the city. Village
entrepreneurs aspired to raise their town to urban status. They
considered the city the major locus of progress and looked to it
for the newest trends and fashions. At the same time the townsman
often regarded the farmer as someone living outside the mainstream
of progress. Farmers thoroughly resented this notion. As one irate
countryman remarked:
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One foolishness common to townspeople the world over is the idea that the
farmer is a hick. That somehow he isn't as bright, or as clever as a business man,
as well·read as the townsman.
The farming class in this country have always averaged higher in native
wit and ability than the town folks. Of late years the American farmer has
been better read, better educated, and a far better businessman than many of
his town brethren and sisters.

In fact many farmers viewed themselves in the mold of the up-todate businessman, often implying that the small town represented a
backwater of ignorance and conservatism rather than the vanguard
of rural progress. They felt, as one Arcadia writer put it, that "the
Hayseed has passed on. In his stead we now have a rural businessman." Yet even while the farmer sought to emulate the businessman
he remained distrustful of the latter's natural habitat-the city.l5
A similar element of ambiguity appeared among small-town
residents. In many ways they absorbed the farmer's image of the
city. The villager's own experience with urban competition and his
sense of economic dependence upon the city undermined his sense of
urban identification. So did the galling tendency of city dwellers
to regard the villager as a rustic, much as the townsman looked
down on the farmer. This attitude of condescension considerably
irked the townsman. As editor Rood of the North Loup Loyalist
complained after reading Main Street, "I am sure we in small
villages are about as broad minded as are our city cousins and that
we are almost as wise." To some degree the widening division
between city and small town involved an admission by the villager
that his town had failed in its drive to become a metropolis and
was doomed to the perpetual status of a country town. And, as
his older dream of becoming an important merchant in a rising
city faded the villager became more sensitive to the virtues of his
town and the vices of the metropolis. Or at least his publicists did.l 6
Village editors endlessly expounded the superiority of smalltown life, particularly in the twenties when it became evident that
the prospects for real urban growth in the Loup country had vanished. The rural press repeated the familiar cliches of small-town
friendliness, the absence of vice and poverty, and the virtues of
living in the open country. The city by contrast featured vice, overcrowding, poverty, air pollution, and sundry other undesirable features. For all of this negative imagery, however, the major crime
of the city lay not in its ugliness but in its attractiveness which
continued to lure rural youth away. The outflow of young people
continued despite warnings that they would disappear into a
whirlpool of oblivion should they migrate to the city. For however
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much virtue might exist in rural life the lack of employment opportunities and the rising cost of getting started in farming eliminated
the possibility of remaining at home for a large segment of the
younger population,17
Although town and country joined together in denouncing the
city the social gulf between the two persisted. This did not mean
that all relationships between farm and village were acrimonious,
however. For example, both co-operative and conflicting relationships developed in the sphere of public education. The village
school served two major functions for residents of the surrounding
countryside. First it provided a high school education for the handful of farm children aspiring to attend college. Secondly, it furnished teachers to staff the rural elementary schools in the vicinity.
Under the state system of teacher certification high school graduates
who had taken a semester course in normal training could take the
standardized teacher's examination and, if successful, received an
elementary school teaching credential. Thus local girls with an
interest in teaching obtained their high school diplomas in town
and then taught at nearby schools before getting married. Some,
of course, remained lifelong teachers.
If the village schools successfully supplied a constant flow of
new schoolmarms they failed abysmally when it came to educating
farm boys. Out of the thirty-six students in the ninth grade at
North Loup in 1909 only eight-six girls and two boys-graduated
from high school. Observers agreed that the high attrition rate
for boys resulted from the emphasis upon college preparatory
courses rather than upon "practical" or vocational subjects. After
reviewing the situation the village school board voted to seek
state aid for vocational training. Such assistance would enable
the district to provide courses in agricultural and industrial arts
without having to raise the school district tax levy.18
This episode typified the movement toward vocational training
programs taking place throughout the state and country at large
at this time. At the national level the passage of the Smith-Hughes
Act in 1917 provided federal aid for vocational education. By 1924
thirty-five Nebraska high schools offered federally funded vocational training in agriculture. The three-year program available at
the Scotia high school included animal husbandry and shop the
first year; crops, soils, and farm mechanics the second year; and
farm management together with further mechanical training the
third year. Upon graduation the student could begin farming or,
if he wished, he could enter the University of Nebraska College
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of Agriculture. Several years later the Ord high school began offering
a similar curriculum and other schools in the region followed suit.
Training in home economics for farm and village girls also became
available at this time under the auspices of the Smith-Hughes
measure,19
The willingness of the village schools to adopt normal and vocational training courses did not stem entirely from disinterested
motives. Not only did the school provide the facilities necessary for
education in American society, but it also brought money to town.
This applied particularly in the case of students from outlying farms
who boarded in town for the school term on account of the poor
roads and transportation facilities. These students brought in money
in the form of personal spending while in town. They also brought
tax relief in the form of nonresident high school tuition which
helped to meet the expenses of operating the village school system. 20
Several school consolidation movements emerged in the region
during the teens and their history further illustrates the complexity
of town-country relations at this time. First came the campaign to
combine rural elementary school districts. The major impetus
behind this movement came from professional educators who wished
to reduce the number of ungraded one teacher schools. From
their point of view larger elementary schools would permit more
specialized instruction by several teachers. This would mark a
major improvement over the usual practice of having one teacher
handle from five to fifteen students in an ungraded school. The
professional educators gained support from some farmers who hoped
to reduce property taxes by lowering the cost of school buildings
and instruction. 21
In contrast with this campaign, the second redistricting movement aimed at the consolidation of rural districts into the village
districts. Support for this drive came primarily from the townsmen who saw it as a means of broadening the tax base that supported their expensive high schools. Since it would appear unseemly to urge consolidation on these grounds they emphasized the
benefits that farm children would obtain from attending school in
town. Besides noting the obvious superiority of village schools in
terms of physical plant and equipment, proponents of this type of
reorganization argued that farm children would perform better in
town schools because of the greater competition there. At the same
time they disclaimed any tax advantages to the village from consolidation and tried to show that it would not significantly raise
the farmer's tax hill.

Farmers and Villagers

/

47

Several consolidations of rural elementary school districts took
place in the teens and twenties but only one case of consolidation
with a town district occurred in the region. In 1919 four rural
districts merged with the Scotia village district. The enlarged district covered nearly fifty square miles. Contrary to the prognostications of village propagandists the mill levy of the consolidated district averaged about half again as high as in the former rural districts. Farmers found reason to doubt the wisdom of the consolidation when they received their higher tax bills just as the bottom
fell out of the agricultural economy. Some malcontents charged
that villagers had engineered the merger to force farmers to pay
for the new school building which the town would have had to
build anyway. Following this experience interest in town-country
consolidation did not revive in the area for another twenty-five
years. 22
This redistricting campaign gave added stimulus to the rise of
a third consolidation movement which directly opposed the efforts
of towns to annex adjacent farm districts. Proponents of this movement sought to establish high schools in the countryside. This
movement arose as a consequence of several factors. On the one
hand it reflected the increased value placed on education by the
farmer. To a considerable degree, however, it grew out of hostility
toward the village and a desire to end its domination of secondary
education. Many farmers blamed the student's exposure to town
life during high school for luring him away from the farm. As one
of them wrote, "If they were kept in the farm school for a few
years longer nine times out of ten they would remain on the
farm." Here again the image of the small town blended into that
of the city, at least in the mind of the farmer. Such sentiments led
to the establishment of six rural high schools in the region by
1919. The number rose to fourteen by 1925 including one fouryear high school and thirteen two-year high schools. 23

III
Elements of agrarian discontent arising from these and other
sources found their fullest expression during the political controversy which developed around the appearance and activities of
the Nonpartisan League between 1917 and 1922. At that time the
resentment which had smoldered for years burst into the open
and the basic lines of social and economic cleavage between town
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and country clearly emerged, just as they had during the stormy
politics of the Populist era two and a half decades earlier. The
bitterness engendered by this conflict lingered through the remainder of the twenties and into the early thirties when the disasters of that decade diverted concern to the basic problem of
economic survival.
The Nonpartisan League became the spearhead of farmer protest in North Dakota soon after its inception. A coalition of old
progressives, socialists, and co-operationists joined together to support a program calling for curbs on the urban dominated agricultural marketing system. The league advocated the establishment of
state-owned terminal elevators, flour mills, and packing houses
together with state grain inspection to avoid abuses in grading.
Other planks in the organization's platform called for the exemption of farm improvements from taxation, state hail insurance, and
credit from state banks at actual cost. The league's leadership sought
to avoid the fate of earlier Populist reformers by eschewing the
formation of a third political party. Instead, the league worked
through the primary elections of the two major parties to nominate
candidates sympathetic to their aims. In 1916 they captured the
North Dakota governorship and elected a majority of the state
House of Representatives, then began a drive to enact their program into law. 24
Encouraged by their success in North Dakota, league members
scurried out into nearby states bearing their gospel of reform.
Although the organization never gained power at the state level
outside of North Dakota, it did find substantial support at the
local level in several other plains states. Organizers and speakers
first appeared in the Lou p country in the summer of 1917 and a
major membership drive soon got under way among the farmers
of the region. Among the first converts was the farm columnist of
the Ord Quiz. In the ensuing controversy the Quiz, under the editorship of H. D. Leggett, became one of the handful of newspapers
in the state to support the league. The Ord Journal, the other major
Valley County newspaper, became the spokesman for business opposition to the movement. 25
Paid professionals from North Dakota carried out the initial
work of setting up regional Nonpartisan League organizations. The
professional organizer traveled through the countryside, stopping
to solicit memberships from farmers along the way. Occasionally
he remained in a particular locality to help with the farm work
and thereby made direct contact with additional farmers. Those
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who joined (and only farmers or retired farmers could become
members) paid an initial membership fee of sixteen dollars. The
funds accumulated from this source flowed into the league's national
treasury where they financed a newspaper, various political activities, and further organizational work. When enough farmers in a
particular area had joined they set up a county organization and
elected their own officials. County conventions later met to deliberate policy, endorse political candidates, and carryon other
business. 26
As the nature of the league's objectives became increasingly evident urban and small-town businessmen directed a heavy barrage
of criticism against its organizational techniques. Village editors
warned farmers against allowing themselves to be fleeced out of
sixteen hard-earned dollars by a few schemers from North Dakota.
The presence of professional organizers from outside the state lent
credence to the charge that outside agitators were stirring up discontent among the farmers. Because the first year of intensive league
activity in the region coincided with the last year of war, the
organization soon ran afoul of single-minded individuals opposed
to any activity which did not contribute directly to the war effort.
Many villagers took the position that the farmer didn't know what
he was doing when he joined the league-a condescending attitude
which further fueled the farmer's resentment. 27
Wartime criticism of the league generally took the form of
attacks upon the national organization. The urban and small-town
businessmen who provided most of the hostile commentary sought
to discredit leading league officials, particularly founder Arthur
Townley. The fact that Townley had once gone into bankruptcy
received considerable publicity. Frequent allegations of financial
irregularity cropped up and the press carried numerous accounts
of splits in the North Dakota organization which usually led to
bitter charges against members of rival factions. But the most
important line of attack by league critics involved the issue of
disloyalty.
From its initial appearance in the Loup country the Nonpartisan League found itself marked with the stigma of disloyalty.
League speakers emphasized the loyalty theme and assailed their
critics as "politically inspired." Soon, however, Horace Davis, the
Democratic editor of the Ord Journal criticized the league on several grounds, the most significant of which involved its need to
prove "100% loyalty." Davis soon found himself caught up by the
war hysteria and in April, 1918, he launched a full-scale assault
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on the movement. In his words, "I am convinced that the leaders
of the movement are the most clever, most dangerous Prussian allies
in the United States and I want to help the council of defense of
Nebraska to rid the state of its influences and to prevent other
loyal, patriotic farmers from giving unconscious aid and comfort
to the common enemy." When the Valley County Council of Defense met the following month its chairman called upon Davis for
evidence to support his charges. The editor conceded that he was
not prepared to offer proof and stressed that his attack was aimed
not against local members but rather at the leadership of a movement which practiced sedition by encouraging class feeling. 28
Soon after its inception in the spring of 1917 the Nebraska
Council of Defense launched a state-wide attack against the league
for allegedly undermining the war effort. Many farmers concluded
that the urban businessmen who dominated the council manipulated it to serve their own purposes. The membership on the council
of a Lincoln businessman whose milling firm had been convicted
of using false weights added to such suspicions. In the spring of
1918 the council secured the passage of a state law redefining sedition. Under the new act sedition included habitual loafing and the
refusal to engage in useful work if available. A later ruling by
the state attorney general defined "useful work" in such a way as
to exclude organizational activity for any body not directly involved
in promoting the war effort. In effect this interpretation outlawed
the league's organizing campaign. Ultimately the collision between
the council and the league led to a compromise agreement whereby
the league halted its use of out-of-state professional recruiters and
the council agreed to refrain from further attacks upon the organization.
To some degree a similar pattern characterized the relations
between the county councils of defense and the league in the Loup
country. The region itself became one of the major league strongholds in the state. In Greeley County its members completely dominated the county council of defense and prevented it from taking
any position in the controversy. In Custer County the county council and the league agreed to a suspension of activity in the Democratic, Republican, and league organizations for the duration of
the war. League support also surfaced in the Valley County Council
of Defense. However, an accommodation between it and the League
did not materialize until tensions had been inflamed by the Thull
incident. 29
Jake Thull began working as a league organizer and farm
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laborer in the Custer and Valley County area in the spring of 1917.
Nearly a year later in June, 1918, the Valley County sheriff arrested
him on charges of violating the state sedition act. The initial complaint came from the Valley County attorney, a Wilsonian Democrat. Thull spent several days incarcerated in the Valley County
jail. When the court convened the following week county attorney
Norman was joined on the prosecution's side by a member of the
county council of defense. After a day and a half long trial the judge
dismissed the case for lack of evidence. League supporters saw the
outcome as a vindication of their own position while Horace Davis
and his associates charged the presiding judge with bias in favor of
the league. Several days after this episode county law officers again
arrested Thull but this time charges were dropped and the prisoner quickly released. 30
Five weeks after the Thull trial the Valley County Council of
Defense issued a carefully worded statement defining its position
on the league. The council specifically denied any doubts as to
the loyalty of Valley County members but criticized the league's
recruiting activity for hindering the prosecution of the war and
urged a postponement of any discussion of grievances until after
the conclusion of hostilities. With the conclusion of the truce between the state council of defense and the league this policy went
into effect. At the same time at least a few members of the Valley
County council remained unimpressed by the attacks upon the
league. Indeed, in the general election of 1918 the league quickly
endorsed council chairman B. M. Hardenbrook for the Valley
County attorney's position held by their bitter foe, Democrat
Norman. s1
Initially the league disavowed any interest in local elections
although in practice it endorsed candidates for county office. Most
of the organization's attention focused upon the election of men
to state and national office since these were the officials who decided
the major issues. This approach involved working through the
existing parties and not through third-party movements. As Ernest
Coats, farm columnist and Valley County league secretary explained:
The western farmers have long been dissatisfied with the two old parties.
Years ago the Farmers Alliance tried to get the farmer what was due him but
they finally got ate up by the democrat party. When Mr. Roosevelt started his
big Bull Moose party we flocked to his party by the thousands and a lot of
democrats swallowed Roosevelt for the sake of the new progressive party, only
to be sold out to the republican party. The way has at last been shown how to
get what we want and to use the old parties for our benefit. They do not
like it and it is going to be a bitter dose but they will have to take it and
be good.
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In July, 1918, the Valley County Nonpartisan League convention
endorsed a platform that stressed the need for curbing corporate
power and eliminating middleman profits. In this respect it followed the model of earlier agrarian protest movements and the
conflict between town and country which followed repeated much
of what had gone before in the Populist period of the eighteennineties.32
Already faced with competition from farmer owned co-operative stores, mail-order houses, and city retailers, the merchants had
no use for any new schemes designed to eliminate the middleman.
After all, they themselves were precisely that. Again and again
members and sympathizers of the league explained that they did
not consider the village merchant their enemy. But the same individuals actively participated in setting up farmers' stores which
sought to undersell the local retailers. Their own personal antagonism toward the small-town merchant blended into their hostility
against the big city interests and reinforced their antiurban, neoPopulist views.33
Village businessmen grasped this fact quite clearly and not only
assailed the league for its advocacy of "class legislation" but also
explicitly defended the role of the middleman. An exchange of
letters which appeared in the North Loup village newspaper in
the spring of 1918 graphically illustrated the division between
town and country on this point. First, a local farmer expressed
his views of the subject:
Now I am wondering from whence come these railings against farmers
organizations, certainly not from the farmers . . . . Do they come from the man
who is doing absolutely nothing to feed the world? ...
Come on, now fellows, get that white shirt off and a checkered one on,
buy a nice pair of overalls, lock up your diamond pin with your notes and
bonds, get out and slop the hogs, haul them to market, step into the bank
and cash your big check, hold up your chin and you will not have time to
rave at the man who has always fed you.

This colorful exposition of farmer attitudes drew a heated reply
from a local elevator operator the following week:
What good is a large part of the farmer's crop if nothing is done but raise
it? Most of it must have something more done to it. Must there not be millers
and packers . . . . To my mind it is not a question of what part of work one
does whether it be farmer, mailer, blacksmith, merchant or elevator man.
The question is whether each of these is doing his part for a fair part of the
profits, or in other words for fair wages.
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This argument represented one more variation on the theme of
the interdependence between farm and town developed in the campaign against the mail-order houses. Such a philosophy left no
room for the rhetoric of class interest that the league employed.
Consequently businessmen stepped up their attack on the organization's "Bolshevist" tendencies after the disloyalty charge lost
its force with the end of the war. 34
Since the league organized with the object of attaining political
power the clearest gauge of its success lies in its performance at the
polls. In Valley County the organization's members concentrated
their attention upon three major contests in the 1918 general election-those for state representative, state senator and county attorney. The league endorsed Dave Strong, a Springdale farmer and
Republican for state representative; W. J. Taylor, a Custer County
Democrat won the endorsement for state senator; and Republican
B. M. Hardenbrook received the nod for the county attorney's
office. In the November election all league candidates carried Valley
County, most of them by substantial margins. Since all but one of
these were Republicans, however, one cannot determine with any
precision the relative significance of league and partisan influences.
Perhaps the best indication of the organization's voting strength
lay in the fact that Hardenbrook carried every farm precinct, receiving 74 percent of the vote in those precincts. He also carried his
home village of Arcadia by a landslide but received only 54 percent of the vote in Ord City and North Loup Precinct. At the same
time the league endorsed Democratic state senatorial candidate
carried eleven of the thirteen farm precincts, receiving 62 percent
of the farm vote compared with only 42 percent of the village vote.
The most marked indication of league strength came in heavily
Bohemian Geranium Precinct which voted 57 to 15 for the Democrat Taylor and 56 to 16 for the Republican Hardenbrook. 35
A better gauge of league strength and of the depth of the split
between town and country appears in the voting pattern that
marked the special election of a delegate to the state constitutional
convention in 1919. Since the convention would determine the
course of future state activity in the economic sphere the election
provided a major test of voting strength and alignments on economic issues. Because both candidates belonged to the Republican
party, partisan considerations did not enter into the race. The
Valley County league endorsed Representative Strong who opposed
John Wall, Arcadia's leading merchant. When the votes had been
counted Strong emerged with a farm precinct margin of 566 to 134,
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receiving 77 percent of the farm vote. He carried every farm precinct while his opponent received as much as one-third of the vote
in only two of them-both of those lying adjacent to his home
precinct of Arcadia. Wall carried the village and township of
Arcadia 196 to 28 and won the other village precincts by a margin
of 260 to 129 or almost exactly two to one. Most of the votes for
Strong in the latter precincts evidently came from farmers in North
Loup Precinct and from retired farm operators residing in the
villages. 36
League officials remained confident of their strength after this
success but in the following year they abandoned their most sacred
tenet with disastrous results. In the summer of 1920 both parties
nominated state tickets which the league found unacceptable. Many
members then joined in the formation of a state Progressive party
which nominated Judge Arthur G. Wray for the governorship. In
the November election Wray received about 89,000 votes compared
with 153,000 for incumbent Republican Samuel R. McKelvie and
130,00 for Democrat John Morehead. None of the league endorsed
candidates won state-wide office but once again they swept Valley
County. The fledgling Progressive party struggled on for another
year and a half before expiring early in 1922. In September of that
year league founder Arthur Townley made his only appearance in
the region when he delivered an address at Bohemian Hall in Ord.
There he struck out at the Nebraska organization for abandoning
the movement's position on third-party campaigns, advising members that they might just as well take their ballots out in the woods
and burn them as vote for third-party candidates. The state organization soon followed Townley's advice and endorsed Democratic
gubernatorial nominee Charles W. Bryan, Republican senatorial
candidate H. R. Howell, and Democratic hopeful Charles Beals for
Congress. In the ensuing election Howell carried Valley County
by a three to one margin. Bryan carried the farm precincts two
to one while losing the village vote three to two. Beals lost the
county when his five to three margin among the farmers failed to
overcome his Republican opponent's two to one lead in the towns.
The county league endorsed independent Marion Cushing for the
state senate and he received 65.7 percent of the farm vote along
with 22.4 percent of the village vote. Results in other contests proved
mixed owing to the appearance of other issues such as prohibition
enforcement. 37
Only a month after this election columnist Coats announced the
impending disbandonment of the Nonpartisan League. He ex-
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plained that it would be superseded by another grassroots organization designed to elect representatives and senators to Congress
who would support the farmers' demands. This organization never
got off the ground, nor did a Nonpartisan League type of operation
develop to elect a profarmer political figure president. However,
the "farm bloc" in Congress did function throughout the twenties
and the discontented farmer found hi~ spokesman among its ranks.3s
Several factors contributed to the demise of the league in the
Loup country as well as in the nation as a whole after 1922. The
economic distress of the two previous years greatly reduced the
ability of individual farmers to raise eighteen dollars in dues every
two years. It also proved impossible to sustain the initial level of
enthusiasm over a prolonged period of time. New issues such as
prohibition threatened the solidarity that had momentarily developed among farmers in the area. Finally, in the presence of
several other farm organizations the league had become increasingly
superfluous. The farmers' union organizations offered a means of
circumventing village middlemen through the operation of cooperatives. The farm bureau became increasingly politically oriented
and adopted some league positions such as the advocacy of tax
reform and improved agricultural credit. In addition, the more
sophisticated lobbying techniques and quasi-governmental status
of the farm bureau proved more effective in securing desired farm
legislation, particularly at the national level, than did the league's
directly political methods. Thus the league came to appear increasingly impractical and ineffective and its appeal diminished, leading
to its quiet extinction. 39

IV
Following the political contests of the late teens and early
twenties the overt conflict between town and country subsided
although a considerable residue of hositility persisted. This development coincided with the re-emergence of another major line of
social cleavage-that between the various ethnocultural groups centering upon the symbolic issue of prohibition. Both villagers and
countrymen divided over this issue which flared up at various times
in the eighteen-nineties and early 1900s. The Roman Catholics of
Bohemian, Polish, and Irish origins opposed prohibition while
most of the old-stock Yankees together with some evangelical Germans and Scandinavians favored it. The predominantly Yankee
villages of Arcadia and North Loup remained dry strongholds from
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the late 1880s down to the mid-twentieth century whereas Ord
veered from one side to the other at different times. The ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment appeared to have settled the question
but the issue of enforcement remained a sensitive one. The Republican Valley County attorney lost his party's nomination in 1922
after he adopted a hard-line policy toward liquor law violators.
That November he ran as an independent and won re-election in
a close three-man race. The issue remained an explosive one and
figured prominently in the 1928 presidential campaign. 40
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of ethnocultura1 conflict in the Loup country during the twenties came with the meteoric rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The KKK first appeared in the area
in April, 1924, when a state senator from Georgia addressed a large
meeting at Ord. The organization drew widespread support from
among the evangelical Protestants who dominated the southeastern
two-thirds of the region. Klan speakers attracted such large crowds
as the estimated two thousand persons who attended a meeting at
Midvale in the southern part of rural Valley County. Klan picnics
also brought out large numbers of local residents. Late in 1926
the organization disappeared from sight in the wake of national
scandals and after 1927 no further reports of the movement's
activities appeared in the pages of the regional press.41
Klan events consisted largely of lectures and occasional costumed
parades, particularly on the Fourth of July. On several occasions
Klansmen attired in hoods and sheets appeared in Protestant
churches to perform rituals and donate offerings. A few night meetings culminated in the burning of crosses on hilltop sites. Most of
the movement's local appeal stemmed from its anti-Catholic and
prohibitionist stance. The old tales of Roman Catholic conspiracy
familiar to students of nativism cropped up again and although
some exponents distinguished between home-town Catholics and
the church hierarchy the appeal to ethnic prejudice remained powerful. In taking its position the KKK drew heavily upon antiurban
sentiment and employed the city as a symbol of alien threats to
the American way of life. In this regard a North Loup correspondent proved at least partially correct when he remarked that
the Klan was in large part an outgrowth of the earlier sentiments
against the financial interests of New York. For despite the shift
in emphasis from economic to religious issues, the city remained
the center of evil while virtue found its haven in the countryside
and small towns. Thus ex-Nonpartisan League members of Protestant background continued to rail against the city, this time as
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the haven of the wet. Now, however, their former Roman Catholic
allies remained silent. Consequently the antiurban aspect of the
movement grew more obscure as it revived the old neighborhood
feuds over the outlawing of demon rum.42
As the election of 1928 approached, the religious question and
prohibition dominated the political arena and Yankee Democrats
began abandoning the Al Smith candidacy in wholesale numbers.
Rumors about Smith that even an ultra-Republican editor called
"disgusting propaganda" circulated widely and Democratic editors
openly blamed his defeat upon religious prejudice. The clearest
indication of the division that developed in this election appears
in the voting pattern of precincts in the region. Smith carried heavily Bohemian Roman Catholic Geranium Precinct in Valley County
119 to 15 and won the Irish precinct of O'Connor in Greeley County
184 to 8. On the other hand he lost the heavily Yankee precincts
of North Loup and Arcadia by votes of 535 to 86 and 400 to 91
respectively. Herbert Hoover carried the largely German Protestant
township of Wallace Creek in Greeley County by a margin of 123
to 32, most of the Smith vote coming from the scattering of Irish
in the precinct. The intense feelings generated during the campaign persisted for several years until the general economic collapse of the thirties turned public attention to other issues. These
basic ethnocultural voting divisions re-emerged in the late thirties,
however, and survived in their general outlines for the next forty
years. 43
Although elements of hostility between town and country persist to the present day, open conflict between the two sectors has
rarely reached the degree of intensity that marked the late teens
and early twenties. Several factors have operated over time to
reduce the social distance between farm and village. With the
revolution in communications and transportation following World
War 1, farm isolation diminished substantially. As rural electrification spread after World War II the gap in living standards between
town and country lessened. Increasing numbers of farmers retired
to the villages where their presence diluted the political strength
of the merchant community. Continued intermarriage between
village and farm families provided further linkages between town
dwellers and countrymen which helped to offset economic conflicts of interest. Finally, with the rise of the large metropolis to
dominance in American society the villager'S sense of common identity with urban interests declined, accompanied by a corresponding
rise in the intensity of his sense of rural identification.44

•

4. Drouth, Depression, and Disaster

LATE IN 1929 farm commodity prices began to tumble, ushering in
what would become the worst agricultural depression of the postCivil War era. The 1930 Nebraska farm price index averaged onesixth lower than the previous year's and it dropped another third
in 1931. In 1932 it averaged only two-fifths of the 1929 figure. At
the same time the cost of goods and services which the farmer must
buy fell much less abruptly. Consequently the real purchasing
power of farm products diminished by more than two-fifths within
the space of three years. This collapse in purchasing power spelled
austerity if not ruin for most farmers even in a time of abundant
harvests. However, almost every year during the decade brought a
subnormal amount of rainfall. When the farm price index soared
in the mid-thirties farmers in the Loup country had nothing to
sell; indeed, they had to purchase feed for their livestock at the
higher prices, thereby further undermining their own economic
position. 1
While the fall in farm income adversely affected all agriculturalists, some found themselves in a more vulnerable position than
others. The more conservative farmer who had avoided investing
heavily in capital improvements found himself with a sharply reduced income but could try to adjust his expenditures accordingly.
However, his more progressive counterpart who had borrowed
money to finance improvements in his farming operation had to
face the critical problem of mortgage payments. For him survival
entailed not only a reduction in his cash outlay but also the acquisition of enough money to meet his mortgage payments and retain
possession of his farm. At the time of the 1930 census 64.7 percent
of the farm owner operators in Valley County held their land subject to a mortgage with an average debt figure equal to 43.1 percent
of the value of their land and buildings. The tendency of mortgagors to improve their land and to hold better land resulted in
a higher valuation for their farms compared with nonmortgagors.
For example, in Valley County mortgaged farms operated by their
owners had an average 1930 value of $67.56 per acre compared with
59
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a figure of $60.80 per acre for owner operated farms not subject
to mortgage. 2
As real estate values plunged during the decade this mortgage
debt mushroomed in terms of its ratio to the actual value of land
and buildings. Average per acre farm values for Valley County
declined from $60.01 in 1930 to $32.99 in 1935 and $23.41 in 1940.
The ratio of mortgage debt to actual value rose from 43 percent to
64 percent during the same period. The combination of faIling
income and high fixed mortgage expenses posed an insurmountable
difficulty for many farmers during the decade. Each year the mortgaged farm operator had to raise enough cash to pay 6 or 7 percent
interest on an amount which might equal the total value of his
farm. Once the drouth set in the prospects of meeting his interest
payments, much less the principal of his obligation, became increasingly remote. 3
When the usual sources of long-term agricultural credit began
to dry up the position of these farmers worsened. Traditionally the
farm owner had obtained five- or ten-year mortgages which he
either renewed or replaced with new mortgages when they came
due. But in the face of the national financial constriction the
volume of funds available for borrowing contracted sharply. The
value of new farm mortgages filed in Greeley County fell from
$660,999.12 in 1929 to $194,785.00 in 1933. The corresponding
figures for Valley County were $753,929.12 and $347,213.85. If the
debtor could not obtain a new mortgage he must pay the old one
off, a difficult feat in prosperous times and a near impossibility in
the depression. These conditions fostered a rash of foreclosures
spanning the entire decade of the thirties and extending into the
early forties. The figures for farm foreclosures in Greeley and
Valley counties appear in table 3. Foreclosure sales became a regular event in the county seat towns. In many other instances
farmers gave up trying to raise impossible sums and sold their
farms to creditors at nominal prices. As a result large tracts of
land passed into the hands of the major corporate firms which had
invested heavily in farm mortgages, notably the Lincoln Joint
Stock Bank and the Prudential, Travelers, Penn Mutual, and Union
Central life insurance companies. 4
Not all farmers stood placidly by while their land passed into
the hands of their creditors. In January, 1933, twelve hundred persons attended an organizational meeting of the Farmers Holiday
Association at Ord. There the chairman and secretary of the neigh-
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TABLE 3
FARM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES
GREELEY AND VALLEY COUNTIES, 1929-1941
Year

Greeley County

Valley County

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

26
23
25
27
15
16
49
27
39
85
24

6
7
8
24
23
26
36

Total

356

44

32
55
21
15
16
313

Index of Instrument,· Filed, Office of the County Clerk, Greeley County
courthouse, Greeley, Nebraska; and ibid., Valley County courthouse, Ord, Nebraska.

SOURCE:

boring Sherman County assoClatIOn addressed the crowd. In the
course of the evening they advocated extensions on farm mortgage
and interest payments until prices rose enough to enable farmers to
pay their debts. In the meantime they proposed to halt any foreclosure actions which mortgage holders might undertake. Following
this meeting Valley County farmers organized thirteen township
associations and elected county officers. Township meetings the
following week attracted large crowds as farm owners sought to
escape the economic morass in which they found themselves. 5
In the same month that the Valley County farmers organized
some three hundred farmers and other interested persons attended
a precinct organizational meeting at Scotia. In the ensuing two
weeks township associations sprang up throughout Greeley County
and a loose county-wide organization emerged. The proposals raised
at the Scotia meeting covered a considerably broader scope than
did those of the Valley County gatherings. Calling a halt to farm
foreclosures represented only the first step in a general economic
program. Various speakers raised the possibility of organizing farm
withholding actions to force farm prices up to profitable levels.
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They also sought new ways to reduce property taxes III order to
provide relief for the farm owner. 6
While the Farmers Holiday groups in the Loup country proved
much less militant than their counterparts elsewhere members
found it necessary to stress the peaceful nature of their aims. The
Valley County association chairman explained that his organization
consisted of the substantial farmers of the county who were merely
asking for a chance to save their homes from the mortgage holders
until prices rose enough for them to pay their bills. Main street
merchants remained dubious, however, and when the Iowa association's members forced the closing of a court in Le Mars in the
spring of 1933 the organization came in for heavy criticism. In the
midst of these controversies the Valley County association worked
to discourage further foreclosures and in March, 1933, it claimed
credit for settling seventeen cases out of court. The following summer the group turned its attention to politics, seeking to influence
political figures and to elect sympathetic candidates. It also campaigned with some success for higher Federal Land Bank appraisals
of farm land for mortgage purposes. 7
These actions did not significantly affect mortgage trends, however, and farmers began contemplating more direct action. By
October, 1933, creditors had initiated foreclosure proceedings against
nearly 110 Valley County farms. Early the following month eighty
members attending a Valley County Association meeting at Ord
voted unanimously to join the proposed national farm strike. They
pledged to oppose violence and picketing and in a bid for local
support agreed not to withhold such items as eggs, meat, or butter
intended for local consumption. The strike movement collapsed
the following month in the wake of sharp criticism from Secretary
of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. The following year the Valley
County group endorsed the Frazier bill for refinancing farm indebtedness and urged a halt to all meat imports from abroad. At this
point the organization's membership included about half the farmers in the county.s
Not only did the Farmers Holiday Association fail in its efforts
to prevent farm foreclosures but it also experienced defeat in its
campaign to halt federal crop reduction programs. The association
came into direct conflict with the farm bureau on this issue. The
bureau stood squarely behind the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA) and the general Roosevelt-Wallace policy of controlled production of agricultural commodities. State and national association
officials constantly reiterated their hostility toward this and other
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New Deal programs, assailing the National Recovery Administration (NRA) as a blue buzzard gnawing at the vitals of the American
farmer and the Reforestation corps for planning to shoot down
farmers trying to save their homes from foreclosure. Spokesmen for
the association expressed jubilation when the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled the first AAA unconstitutional in January, 1936, but even
that triumph proved short-lived with the subsequent enaction of
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotments Act followed by
the second AAA.9
The confrontation between the Farmers Holiday Association
and the farm bureau represented not only a disagreement over specific farm policy but also a divergence in basic world views. The
association spoke for farmers who viewed agriculture as a fundamental way of life and who sought essentially to restore earlier,
more favorable conditions. To such individuals the idea of deliberately reducing the output of foodstuffs appeared contrary to nature, especially in view of the existence of hunger in the cities.
They sought to restore security of tenure to the family farm and
to return to their customary mode of living. Farmers closely associated with the farm bureau subscribed to a different approach.
They tended to view farming as a business rather than as a more
general way of life. They concerned themselves primarily with perfecting their marketing organization and enhancing their productivity, for their general outlook stemmed from a basic concern with
increasing their profits. Hence they did not feel the ingrained opposition to production controls which the traditional farmer experienced, viewing them in the light of a business proposition rather
than a fundamentally moral question. This does not mean that all
individuals in either organization subscribed completely to either
viewpoint, for many persons belonged to both organizations. Nonetheless this basic divergence in outlooks did shape the political
stances of the two organizations.
This disagreement found direct expression in the contest to
abolish the Valley County extension agent's post in 1934. The
Farmers Holiday Association and its ally, the Valley County Taxpayers League, sought to abolish the position on the grounds of
economy. In practice, however, the campaign represented an attack
upon the farm bureau and the AAA, both of which retained close
relationships with the agent. In the November election of that year
the basic voting divisions of the 1924 contest reappeared. This time
the electorate favored retention of the office by a margin of 1,942 to
1,903. Again the winning margin came from the city of Ord. On
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this occasion the townships of Arcadia and North Loup voted for
abolition since village residents saw no benefit for their towns in
the presence of the agent at Ord. The distribution of votes among
the farm precincts paralleled that of the previous contest although
this time the total farm precinct vote deadlocked 965 to 965. 10
Even before the Farmers Holiday Association appeared on the
scene state officials acted to alleviate the farm mortgage crisis. In
November, 1932, several district judges declared a moratorium on
the foreclosure cases pending in court. Then on February 13, 1933,
Governor Charles W. Bryan issued a proclamation calling upon
all mortgage holders to suspend foreclosures and forced sales until
a commission which he had established to mediate such disputes
could complete its organization, and until the state legislature and
Congress could act. The legislature quickly enacted a moratorium
statute which gave at least the appearance of stemming the tide
of foreclosures. Ultimately the state Supreme Court declared the
measure unconstitutional, but this action did not come until 1938.1 1
Most new mortgages acquired after 1933 took the form of Federal Land Bank and Federal Land Bank Commissioner Loans.
These loans bore interest rates of 4 or 4.5 percent compared with
the existing commercial rates of 6 or 7 percent. More significantly,
they covered much longer terms-twenty years or more in the case
of land bank loans-thereby providing borrowers with relatively
long-term security. With the disappearance of most types of private
credit these loans offered about the only means of refinancing mortgages available to farm owners. The land bank loans entailed first
mortgages on real estate while commissioner loans involved first or
second liens and covered chattels as well as lands. Under existing
regulations the federal loans could not exceed half the appraised
value of farm land or 20 percent of the value of improvements.
Appraisers based their estimates upon the productivity of the land
multiplied by the farm commodity prices for the base period of
1910-1914. This system of appraisal and especially its choice of a
base period provoked numerous complaints from borrowers who
thought the new valuations too conservative.
Thus influx of federal loans led to a sharp increase in the value
of farm mortgages filed in 1934 and 1935 after which the volume
of new land bank loans receded to its previous level. New federal
loans in Greeley and Valley counties from 1933 through 1936 totaled more than $1,700,000. Judging from the incomplete agricultural census data for this period it appears that by 1940 Federal
Land Bank loans accounted for perhaps two-thirds or more of the
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total farm indebtedness in the region. For some farmers the reduction in interest and the extended period of repayment provided
the margin necessary to retain ownership of farms which they would
otherwise have lost. For many others, however, federal loans merely
staved off the inevitable a little while longer. The intense drouth
which began in earnest in 1934 prevented even men of superior
managerial ability from meeting their financial obligations. The
combination of exhausted financial resources due to repeated crop
failures together with the nullification of the state moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures in 1938 led to a sharp rise in foreclosure
activity in that year as table 3 (p. 61) indicates. 12
A more detailed analysis of the mortgage picture in Valley
County reveals several patterns of interest. About sixty-eight thousand acres or 19 percent of all farmland in the county underwent
foreclosure proceedings while a further thirty-seven thousand acres
or 11 percent went to creditors through forced sale. The latter
group included approximately 150 farms which combined with
the 313 foreclosed units gives a total of 463 farms lost to creditors.
According to local statistics, this meant that 29.2 percent of Valley
County farms including about 30 percent of the total land area went
to creditors. In other words, the farms lost averaged close to the
mean average size of farms in the county. Scarcely any of the smallest farm units-i.e., those of less than forty acres-underwent forced
transfer although numerous eighty acre tracts did so. On the other
hand the largest units did not enjoy immunity from foreclosure on
account of their size. Most forced transfer units fell in the hundred
sixty- to three hundred twenty-acre size grouping-the normal
family farm category. For a more detailed examination of this process at work among a cross section of Loup country farms see chapter 7. 13
Who lost his farm and who did not? Those free from the burden
of mortgages experienced relative security of tenure. Mortgage free
farms generally fell into one of three categories. In a large number
of cases the owner who had finished paying for his land had retired
and rented his farm. Thus in 1940 full owners of mortgage-free
farms averaged 58.2 years of age compared with a figure of 51.9
years for debtor farmers. In many other instances debt-free land
remained tied up in family estates. Finally, in a few cases young
operators who had recently inherited land had not yet acquired
mortgages. Conversely those operators engaged in expanding their
holdings or who had not yet held their land long enough to pay
off their debts found themselves in a vulnerable position. Hence
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farm operators between the ages of thirty and the late fifties found
themselves most susceptible to foreclosure or forced sale.14
Which of the mortgaged farmers lost their land? Altogether 45
percent of mortgaged land passed to creditors whereas 55 percent
of the debtors retained possession of their farms. In part survival
depended on how much of the mortgage principal remained due.
A number of farmers had only one or two years of payments to
make at the beginning of the decade and managed to obtain the
necessary funds before the drouth set in. In other instances those
who began farming late in the thirties had only to struggle with
two or three fairly small payments before the war boom began.
Those substantially in debt at the beginning of the thirties, however, faced a better than even likelihood of losing their farms. Individual success or failure in this regard depended upon a variety of
factors. The most significant of these involved the quality of the
farm land. Farmers in soil-depleted, hilly regions had much less
chance of survival than those in river valleys where subirrigated land
might produce at least a partial crop together with some pasturage
for livestock. Freak weather variations proved significant as hailstorms demolished some crops which the drouth had spared. A
farmer's managerial capacity, the ability of the family to obtain
funds from relatives and other nonfarm sources, and participation
in federal farm programs for cash payment all played a part in
determining individual farm survival or failure.
Figure 4 illustrates the variability in the mortgage picture from
one precinct to another. Higher rates of forced transfer generally
prevailed in the marginal farming areas such as Noble, Springdale,
Davis Creek, and Independent. The better land lying in the river
valleys and in south central Valley County did not go to creditors
nearly as often. Cultural factors also exerted some influence since
the Germans and Bohemians tended to borrow from neighbors and
relatives rather than from banks or mortgage brokers to a far
greater extent than did the population of old-American stock. Thus
the proportion of mortgaged land lost proved notably low in (German) Enterprise and (Bohemian) Geranium townships. In addition,
the general farming pattern characteristic of the Bohemians proved ..
better suited for survival during drouth periods than the livestockfeeding economy prevalent in the hilly areas which depended on
imported feed for animals and required large-scale capital investment. Obviously a number of variables influenced the prospects for
farm survival during this period so that any sweeping generalizations on the subject require qualification.

Drouth, Depression, and Disaster
Eureka
37.8
26.0
11.1
37.1
23.1

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

26.7
25.6
20.8
46.3
33.9

Geranium

Michigan

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

47.4
12.8
10.1
22.8
12.0

39.5
20.1
11.3
31.4
19.1

67

r-;oble

Elyria

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

/

MF
Fel
FS
MLI.
TLL

-1--

o~

'<'

32.9
44.2
2R.2
72.4
4R2

Springdale
Ord
MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TL1.

29.9 'b
17.4 %
11.3
2H.7
20.1

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

19.3
49.9
11.5
61.4
49.6

fti."ue'f

Liberty

Enterprise

Vinton

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

35.5
20.1
20.4
40.6
26.1

~ITM"
"

MF
Fel

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

:fo.

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

Yale
32.4
30.2

~

9.~~
";-

FS
MLL
39.4
TLL 26.7

50.8
26.4
17.9
44.3
21.7

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
T1.L

34.6
21.8
4.4
26.2
17.1

Davis Creek

33.5
26.1
17.8
43.9
29.5

North Loup
28.2
23.5
15.0
38.4
27.5

Independent

40.5
62..'>
6.6
69.1
41.1

MF
Fel
FS
MLL
TLL

32.1
35.0
29.7
64.6
43.8

Figure 4. Mortgage Situation, Valley County, 1929-1941.

II

Meeting his mortgage payments comprised only one of the
many difficulties facing the farmer during the thirties. Once the
price collapse had begun the simple task of raising the cash necessary to pay such basic expenses as taxes, grocery bills, and seed costs
grew increasingly formidable. Consequently the farm operator began
looking about for financial assistance. The major channel for direct
federal help initially consisted of the emergency seed loans authorized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This
measure provided for loans to midwestern farmers affected by
drouth and insects. Both natural hazards afHicted the Loup country
in 1931 and 1932 and in the latter year the Valley County agent
obtained federal authority to implement the program in his area.
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Under this program the farmer who could not obtain a seed loan
from regular commercial sources could borrow up to four hundred
dollars from the federal government. In exchange he paid 5.5 percent interest, deducted in advance, and gave a lien on his crop.
Only those who had operated their farms the previous year qualified for such loans. This program remained in effect for most of
the decade although the Roosevelt administration later incorporated acreage reduction requirements into its provisions,15
Herbert Hoover's establishment of the Federal Farm Board in
1929 had signalled the end of an era in the rp.,lm of federal agricultural policy. Prior to that time governmental involvement in
agriculture had consisted almost entirely of limited financial support for education and research together with occasional disaster
relief. The major exception to this policy of limited activity came
during World War I when, under Hoover's administrative leadership, the government established minimum farm commodity prices
in order to encourage production. This policy terminated abruptly
following the successful conclusion of the conflict. Even in wartime
the typical farmer had not come into direct contact with federal
officials other than the county agent who himself represented a
hybrid combination of federal, state, and county authority. The
price-fixing procedure had appeared as remote to the agriculturist
as the normal process of price determination in the urban terminal
markets. Hence even during the war the individual farmer had not
felt any personal sense of governmental intervention in his domain.
The same remained true when the Federal Farm Board launched
its abortive effort to raise farm commodity prices through manipulations of the marketing system.
With the advent of the Roosevelt administration in 1933 the
traditional policy of governmental abstention from participation
in the producing sector of American agriculture received a final
blow. Roosevelt and his farm policy makers concluded that the
failure of the farm board stemmed from its inability to control
farm production. Proceeding on the assumption that the root
cause of the farm crisis lay in the overproduction of basic farm
commodities the new regime moved to resolve the problem by
lowering production to a level consonant with demand. Now, for
the first time, the individual farmer found himself asked to surrender a degree of his managerial autonomy in exchange for guaranteed economic support. Thus, rather than operating in a remote
way the new agricultural programs led to direct farmer-government
contracts restricting production and specifying practices to be car-
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ried out by the farmer in exchange for cash payments. Under this
system the farm operator found himself increasingly integrated
into a large bureaucratic structure of the type already familiar to
most urban manufacturing and commercial enterprises.
New Deal farm policy took shape with the passage of the first
Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933. Under the provisions of this
measure farmers who reduced their crop acreages from existing
levels could qualify for benefit payments. In the summer of 1933
AAA organizations sprang up in all three counties in the Loup
country as the first step toward the implementation of the new
program. Greeley County acquired a farm extension agent at this
time-fifteen years after Custer and Valley counties had done so.
The county agent supervised local AAA activities, thereby underlining the intertwining relationship between the farm bureau, the
federal government, and the county. The administrative structure
of the AAA followed the usual precinct and county lines with a
pyramidal hierarchy of elected officials topped by the county board
of directors,16
Since farmers sowed winter wheat in the autumn it received
first priority in the activation of the acreage reduction program.
Owing to the limited nature of wheat production in the Loup
country, however, it did not significantly affect the regional economy. But when federal officials began setting up the corn-hog
reduction program to take effect in 1934 they reported encountering exceptional local interest. During the first year approximately
three-fourths of the farmers in the region signed up to participate
in the program. These operators agreed to reduce their corn
acreage by 20 percent and hog production by 25 percent in exchange
for direct cash payments. These contracts proved unexpectedly easy
to enforce-at least with respect to the corn crop-since the drouth
that year killed nearly all of it. A shortage of feed led Custer
County farmers to slaughter many of their hogs and eliminated any
problem of enforcing compliance with hog reduction there. In
Greeley County, however, some farmers produced too many swine
which the county agent advised them to kill or donate to the
county for relief purposes.
Despite their initial enthusiasm Loup country participants in
the corn-hog program voted against continuing it in 1935 by a four
to three margin. Nonparticipants opposed continuation by a margin
of four to one. The low voter turnout contributed to the negative
vote since many of those satisfied with the system became compla-
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cent and remained home while those with grievances turned out
in large numbers. Partisan politics also played a major role as
normally Republican precincts opposed continuation whereas Democratic areas favored it. Finally, many of those who favored continued federal payments opposed the concomitant production controls because they failed either to understand or accept the concept
of artificially induced scarcity to foster high prices.17
Probably the most significant source of opposition to the cornhog program, however, lay in the nature of the regional agricultural economy. The corn-hog program sought to raise the price of
both corn and hogs by restricting their production. Neither this
nor any other federal program provided for raising beef cattle
prices and most farmers in the region obtained the bulk of their
income from the sale of cattle rather than from the sale of corn or
hogs. As early as 1931 the Valley County Farm Bureau had gone
on record opposing the plan of the governor of Iowa to raise corn
prices to sixty cents per bushel. Bureau spokesmen pointed out
that Valley County farmers had imported two hundred carloads of
corn that year and had no interest in raising their own feeding
costs. Six years later a Scotia farmer echoed the same sentiment
when he stressed that Greeley County farm operators had to buy
their corn from outside the area and had no interest in raising
corn prices. For the beef producer, then, the program's disadvantages considerably outweighed its advantages and he sought to
abolish it accordingly.
Despite the negative vote, participation in the corn-hog program
in 1935 exceeded the level of the previous year. In the referendum
on continuing the program in 1936 the region's farmers favored
renewal by a margin of more than two to one. The reversal from
the previous year's vote resulted from the continuing drouth which
left nearly all farmers faced with heavy operating losses. Indeed,
the Greeley County agent reported that had it not been for their
participation in the corn-hog program farmers would have had to
sell most of their hogs for lack of feed. The sharp reduction in the
number of cattle due to the drouth also contributed to the election's
outcome as beef producers reduced the size of their herds and with
them the scope of their grain requirements. The signing up of
farmers for the 1936 season proceeded at a brisk pace but halted
abruptly when in January, 1936, the United States Supreme Court
ruled the AAA unconstitutionaJ.18
At this juncture Congress enacted the Soil Conservation and
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Domestic Allotment Act to provide continued assistance to farmers
who reduced their crop acreages. The act defined corn, sorghum,
small grain, and other row crops as "soil-depleting" while classifying alfalfa, sweet clover, and permanent grasses as "soil-improving."
Farmers could convert up to 15 percent of their soil-depleting crop
acreage to soil-improving crops the first year in exchange for payments similar to those made under the AAA programs. The number of farmers signing up for the new scheme exceeded those for
its predecessor although payments averaged less, as burned-out
farmers sought desperately to obtain funds from any available
source. Two years later in 1938 Congress enacted the second AAA
which incorporated the basic provisions of the 1936 act. This program, with some minor alterations, provided the basic framework
for agricultural policy down to the )970s. 19
Another major New Deal farm program that initially attracted
considerable attention among Loup country farmers centered upon
the operations of the Commodity Credit Corporation. The secretary of agriculture established this corporation in October, 1933,
and the new enterprise began operating in the region shortly after
the fall harvest that year. Participating farmers agreed to undertake acreage reductions and brought their corn to the corporation
in exchange for loans at the rate of forty-five cents per bushel at
4 percent interest. In the early months of 1934 more than three
hundred Valley County farmers or slightly less than one out of
four signed up for loans averaging about eight hundred bushels
each. Total corporation payments in the county that year came to
over $125,000. Following this initial burst of enthusiasm interest
in the Commodity Credit Corporation waned as drouth conditions
drove corn prices well above the loan rates. During the last two
years of the decade some farmers again sought corn loans but with
the coming of W orld War II price increases once more led to a
cessation of the corporation's activity. It, too, continued to function
under the provisions of the second AAA and became a mainstay in
the operation of postwar agricultural programs. 20
Although the AAA, the Soil Conservation Act, and the Commodity Credit Corporation all sought to raise farm prices by restricting production other federal programs aimed at achieving
different and not entirely compatible objectives. These included
several emergency programs designed to alleviate the effects of the
intense drouth which plagued the region for most of the decade.
The extended drouth began on a small scale following the near
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record harvest of 1930. In each of the next three years subnormal
rainfall caused declining crop yields. Corn and oat yields fell by
about one-third below the level of the twenties and wheat yields
declined by nearly one-fourth. This period of moderate drouth
reduced the level of subsoil moisture and caused the drying out of
the surface soil. This paved the way for serious wind erosion and
in September, 1933, the most severe dust storm in many years struck
the Ord vicinity. Winds of forty to fifty miles per hour drove
clouds of dust which forced motorists to use their auto headlights
at midday. Then real disaster struck. Between December 2, 1933,
and July 19, 1934, the village of Scotia recorded less than two
inches of precipitation. Finally, in September, 1934, some rains
came, followed by the appearance of a few blades of grass which
sprouted up in the pastures.
Even with the fall rains the year proved a major disaster for
Loup country farmers. They harvested less than one-eighth of the
seeded wheat acreage and even that produced only one-fourth of
the normal yield. Three-fourths of the corn acreage produced nothing at all while the remainder averaged about one-third of a normal
crop. Likewise the production of hay crops shrank as the acreage
of alfalfa cut fell by three-fourths and that of wild hay harvested
by more than nine-tenths. The acute moisture deficiency that year
further dried out the subsoil and in the spring of 1935 dust storms
began to wreak genuine havoc. In April storms swept into the
region bearing red soil from Texas and Oklahoma. Townsmen
swept and shoveled dust from their sidewalks as they might remove
snow after a blizzard. The following summer dry spells alternated
with sudden rains and the worst hail storms in thirty-five years
pelted the northern part of Valley County. Again crop losses proved
severe but small grain suffered less than corn and farmers enjoyed
a successful oats harvest. 21
Similar conditions prevailed through the remainder of the
decade. In the fall and spring rains usually fell, facilitating the
seeding of wheat and other small-grain crops. In July and August
rainfall ceased and hot southern winds burned up the corn crop.
Farmers began cutting their corn for ensilage in July in order to
save something of the crop while small grains usually produced half
their normal yields. Another major disaster occurred in 1937 when
the over-all damage approached that of 1934. The influence of the
drouth shows up most clearly in the statistics for crop yields in the
thirties compared with the averages for 1921-1930. These figures
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which appear in table 4 tend to understate the impact of the drouth
somewhat in that they do not take into account acres seeded but
not harvested, a classification which included most of the crop
acreage in 1934.22

TA£LE 4
VALLEY COUNTY CROP YIELDS,

Year

Wheat

Corn

1931-1941

Oats

Alfalfa

1921-1930
Average

17.6 bu.

24.2 bu.

29.4 bu.

2.2 tons

1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

18.2
11.9
9.9
3.6
9.7
15.4'
5.8
13.4
9.5
9.2
9.9

12.8
10.8
20.0
1.6
7.9
2.1
3.2
8.7
6.8
3.8
11.8

16.9
31.4
7.4
11.9
26.8
10.0
8.4
22.8
12.2
10.0
22.8

1.15
1.44
1.35
0.90
1.50
0.78
0.81
1.19
0.75
0.60
1.02

Compiled from the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. Nebraska
Agricultural Statistics, (annual) passim,

SOURCE:

As the severity of the drouth became evident in 1934 the federal
government initiated two emergency programs of major significance
to farmers in the region. As the pastures dried up and the supply
of fodder dwindled the government designated the region a drouth
disaster area, thus making the resident eligible to participate in
federal emergency cattle-buying operations. The intensity of the
drouth led Custer County farmers to offer for sale eight times the
number of animals that the federal quota allowed. Two-thirds of
the farmers in Greeley and Valley counties made sales ranging from
one to over one hundred head of cattle each. In the case of Valley
County the number of cattle sold-nearly sixteen thousand headamounted to more than half the total in the county. As the auctions progressed considerable irritation developed owing to the
inability of buyers to purchase all cattle offered for sale. 23
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While forage supplies dwindled another emergency program
went into effect. The emergency feed loan program attracted widespread interest among livestock owners throughout the region.
More than five-sixths of the farmers in Greeley County applied for
feed loans and the county commissioners imported ninety-four
carloads of feed. Four hundred farmers received direct loans
averaging more than $300 each. Across the county line to the west
nearly half the Valley County farm operators received a total of
$150,000 in feed loans. An additional 150 farmers there obtained
emergency loans from the Federal Emergency Relief Act program,
paying for their feed by working on the county roads. This emergency program did not extend beyond 1935 but for some it proved
crucial. For many operators these emergency loans together with
AAA payments provided the only means of remaining in business
for another year. 24
Last among the major agricultural programs to affect the area's
farmers during the depression decade came the Resettlement Administration (RA) whose functions eventually passed into the hands
of the Farm Security Administration. This agency provided small
subsistence grants to farmers along with occasional larger loans to
assist them in consolidating their debts or acquiring ownership of
their farms. During the particularly severe drouth year of 1937
nearly half the farm families in the region received grants from
this source. Certain program administrators came under heavy fire,
however, because of the criteria used in selecting recipients. A mass
meeting of farmers and townsmen in Greeley late in 1937 voted
540 to 14 to condemn the attitude of the local RA office. Shortly
after this meeting RA officials reported that grants were being made
on the basis of need. This quieted the agitation although some
degree of rancor persisted. 25

III
Loup country residents had never entirely dismissed the possibility of developing irrigation as a means of combatting the drouths
which periodically afflicted the region. Irrigation boosters looked
back to the diversion projects of the 1890s which had functioned
briefly with some degree of success. However, the ultimate failure
of those projects gave rise to skepticism concerning the economic
feasibility of large-scale diversion. Consequently interest shifted
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from diversion to well irrigation during the twenties. This change
paralleled the rise of well irrigation in the Platte valley to the
south of the region. Experts from the State College of Agriculture
recommended the use of pump irrigation from either rivers or
wells since the presence of the sandhills to the north ensured not
only a regular flow of surface water throughout the year but also
an abundant subsoil moisture supply for well irrigation. 26
As the drouth began to appear in the thirties public interest
veered back in the direction of large-scale diversion. In 1930
rumors spread that the federal government would designate the
Ord vicinity an irrigation, drainage, and flood control district.
Area leaders queried the state engineer on the matter and that
official advised them to form an irrigation district and submit a
loan application to the federal government. To hard-pressed farmers seeking to cut their expenses the projected water rates of from
$3.50 to $4.00 per acre appeared excessive and support for the
project lapsed. However, interest in the subject revived when the
drouth began in earnest.27
Late in the summer of 1932 farmers in the North Loup vicinity
began seriously considering plans for a project that would irrigate
ten thousand acres along the North Loup River south of Ord. The
RCF tentatively offered a loan to finance the construction of a dam
and diversion ditch. The proposal touched off a major debate over
the costs and advantages involved in carrying out such a project.
A number of critics expected building costs to greatly exceed the
official estimates whereas others contended that the projected benefits from irrigation were unrealistic. The major opposition to the
scheme came from those who did not expect to benefit from irrigation and who feared being assessed to help pay for the project.
Despite these objections a farmers' meeting at North Loup elected
temporary officers for the proposed district and drew up petitions
for permanent formal organization. 28
Further meetings in the North Loup River valley towns led to
a public consideration of additional irrigation and hydroelectric
power generating schemes. In March, 1933, irrigation enthusiasts
raised the funds to finance an initial survey for the project. Early
in June the preliminary report appeared, carrying with it a cost
estimate of $2,905,000. This greatly deflated proponents of the
project whose highest previous estimate had only approached a
million dollars. After some hesitation they decided to proceed and
applied to the state for the necessary approval. Late in June Gov-

76

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

ernor Bryan approved the loan requests submitted to the federal
government. The North Loup Public Power and Irrigation District
then formally organized and the directors reported that the anticipated cost of the project had been reduced to about two million
dollars. 29
There followed a protracted series of negotiations as district
officials sought to obtain the necessary funds from the federal government. Finally, in August, 1936, the congressional appropriation
for the project received the president's signature. Altogether nearly
forty-eight thousand acres in the North Loup Valley would come
under irrigation. Government experts estimated that annual water
rates would average about $2.50 per acre. The public response to
this approval, coming as it did in the middle of the third consecutive severe drouth year, followed a predictable pattern: "Whistles
shrieked, bells clanged and men and women went wild with joy in
the towns of the North and Middle Loup valleys.... At Ord the
fire siren began blowing about 10:30 but it was two hours before
all people had been acquainted with the reasons for so much noise.
Then bells, car horns and other noise-making devices joined the
fire siren which blew intermittently for several hours." Several
months later Senator George Norris who had carefully steered the
project through the myriad paths of the federal bureaucracy appeared at Ord. There he plowed the first furrow to begin construction on the North Loup project. An estimated eight thousand
persons attended the celebration held at Ord in conjunction with
the ceremony.30
Events in the Middle Loup valley followed a similar course.
Mass meetings in 1932 led to the completion of a preliminary study
early in 1933. In January of that year promoters began signing up
landowners who would use irrigation water. They formally organized the Middle Loup district in May and drew up plans for the
project. These initially called for the construction of two main
gravity irrigation canals together with a hydroelectric dam; however, they underwent considerable modification in the process of
application for federal loans. Finally in 1936 Congress appropriated
the funds for project construction. As in the case of the North Loup
district the Middle Loup project dropped its proposed electric
power generating scheme. In the spring of 1937 the district awarded
bids for construction and work began almost immediately. Water
first flowed through the system's canals late in 1938, almost at the
same time as it began reaching the fields in the North Loup district.
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Shortly thereafter the Comstock editor reported that about forty
farmers who had received water were doing well while adjacent
dryland corn had already burned Up.31

IV
Low prices and acute drouth forced the farmers in the Loup
country to revamp their operations if they hoped to survive. Some
turned to irrigation as part of the movement outlined above but
they did not attain their goal until 1938. Even then only about
one out of six farmers in the region benefited directly from the
diversion projects since the remainder lived outside of the irrigable
zone. For these farmers the process of adaptation continued until
the onset of war prosperity and the return of adequate rainfall
after 1941. This adaptation process involved two basic dimensions.
First, the farmer sought to reduce his cash expenses as far as possible. Second, he altered his pattern of commodity production so
as to obtain the highest possible income within the context of
curtailed operations.
One of the most obvious and traditionally the most obnoxious
source of cash expense to farmers lay in the real and personal
property tax. In 1930 property taxes in Valley County averaged
sixty-two cents per acre of farmland. For an average-sized farm of
240 acres this amounted to nearly $150, a substantial cash sum
even before the deflation of the thirties. Consequently the farmers
soon launched a campaign to reduce property valuations and government spending. They began holding meetings at the township
level to discuss the problem and soon the county boards received a
flood of petitions requesting a downward revision of farm property
valuations. Assessment boards across the state responded to such
pressures by reducing land valuations IS percent in 1932 with
further downward adjustments in later years. They also lowered
the personal property assessments for livestock and grain inventories
to reflect their diminished value. In Valley County the assessed
valuation of personal property on farms decreased between onethird and one-half in 1932. Thus the farmers achieved their initial
objective of reduced tax valuations without encountering any serious resistance.32
But lower assessed valuations meant little if government spending did not decline since mill levies could rise as rapidly as valua-
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tions fell. This consideration led both farmers and their village
allies to launch a vigorous attack on government spending. The
Valley County Taxpayers League formed in 1932 for the express
purpose of reducing county and local taxes. Similar organizations
appeared elsewhere in the region and throughout the state as well.
These groups demanded a number of changes including reduced
school budgets, the consolidation of county governments where
such action could reduce county expenses, and the closing of tax
loopholes-particularly with regard to intangible property. They
also urged a general reorganization of the tax structure based upon
the substitution of a state income tax and luxury goods sales tax
for a large part of the property tax burden. The crusade to cut
taxes achieved some degree of success as the average property tax
per acre of farmland dropped by about one-fourth during the
decade, from sixty-two cents in 1930 to forty-eight cents in 1940.33
Reducing property taxes provided one means of lowering farm
expenses but obviously the farmer had to make adjustments elsewhere as well. Most of the farmers in the region adopted a conservative strategy, reducing the scope of their operations which involved cash outlays. Livestock farmers decreased their holdings in
an effort to eliminate the cash expense of buying feed and young
animals. This led to a sharp drop in the number of cattle and hogs
in the region in mid-decade. Government programs played a
limited role in this progress-chiefly affecting the steep reduction in
the number of cattle through the emergency buying program in
1934 and to some degree the reduction in hog numbers in 1934-1935.
Statistics for the animal population in Valley County appear in
table 5.34
Other cuts in farm expenditures came less from the curtailing
of operations than from the avoidance of new expenses. Construction activity on farms halted entirely and existing buildings received
a minimal amount of maintenance and repair. Altogether the value
of farm buildings in Valley County fell by nearly three-eighths in
terms of constant dollars during the decade. Part of the decline
resulted from the abandonment of farms whose buildings then disintegrated. Nonetheless the fall reflected a real deterioration in the
general condition of farm buildings in the region. Similarly the
amount of money invested in new machinery diminished significantly. The total value of farm implements and machinery in
Valley County declined by about one-third in terms of constant
dollars during the thirties. Purchases of new automobiles also
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TABLE 5
CATTLE AND HOGS
VALLEY COUNTY,

1931-1940

Year

Cattle

Hogs

1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

23,500
20,760
20,260
24,450*
10,520
19,000
16,680
15,610
17,730
18,980

65,340
68,240
45,660
54,400
21,480"
24,890
16,470
15,280
19,030
23,190

·In 1934 federal buyers purchased 15,963 Valley County cattle.
"In 1935 Valley County AAA participants reduced hog production by 13,079
from the preceding year.
SOURCE: Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, passim.

slowed drastically from the level of previous years. More than half
the autos on farms in 1940 exceeded ten years of age while fewer
than one-sixth were less than five years old.
If the over-all investment in farm machinery fell alarmingly
during the thirties mechanization did advance in at least one area.
The proportion of Valley County farms using tractors rose from
about one-fifth in 1930 to more than two-fifths in 1940. While part
of this increase came as a consequence of the declining number of
farms, the actual number of farming operations using tractors nearly
doubled during the decade. About two-fifths of the tractors in use
in 1940 exceeded ten years of age-relics of an earlier prosperity.
Only about one-sixth consisted of 1931-1935 models. Most of the
tractor buying that decade came after 1937. Many of the new purchasers evidently lived in the river valleys and resumed profitable
operations after the arrival of irrigation water in 1938. Other cash
grain farmers, especially the small-grain producers in the southern
part of Valley County, also acquired tractors which they found useful in field crop production.35
Other advances also occurred within the framework of a reduced
scale of farm operations. Prior to the drouth the silo had won
only limited acceptance in the region, chiefly from dairymen. But
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when it became evident that cutting corn for ensilage offered thE!
only means of saving part of the crop, general and livestock farmers
adopted the practice with alacrity. The number of silos in Custer
County alone rose from three hundred in 1934 to twelve hundred
two years later. Corn growers also investigated improved strains
of seed but the persistent drouth frustrated progress in that direction. Dryland corn invariably failed whatever the variety of seed
planted. Only after large-scale irrigation got under way in 1938
did hybrid corn come into local use. Farmers who watered their
fields reported that the new varieties increased yields by 30 to 40
percent. This pointed the way toward a general adoption of hybrid
corn once rain returned to the area. 36
Another aspect of the search for survival concerned the production of crops more resistant to drouth than corn and small grain.
For a while Jerusalem artichokes received a good deal of publicity
but the ballyhoo over this crop eventually subsided. The widespread adoption of grain sorghum proved far more significant as
the Valley County acreage of this crop rose from less than a hundred
in 1930 to more than nineteen thousand in 1939. The latter figure
equaled more than two-fifths of the corn acreage seeded that year.
The adaptation of corn planters and other machinery to sorghum
production posed some technical problems but farmers soon ironed
them out. Sorghum producers cut about half their acreage for
ensilage or hogged it while harvesting the rest for grain. During
the same period barley production expanded rapidly, particularly
after the introduction of the hardier Spartan variety. In 1940 Valley
County producers planted sixteen thousand acres of barley, a figure
nearly equal to that of all other small grains combined.37
Somewhat paradoxically the reduction in livestock numbers provided an opportunity for advancing the regional cattle industry.
The necessity for getting rid of large numbers of animals forced
farmers to examine, many of them for the first time, the individual
performance records of their cattle. Thus while much indiscriminate unloading of livestock did take place, a generally culling
process went into operation. This applied to dairy animals as well
as beef cattle. Late in the decade dairy farmers in Valley and Custer
counties began importing purebred dairy bulls with the assistance
of village creamery managers and the county agents. This led to a
noteworthy improvement in the grade of dairy animals. At the same
time the counties in the Loup country finally initiated tuberculosis
testing programs. Farmers had earlier opposed testing because of
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the inadequate compensation for animals found infected and destroyed. With the drouth and the resulting necessity for reducing
the number of animals the compensation prices appeared more
attractive. Testing got under way in 1935 and Valley County earned
a modified tuberculosis-free rating the following year. Custer and
Greeley counties achieved a similar status shortly thereafter. 3s
One other positive aspect of drouth adjustment appeared with
the growing interest in soil conservation. Few farmers had seriously
thought about the subject in earlier decades and the main conservation practice in the region consisted of a system of crop rotation
based upon alfalfa or sweet clover and grain. When their land
started to blow away, however, farmers began to grasp the necessity
for adopting soil conservation measures. Unfortunately, the means
for implementing a long-term conservation program did not exist.
The enactment of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act in 1936 helped to fill this gap by providing technical assistance
and financial benefits for participating farmers. Since the program
aimed primarily at crop reduction its major initial effect involved
the movement of cropland into legumes and permanent grassland.
But after the adoption of the second AAA the emphasis shifted
toward the encouragement of other soil-conserving practices. Contour plowing quickly attracted attention because of its moisture
conserving characteristics. Toward the end of the decade terracing
and the construction of farm ponds also got under way although
significant participation in these practices did not come until after
the return of the rains in the early forties. 39

V

As the farmer's economic plight worsened the banking institutions dependent upon his well-being began to go under. In June,
1929, the Farmers State Bank of Scotia went into involuntary receivership. The major sequence of failures in the region began two
years later when the State Bank of Ord suspended business on
October 15, 1931. The following day the North Loup State Bank
failed to open its doors. Officials of the latter institution blamed
the suspension on heavy demands by depositors coupled with low
farm prices which made it impossible for farmers to meet their
obligations. During the next few days the village experienced a
fever of unrest and discouragement and business came to a complete
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halt. The debacle aroused considerable ill feeling among those most
affected and complaints soon appeared that merchants were taking
unfair advantage of the absence of any bank by charging five cents
for cashing checks.40
North Loupers confronted the problem of carrying on business
without regular banking facilities for a decade and a half as they
did not obtain another bank until 1946. After limping along for
nearly three years dependent upon the credit facilities of nearby
towns, a group of village merchants established a credit association
in the summer of 1934. This organization, the North Loup Cooperative Credit Association initially limited its transactions to
cashing checks and to accepting deposits from those who had paid
the ten-dollar membership fee. By 1938, however, it had acquired
most of the functions normally associated with banks-accepting
money for deposit, allowing members to write checks, loaning
money on security, and discounting notes with city banks. The
organization did not join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) because some of its directors lacked faith in that
agency's ability to meet the strain should another real financial
emergency arise. Consequently the association could not guarantee
the security of its deposits. Despite this fact the institution fulfilled
its functions with considerable success and villagers did not feel the
absence of a bank so deeply during the latter half of the decade. 41
Four months after the suspension of the Ord and North Loup
banks both Sargent banks closed their doors within the space of a
week. The Sargent State Bank never reopened and the Farmers
State Bank remained closed for seven months. Officials of the latter
bank explained the suspension in the same terms as had the North
Loup bankers. Large certificates of deposit coming due could not
be met without forcing farmers to sell everything they possessed to
payoff their notes. In September, 1932, the bank reopened under
special arrangements for handling the problem of withdrawals.
Those who left their large deposits in the bank were repaid over
the course of the next ten years while those who wanted immediate
withdrawal were offered a 24 percent final settlement.42
A month after the Sargent banks had closed the Citizens State
Bank of Comstock suspended business and did not reopen. The
other Comstock bank, the Farmers and Merchants State Bank, remained in operation and ultimately joined the FDIC. In the same
month the only bank in the hamlet of Horace north of Scotia failed.
A year later on January 30, 1933, the State Bank of Scotia closed its
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doors. Efforts to revive the institution failed and it was succeeded
by a new institution, the State Bank of Scotia, financed by local
farmers and businessmen together with several wealthy Ord attorneys. This bank operated successfully through the remainder of
the depression. One other bank in the region, the Elyria State Bank,
went into voluntary liquidation and wound up its affairs in January,
1936. Only the village of Arcadia with its lone bank weathered the
depression without a bank suspension. Altogether a total of nine
of the thirteen banks in the region closed of which only one successfully reopened. Thus in the space of seven years the number of
banking institutions in the Loup country fell by more than half.43
Both Governor Bryan's bank holiday which began March 4, 1933,
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's national bank holiday which
began two days later came too late to affect most of the region's
banks. During the "holiday" period Ord merchants issued scrip as
a substitute for checks and currency. Various proposals for circulating such scrip had appeared during the earlier banking crises and
one such scheme had attracted the favorable attention of the Ord
editor. But like the Townsend clubs which sprang up in several
Loup country towns the scrip projects proved more useful in creating a sense of activity on the part of a badly shaken populace than
in accomplishing any genuine change. 44
Banking failures represented only one facet of the depressed
economic conditions in the towns. As farmer buying power shrank
after 1929 retail sales slumped, leading to a general reduction in
the village sales force. Construction activity soon came to a halt,
adding further to the unemployment problem. Hence the appearance of the NRA drew an enthusiastic response from local businessmen struggling to ward off bankruptcy. They rushed in to sign up
under the blanket code and for a brief time optimism reigned
supreme. As adverse conditions persisted, however, disillusionment
set in. A year after the implementation of the NRA Ord merchants
warned that strict compliance with the code would force many men
out of work since they could not afford to pay the specified wage
rates given the current business climate. 45
Faced with this unpalatable situation villagers as well as farmers
began seeking work on the various federal relief projects in the
area. In the summer of 1933 nearly a thousand Valley County men
including a number of farmers signed up for work. The county
itself carried on relatively few relief operations, leaving the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and Civil Works Ad-
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ministration (CWA) to finance most of the work projects in the
area. By January, 1934, more than two hundred men were engaged
on CW A projects involving road work and water and sewer line
construction, but they worked only on a fifteen-hour per week basis.
That month Arcadia received a federal grant and loan for the construction of a new schoolhouse, a project which provided employment in that area. Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects
began operating in 1935 and centered upon road work, much as
the CWA projects had. Relief operations of this type continued for
most of the decade with the largest projects involving the construction of the North Loup and Middle Loup irrigation systems in 1937
and 1938. 46
Despite the operation of these programs times remained hard in
the villages of the Loup country and many merchants went out of
business. The survivors strove to reduce costs by laying off employees, reducing inventories, and seeking to reduce taxes. With the
worsening conditions later in the decade a substantial net outmigration from the villages developed as the inflow of population from
the farms dwindled. For the first time in thirty years the smaller
towns began losing population as local residents left in search of
work. Ord did not suffer as greatly as it served as district headquarters for most of the relief projects. Even there, however, the
number of retail firms diminished under the pressure of unfavorable
economic conditions. Thus began a long-term period of decline for
the agricultural villages of the region. 47
During the second and third decades of the twentieth century
a substantial outflow of migration developed in the Loup country
owing to the lack of employment opportunities for local youth. This
stream of outmigration slowed in the early thirties due to the
decline in employment opportunity elsewhere. With the worsening
of the drouth, conditions deteriorated further and another major
outflow developed. Among those who left the more successful sent
letters home advertising the advantages of their situations and urging others to join them. One family that moved from Greeley
County to the Yakima Valley sent a letter characteristic of this
genre to the Scotia editor. In somewhat patronizing terms the
author wrote: "To the friends we left behind us we give our sympathy. We sincerely hope the hard times let up back there and that
you all prosper as we have since we have been out here . . . . We
have all been working steady since we got here and good wages, too.
All of us are making from $2.50 to $4.00 per day. The climate here
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just suits us. It is warm during the day and cool during the nights
and a person sure can get a good night's rest." Encouraged by such
tidings many residents seriously considered moving west, especially
after the severe drouth season of 1937. Farm Security Administration personnel warned that the rumored labor shortages there were
temporary and that the work and income were only seasonal. Compared with the certainty of receiving no income at all, however,
the prospects remained alluring and the late thirties saw a marked
movement of population out of the region toward the West Coast.48
The harshness of the conditions facing those who remained
would have tried the patience of Job. Perhaps the most poignant
description of the situation came from a Greeley County housewife
in a letter to her Congressman:
I want you to know the real conditions of farmers in general here. 1934, dried
out-1935 raised feed, nothing to sell, 1936 dried out-1937-grain dried out,
corn holding on, but can't much longer without rain. We have been living on
hopes and half rations for 4 years. No gardens, except a little early garden and
not much to buy fruit and vegetables shipped in. It sure is getting monotonous
living on half rations. Our cows and horses had nothing to eat all summer but
weeds. We worked the horses on that diet. Nothing to buy feed with.
Most of the grass in pastures died out last summer, and now the weeds are
drying up. Lots of people have gone to the west coast, and many more are
talking of going. They think they can get to pick fruit out there and something to eat. Nebraska has raised lots of wheat this year, but not in Greeley
County as it dried out here. People here are a thrifty, energetic class of people.
In the summer they have some eggs and cream to sell. But unless we raise some
corn there won't be anything to feed the chickens and stock with, as the hay
meadows have turned to weeds, too. If we had some money we could buy feed,
but our pocketbooks are empty. People are talking of moving to the eastern
states now as it is about filled up on the west coast. If we don't get rain soon,
what are we to do?
Farmer's Wife
Scotia, Nebraska
P.S. We also have too many grasshoppers.

With increasing frequency those faced with such intolerable conditions simply gave up and left. Large numbers of abandoned farms
cropped up on the landscape, causing the remaining residents to
conclude that a major exodus of population had begun. Later
generations of Loup country dwellers continued to point to the
thirties as the time when migration out of the region began, a
notion which will receive more detailed consideration in chapters
7 and 8. In the fall of 1939 columnist George Gowen of the Ord
Quiz offered several illustrations of the desertion of the countryside.
Twenty-five idle farms lay along a twelve mile stretch of road to
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the south and west of North Loup, while a mail carrier reported
that his rural route had fifty fewer mail boxes than a few years
previously. That a heavy movement of population out of the
region had materialized seemed undeniable although a few scattered boosters still preferred to deny the inevitable. The census of
1940 revealed the extent of the decline in human numbers, the
beginning of a trend destined to continue through succeeding
decades. In many ways the new trend toward rural depopulation
would prove the most significant development in the social and
economic history of the region. 49

5. New Directions in Agriculture,

1940-1970

Loup COUNTRY who had survived the economic
disasters of the thirties saw few auspicious omens in the arrival of
the forties. Although the outbreak of war in Europe raised hopes
for higher farm prices the drouth continued unbroken. The average corn yield in Valley County fell from a meager 6.8 bushels
per acre in 1939 to a miserable 3.8 bushels per acre the following
year. Faced with a seemingly endless drouth farm residents grew
increasingly discouraged and outmigration from the region continued. As editor Leggett of the Ord Quiz wrote in the summer of
1940: "The discouragement over this section of the country this
summer, is the worst of any yet. Many proclaim this the worst year,
but it don't seem much different to me than many others and especially 1934. But everyone has become a little poorer as we come
along and many of those that are left here haven't money to get
away or to live on either.... " Fortunately 1940 proved to be the
last year of the severe drouth period. Although dry spells curtailed
corn yields on several occasions during the forties substantial crop
failure due to drouth did not recur until the middle fifties.!
As wartime demand mounted farm prices rose sharply in 1941
and continued their climb until the adoption of a price stabilization
policy by the federal government in 1943. The combination of
normal precipitation and high prices which then materialized
spelled a new era of prosperity for the farmer. Indeed the period
from 1942 through 1952 emerged as the second "golden age" for
twentieth-century agriculture. Even as the war ended in 1945 the
upsurge of consumer demand sustained high farm commodity prices,
and the demand generated by heavy European imports of foodstuffs drove the Nebraska farm price index to its highest point in
the decade in 1947. Prices continued favorable throughout the
Korean War. With the end of this conflict, however, prices again
fell and for much of the ensuing two decades the old specter of
overproduction returned to haunt the farmer. Although the actual
price situation varied from year to year the parity index generally
RESIDENTS OF THE
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hovered in the middle or upper eighties-or about the average for
1930. The annual index figures for 1940 through 1970 appear in
the Appendix.
In much the same way as its predecessor two decades earlier
World War II encouraged changes in the crop production patterns
of the Loup country. The combined acreage of corn and sorghum
remained unchanged but the ratio of the former to the latter rose
from less than four to one in 1940 to more than twenty to one
in 1945. The change-over followed the return of rains in 1941 as
farmers returned to their favorite crop. Small grain acreage rose
by nearly two-fifths in 1939-1943 compared with a one-third expansion in 1914-1918. Nearly 40 percent of the increase resulted from
expanded barley production which continued the rapid growth
begun in the late thirties. Although wheat and rye acreages tripled
their combined total did not equal that of barley. Oats production
remained stable throughout the war.2
During both world wars favorable meat prices encouraged a
substantial increase in livestock production. Between 1914 and 1918
the number of beef cattle in Valley County rose by half and the
number of swine by one-fourth. Between 1941 and 1945 cattle
numbers in the region nearly doubled. About half of this increase
went to make up for the losses due to drouth the previous decade.
Thus in Valley County the number of nondairy cattle fell from
24,450 in 1930 to 18,000 in 1941. By 1943 the number had risen
to 27,450 and it reached 37,000 in 1945. Early in the war high corn
prices hindered the expansion of cattle-feeding operations while
pastures in the area did not fully recover from the drouth until
1942. Real expansion in the number of cattle beyond the level of
earlier decades came after that date. 3
Other farm animals also increased in number during the war.
The swine population doubled between 1940 and 1944 although
this expansion represented recovery from the curtailment of the
thirties rather than renewed growth. Even at the latter date Valley
County counted 11 percent fewer hogs than in 1934. Poultry holdings doubled during the first half of the war in the wake of the
federal government's decision to guarantee the price of eggs. In
the latter two years of the conflict poultry and egg production fell
somewhat as other animal populations rose. Despite the increase
in dairy prices the number of dairy cattle in the region remained
stable due to the emphasis on beef finishing. Owing to an increase
in feed production and to improvement in the quality of local
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animals the volume of dairy products marketed rose by about onefourth even while the number of cows milked remained unchanged. 4
Again like its predecessor World War II generated fears of a
labor shortage which ultimately proved unfounded. The industrial
expansion touched off by full scale military mobilization created
a strong demand for labor at relatively high wages. Urban wartime
jobs lured farm people to the cities in large numbers so that outmigration from the region continued ilt a rate nearly equal to that
during the drouth years of the previous decade. The sight of these
masses of people departing created a degree of panic among those
who remained and who normally hired farm labor during harvest
season. To a considerable extent the draft laws alleviated the
shortage by providing deferments for agricultural laborers. In
practice the expected labor shortage confined itself to the smallgrain harvest and scarcely any grain was lost for lack of field hands.
As the Greeley County agent noted, if nothing else the ability to
harvest crops with a sharply diminished labor force showed the
degree of waste in the pattern of labor utilization in earlier years. 5
If the changes in crop and livestock production and in labor
demand followed similar directions in both wars major differences
characterized other aspects of regional agriculture. The United
States entered World War I relatively late and never mobilized its
resources to the degree characteristic of World War II. The course
of mechanization clearly demonstrates the difference in this respect.
During World War I the farmer did not compete directly with the
military for priority in obtaining machinery and equipment. Hence
during the war many farmers bought automobiles and farm implements and began electrifying their farms. This pattern did not
recur during World War II because of the necessity of diverting
steel to military use from an early date. The ultimate ordering of
priorities by the federal government led to a major reduction in
the manufacture of farm machinery with emphasis upon the production of spare parts. The scarcity of new machinery made the
blacksmith the busiest man in the rural areas as farmers called upon
him to repair their aging equipment. Thus while the war brought
large farm profits it also resulted in stagnation in the mechanization process because of the lack of machinery to buy.6
The more advanced technological level of agriculture also
created new problems which had not affected farmers during
World War I. By 1940 nearly all farm operators owned automobiles
and the rationing of gasoline and tires directly affected them. Rural
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social life suffered as a consequence and the county extension agents
had to curtail their programs. Furthermore, by 1941 about half of
the farms depended upon tractors as the major power source for
field work. These tractors operated on either fuel oil or gasoline,
both of which were rationed. Ultimately federal officials resolved
this difficulty by assigning farmers priority in the distribution of
gasoline and oil. Farmers received similar concessions with respect
to new tires for both automobiles and tractors. 7
Because of the system of priorities in the allocation of resources
farmers found it necessary to utilize their profits differently during
World War II than they had during World War I. Since they could
not buy manufactured goods, they applied their profits primarily
toward reducing their debts and acquiring land. This contrasted
sharply with the World War I boom in consumer durable goods and
machinery. The large-scale flow of funds into real estate did not
lead to a speculative boom comparable to that of the late teens,
however. First, the psychology of the depression loomed large in
the minds of most farmers who sought to reduce existing debts
rather than to contract new ones. They subscribed to the general
view that a major depression would follow the war so that those
with heavy debts at the cessation of hostilities would probably lose
their farms. Everyone from the president down to the local village
editor joined in the chorus urging farmers to liquidate their indebtedness. Such a step would reduce future problems of postwar adjustments, prevent inflation, and enable creditors to buy war bonds
with their repayments. But this process together with the widespread acquisition of additional farm land did not lead to a new
real estate boom as one might have anticipated.
While land values in the Loup country rose, they did so at a
slower rate than did the general price index. Even in 1945 the
average per acre value of land and buildings remained less than
half of the 1930 figure. The continued industrial demand for labor
encouraged further migration away from rural areas so that farm
sales remained brisk even late in the war. In addition, the large
volume of land held by mortgagees of the thirties lay waiting for
purchasers at unusually favorable prices. These lands included perhaps one-fourth of the total acreage in the Loup country in 1940.
Consequently the available supply of land could easily meet the
new demand without generating price inflation. Furthermore, the
tightening of general credit limited speculative activity of the type
common in the late teens and helped to keep real estate pri~es
stable. s
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II
If the war years brought partial recovery from the effects of the
preceding decade the latter half of the forties saw the beginning
of a sustained drive toward enhanced agricultural productivity
which has continued to the present day. Wartime profits went
largely toward the liquidation of old debts, the acquisition of land,
and the rebuilding of depleted livestock herds. But with the end
of wartime restrictions farm operators became free to invest on a
large scale in new labor-saving equipment. At the same time the
availability of copper and aluminum facilitated the spread of rural
electrification over the countryside. (For an extended discussion of
the mechanization and electrification processes see chapter 6.) But
postwar changes came in other areas as well. Specialization became
the dominant feature of Loup country agriculture as the older
emphasis upon diversification faded. The federal government did
not repeat its earlier policy of abrupt withdrawal from the agricultural scene after the war but remained actively engaged in trying to promote farm prosperity. Farmers increasingly sought to
organize themselves in such a way as to improve their long-term
economic and social position in American society. Finally, even as
all these trends developed, the individual farm enterprise expanded
greatly in size as part of the long-term process which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Before the war farm tenancy trends in the Loup country had
largely paralleled those of northern agriculture generally. The tenancy rate in Valley County rose from 32 percent in 1900 to about
45 percent in 1925 and slightly less in 1930. The rash of foreclosures in the thirties forced the rate up to a high point of 58.5 percent in 1940. Table 6 provides a picture of the changing tenancy
pattern after that date. During World War II 118 farms disappeared
from the tenant column. Of these 52 or about four-ninths acquired
owner operators or part-owner operators. The rest were consolidated
into other farm units. In other words, about one out of thirteen
1940 tenant farms had acquired an owner operator by 1945. Most
of this movement occurred late in the war as farmers obtained
increasing amounts of cash.
Over the next five years 203 farms or more than one-third of
the total dropped out of the tenant column. One hundred fortyfour of these reappeared in the owner and part-owner columns,
meaning that more than one out of four tenant farms in 1945 had
acquired owner operators by 1950. This impressive showing resulted
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TABLE 6
FARM OWNERSHIP STATUS
VALLEY COUNTY, 1940-1969

Year

Full
Owners

Part
Owners

Tenants

Tenancy
Rate (%)

1940
1945
1950
1954
1959
1964
1969

323
333
434
420
353
354
323

160
202
245
257
238
224
207

686
568
365
361
261
174
ll3

58.5
51.3
34.9
34.8
30.7
23.1
17.5

SOURCE: Census of Agriculture, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969.

from a fortuitous combination of favorable farm prices and relatively low real estate values-the average value of land and buildings in Valley County rose only 7.9 percent in constant dollars
during the five-year period. During the first half of the fifties real
estate prices climbed rapidly while farm prices sagged, producing
virtual stagnation in the tenancy pattern. After 1954 real estate
values continued to mount under the pressure for farm expansion.
The sharp reduction in tenancy after 1954 proved somewhat illusory in that it resulted from the purchase of abandoned tenant
farms by other farm owners rather than from the movement of
tenants up to owner or part-owner status.9
Even as the tenancy structure in the region underwent modification the nature of the farming operation itself changed. The most
significant aspect of this change related to the growing dominance
of a specialized pattern of commodity production based on the
finishing of beef cattle for slaughter. As this specialty grew in importance certain sectors of production which had played a key role
in earlier diversification efforts declined, both in significance and
in absolute numbers. The dairying, poultry, and swine-raising sidelines disappeared from a majority of farms. This development grew
out of changes both in the sideline operations themselves and in
the beef-producing business.
The decline in dairying resulted from changes in marketing
and in individual farm management. As noted above dairying as a
specialized type of operation never really developed in the region.
The dairy animal which before the war was usually a dual purpose
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cow remained a subsidiary source of income for most farmers. During tbe thirties the number of cows milked in Valley County fell
by about one-fifth. Although dairy cow numbers remained stable
during the war the removal of price supports for dairy products
in 1946 led to a sharp fall in numbers that year. The continued
high prices for beef cattle and grain further encouraged farmers
to move out of dairying. In addition, as herds improved the animal
became more expensive and no longer offered the advantages of
the earlier dual-purpose cow. The necessity for maintaining dairy
animals separately from beef cattle made the task of keeping them
more burdensome. As a result of these and other factors the number
of dairy cows continued to diminish gradually throughout the
late fifties. 10
Dairy management practices in the region remained backward,
making dairying less profitable than should have been the case.
Similar conditions had obtained in earlier decades but the desire
for a regular cash income together with a lack of cost accounting
techniques obscured the fact. Now, however, farmers became increasingly aware of the unprofitable nature of their milking operations both in terms of hard cash and in the return on the labor
involved. A testing program carried out by the Valley County
extension agent in 1962 clearly revealed the casual nature of local
dairy management. The value of products sold per cow ranged from
$241 in one herd to $384 in another while average feed costs varied
from $84 to $175 per animal. If these conditions marked the larger
herds one may well imagine the chaotic situation among smaller
operators.H
Other factors also contributed to the downgrading of dairying
enterprises in the area at this time. In the middle and late fifties
several dairy processors in the region closed down their operations.
Simultaneously processors began to shift away from purchasing
home-separated cream in favor of buying whole fluid milk. This
forced the dairyman to buy expensive bulk-cooling equipment in
order to meet required health standards. At the same time the
enforcement of these standards became increasingly stringent as
state inspectors began checking more closely upon local processors.
For many farmers to whom the milking business was secondary
this provided sufficient justification for discontinuing operations.
As a result, the number of milk cows in Valley County fell to less
than one-third of the 1934 figure by 1970 at which time only about
one-fourth of the region's farmers kept cows for milking purposes
compared with more than three-fourths at the earlier date. 12
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Poultry growing in the region declined even more precipitously
than dairying. Poultry and egg production reached a peak in 1943
when Valley County farms counted more than 200,000 chickens.
By the end of the war poultry numbers had fallen by about 15
percent. Sharp breaks came late in the forties but by the mid-fifties
the chicken population had stabilized at about half of the 1943
level. Over the next fifteen years the number of fowl dropped by
nearly three-fourths in the wake of the development of factorytype chicken operations which virtually wiped out the market for
fryers. By the early sixties farmers could no longer justify raising
poultry for market and the proportion of farms producing chickens
or eggs fell from over nine-tenths in 1944 to less than half in 1959
and one-third in 1969.13
Swine production in the region remained relatively stable during the postwar era although numbers fluctuated on a year to year
basis, usually between twenty and twenty-five thousand for Valley
County farms. The proportion of farmers raising pigs fell from fourfifths in 1945 to half in 1964 and two-fifths in 1969. Several reasons
lay behind this diminishing interest in hog production. Diseases
remained troublesome, particularly in the case of erysipelas outbreaks from the mid-forties on. Swine raising also required too
much labor, especially during farrowing time, if carried on as a
sideline operation. Hog raising then, proved profitable only when
the farmer had the labor available to care for the animals. Thus
swine production passed increasingly into the hands of a dwindling
number of specialists while the majority of farmers turned their
attention to expanding beef production. 14
While these diversified farming operations declined substantially after World War II, the fattening of beef cattle for slaughter
underwent a major expansion. Beef cattle finishing had traditionally
played a major role in the farm economy of the Loup country,
but it had not completely dominated the scene to the degree that
it would later. Between 1919 and 1945 the ratio of swine to cattle
on Valley County farms virtually reversed itself from 34.1 to 19.5
at the earlier date to 2l.8 to 38.5 at the latter. The number of
beef cattle in the region declined in the three years following the
war due to a combination of high feed-grain costs and unfavorable
meat prices. The cattle population regained its 1945 level by 1951
and stabilized for the remainder of the decade. During the sixties
the number steadily increased, showing an over-all gain of 40 percent. By 1969 the number of cattle per farm had reached 98.2.1 5
Obviously the farmers themselves concluded that fattening
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cattle offered the best hope of making a profit or they would not
have expanded in this direction. But several regional factors contributed to this trend and may properly be considered here. First,
the presence of the Nebraska sand-hills ranching area immediately
adjacent to the region provided an easily accessible source of livestock for finishing. Loup country farmers raised nowhere near the
number of animals which they fattened annually and had to import
large numbers of feeder cattle each year. Due to the introduction
of improved grasses the carrying capacity of the sand-hills ranches
rose substantially after the thirties so that the necessary supply of
young animals became available at minimal transportation cost.
Local geography and land utilization patterns also favored
beef production over, for example, swine raising. Continued cropping of marginal land in the thirties had taken a heavy toll of
topsoil even before the dust storms appeared. Consequently a large
acreage of farm land previously devoted to crop production remained suitable only for pasture and in the postwar period went
into permanent grassland. The presence of this large expanse of
pasture provided a major incentive for carrying cattle. Such land
enabled farmers to graze their animals over the summer before
finishing them for slaughter in their feed lots. Hence by expanding
their beef cattle operations farmers could obtain maximum use of
their land holdings.
A further advantage of the cattle-feeding operation lay in its
relatively limited labor requirement. Cattle feeding required a
much smaller labor input than, for example, dairying. Particularly
after the adoption of mechanical self-unloading wagons and grain
augers in the fifties, the farmer could handle several hundred cattle
in an hour or two of feeding time daily. This gave him more time
to devote to his other operations, particularly to cultivating the
field crops on his expanding farm. Most farmers preferred feeding
their own crops to their cattle to purchasing feed grain for cash
although the feed deficit in the region forced them to adopt the
latter practice to an increasing degree.1 6
If the rise in cattle numbers represented one aspect of the growing regional specialization in corn / livestock production, the
changes in crop growing reflected another. Two major developments marked the postwar picture of crop production in the region
as table 7 illustrates. First, the acreage of cropland harvested decreased substantially during the postwar years. The over-all figure
for Valley County declined 46 percent between 1945 and 1969.
This decline almost exactly equaled the rate of decrease in the
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number of farms so that the average acreage of cropland harvested
per farm scarcely changed at all. Nearly one-fourth of the cropland taken out of production went into some type of federal crop
diversion program while the remainder shifted over into permanent
pasture.
TABLE 7
CROPLAND HARVESTED AND CROP ACREAGES
VALLEY COUNTY, 1945-1969

Year

Cropland
Harvested

Cropland
Harvested
per
farm

1944
1949
1954
1959
1964
1969

171,548
161,775
166,262
139,332
106,725
92,901

164.3
163.6
173.0
177.3
161.4
165.8

Corn

Sorghum

89,467
79,153
75,605
66,822
35,342
40,907

7,164
2,139
1,816
9,807
15,662
5,881

Wheat

Other
Small
Grain

Hay

8,898
16,899
8,355
10,693
10,002
7,887

35,905
24,044
25,557
13,216
2,984
1,558

24,854
36,754
54,266
37,983
40,053
34,984

SOURCE: 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, Census at Agriculture.

As the over-all crop acreage in the region declined small grain
other than wheat virtually disappeared. Rye had largely vanished
by 1954 while barley experienced a long steady decline from 1945
until it had practically disappeared by 1964. The acreage devoted
to oats actually rose in the decade after the war, reaching a high
figure in 1954. Production fell by two thirds in the next five years
and by 1969 less than a thousand acres remained seeded to oats.
Wheat production, on the other hand, fluctuated somewhat but
generally amounted to eight or ten thousand acres. By 1970 it
remained the only crop in the region that could challenge the
monopoly of corn and its ally sorghum.

III
Early in World War II farm spokesmen in Congress secured
the passage of the Steagall amendment which ensured the continua-
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tion of federal agricultural programs following the conclusion of
the war. In so doing they sought to avoid a repetition of the abrupt
deflation and agricultural depression which had followed the sudden termination of federal price supports at the end of World
War I. The crop loan program continued to operate as the basic
price-support mechanism. Under this system farmers who agreed to
accept acreage restrictions could obtain federal crop loans from
the Community Credit Corporation at a specified rate. The continued high prices for farm commodities immediately after the
war discouraged participation in the program and in 1947 only
two farmers out of more than a thousand in Valley County obtained
corn loans. 17
This period of minimal participation in federal agricultural programs ended abruptly with the record harvest of 1948 which coincided with a collapse in European grain demands. As early as August
of that year local editors warned that existing storage structures in
the area were inadequate to hold the impending harvest. Farmers
besieged lumber dealers as they sought materials for constructing
cribs to hold the new crop. When the government established a
corn loan rate of $1.37 per bushel in October more than one-fourth
of the local farmers sealed an average of about a thousand bushels
of corn each. The following year another bumper corn crop led
to increased participation as nearly half the active farmers sealed
corn in exchange for loans totaling more than $700,000 in the case
of Valley County alone. 18
Faced with these rapidly accumulating stockpiles the Department of Agriculture began constructing additional bins on the
federal sites in the region. Storage space in federal binsites in
Valley County rose by three-quarters of a million bushels in 19491951. Fortunately the outbreak of the Korean conflict set off
another round of high prices and the number of corn loans fell
to only eight in 1951. As prices fell in the next two years participation again rose and in 1953 more than one-quarter of the area's
farmers again sealed corn in federal bins. Over the next three
years recurrent drouth curtailed corn production and reduced participation, but the return of rains in 1957 brought with it a new
bumper crop and drove the proportion of borrowers up to more
than two-fifths. The figure rose even higher in 1958 when crop
loans in Valley County exceeded $850,000. 19
By the middle fifties the problems engendered by growing federal stockpiles of surplus farm commodities had come under close
scrutiny and harsh public criticism began to emerge. Faced with
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rIsmg surpluses and falling prices the Eisenhower administration
developed a new farm plan which it unveiled in the spring of 1956.
In effect it revived the first AAA policy of controlling commodity
production by subsidizing acreage reductions. Under the new
plan farmers could earn cash payments by reducing their planted
acreages below the existing level. In effect they put their land
into the "soil bank" in exchange for federal subsidies and continued
price supports. Although the soil bank program did not go into
full operation until 1957 some farmers did enroll under its provisions in 1956. These included farm operators who had underplanted their base acreage, those who had plowed under part of
their crop, and those who would not harvest part of their seeded
acreage due to crop failure. In the face of the drouth of that year
farmers rushed into the temporary program in large numbers. Many
of them signed up for maximum participation, agreeing to retire
50 percent of their base acreage. In exchange they received payments based on normal production multiplied by a base-price figure
per bushel for corn and wheat. By August, 1956, more than half
the farmers in the area had applied for participation in the program. At the same time the Community Credit Corporation continued to extend crop loans based upon acreage allotments. Interest
in these programs ran high among local farmers, and in Greeley
County agricultural officials received enough applications for enrollment in the soil bank in 1957 to retire more than half the corn
acreage in the county.20
Despite considerable fanfare the soil bank program failed t(J
achieve its objective of reducing farm production, based as it was
on the obsolete concept of acreage controls. The process of intensification in the production process discussed in the following chapter rendered acreage figures largely meaningless. Following the
advent of the Kennedy administration the federal government
launched another campaign to eliminate farm surpluses. The new
"feed grains" program followed the same basic lines as its predecessor in providing diversion payments and price supports in
exchange for crop acreage reductions. Participation required a minimum reduction of 20 percent compared with a 10 percent minimum
under the soil bank program but the maximum retirement rate
remained at 50 percent. In 1964 most farmers in the region participated in the program and diversion payments in Valley County
that year totaled over $1 million with price support payments
exceeding $270,000. About 32,000 acres of cropland in the county
went out of production that year. Altogether about one-fifth of all
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cropland in the county was diverted from production under this
program. The high level of direct diversion and price support
payments continued through the remainder of the decade. 21
Despite their lack of success in stimulating farm prosperity these
programs played a key role in the region during the fifties and
sixties. From 1953 through 1969 total federal payments under the
various agricultural programs amounted to slightly over $25 million
for Valley County. This included more than $1 million dollars
in conservation grants under the Agricultural Conservation Program
along with more than $10 million each in crop loans and diversion
payments and $3 million in price support payments. Over-all federal
payments averaged about $1.5 million annually at a time when
total county farm income ranged from about $10 to $14 million per
year. Thus in most years federal subsidies accounted for from 10
to 15 percent or more of the region's total farm income. It remains
problematical whether these programs influenced the process of
farm consolidation one way or another. However they did undoubtedly provide added impetus to the process of technological intensification by subsidizing the removal of marginal land from production. 22
Postwar federal farm programs tended to reflect the influence
of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the major farm organization which drew the bulk of its membership from livestock producers and large farm operators. Although the farm bureau severed
its direct connection with the federal government in the early forties
it remained by far the most influential farm lobbying organization.
The Loup country lacked any grange organizations while the
Farmer's Union groups concerned themselves primarily with the
operation of local co-operative enterprises. Thus by default the
farm bureau enjoyed a virtual monopoly of membership among
the region's farmers until the late fifties. The only exception to
this rule came during the thirties when the Farmers Holiday Association sought unsuccessfully to challenge the bureau's position.
But as farm discontent increased during the fifties competing
agricultural spokesmen began to appear. The most significant
among these was the National Farmers' Organization. The NFO
made its debut in the region at a farmers' meeting held in Greeley
County in the spring of 1956. During the next two weeks further
meetings led to the election of officers and the establishment of a
formal county organization. Several months later farmers met at
Ord to form a Valley County NFO branch while farm operators
in Custer County organized the following year. The NFO initially
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set dues for farm members at $1.00 per year, later increasing the
figure to $3.50 annually. After this initial burst of activity the
local organizations lapsed into a relatively dormant state until
another major membership drive got under way in 1962.23
At the beginning of this period the major interest of NFO
officials lay in the influencing of federal farm policy. They proposed a new farm program with price supports set at 100 percent
of parity for farmers undertaking a minimal acreage reduction. In
addition they favored the establishment of price supports for livestock as well as for grain. At a local appearance in February, 1958,
President Oren Lee Staley unveiled a new program proposal involving a national checkoff system for commodities which would allow
farmers to dispose of their own surpluses and administer their own
prices with allotments based on production rather than acreage.
In advocating this policy the NFO demonstrated an appreciation
of the diminishing relevance of acreage control to production control. It also parted company with previous proponents of agricultural programs in de-emphasizing federal supervision in favor of
a program operated by the farmers themselves. 24
This emphasis on a reduced federal role in agriculture soon
developed further. Basically the NFO altered its self-conception
from that of a lobbyist to that of a collective bargaining agent
for its members. Farm operators would band together and negotiate collectively with buyers in order to secure higher prices for
their products. The ultimate weapon for enforcing their demands
lay in the farm strike or withholding action designed to prevent
farm produce from reaching commodity buyers until terms had
been settled and contracts signed. In exchange for these services
NFO members agreed to pay one percent of the gross value of
sales under NFO contracts to the organization to cover the cost of
weighing and grading. Members of the increasingly militant group
pledged to sell all their commodities through the NFO, penalizing
themselves for noncontract sales made after contracts had been
signed. In addition the organization raised membership dues to
twenty-five dollars annually, partly to help finance the new system,
partly to discourage the faint-hearted from seeking membership.25
While the national NFO undertook a short-lived withholding
action on hogs in the fall of 1959, the first serious effort in this
direction came in September, 1962, following a major membership
drive and publicity campaign. Soon NFO spokesmen reported reductions of one-half or more in livestock sales receipts in the region.
Other members charged that the farm bureau had advised its
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members to ship in livestock in order to confound its rival. At
this time the NFO reported a membership of about one hundred in
Valley County, many of whom manned checkpoints during the
strike. Unfortunately the NFO lacked the strength necessary to
achieve success and found itself forced to call a recess in the withholding action a month after it had begun. Following the initial
slump in receipts livestock prices had climbed perceptibly but after
several weeks they fell back to normal levels and the effort collapsed. 26
Two years later the Valley County NFO reached an agreement
with the Ord creamery whereby the NFO would serve as its procurement agent. However, the agreement never went into effect
since its operation was conditional upon the success of the general
organizing drive that the NFO was sponsoring throughout the Midwest at that time. Another livestock withholding action in 1966
proved unsuccessful and only generated additional bitterness between NFO and farm bureau members. A similar pattern characterized later withholding attempts as the NFO failed to attract
enough large producers into its ranks to successfully influence
marketing receipts at the major terminals. As this failure became
increasingly evident the NFO organizations took a growing interest
in the operation of the day-to-day marketing progress. Thus, for
example, they established a hog collection point near Sargent which
shipped members' hogs to packers in Nebraska and Iowa. 27
The gulf between the NFO and the farm bureau mirrored a
real division of sentiment among farmers both locally and nationally. Within the Loup country NFO members tended to lean
toward the Democratic party while the farm bureau had a substantially Republican membership. The NFO drew largely upon
the general and dairy farmers-smaller operators who feared for
the future of their family farms. The farm bureau attracted larger
farmers, particularly the livestock specialists. These farmers operated
expanding units and sought chiefly to maximize their productivity
and profits, looking to the federal agricultural programs to resolve
the problems of overproduction. This does not mean that NFO
members lacked interest in raising productivity or that farm bureau
members did not worry about the future of the family farm enterprise. But in terms of their major emphases the two organizations
did represent, in essence, the two major types of farm operator in
the region.
Smaller farmers as typified by the NFO membership especially
feared two major developments which they believed could spell
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the end of the family farm. First they opposed federal farm policy
which they felt subsidized the larger producers while forcing smaller
operators out of business. These fears reached a climax with the
publication of the report of the President's Committee on Economic
Redevelopment in 1962. This report recommended the elimination
of two million marginal farm units and the relocation of their
operators elsewhere. The appearance of this document touched off
a violent outburst among small farmers who received support from
village merchants fearful of losing still more of their farm customers. An intense distrust of federal policymakers has continued
to linger among small farmers down to the present. 28
Increasing corporate farming activity also generated considerable apprehension about the future of family farming. NFO members reminded themselves and others of the collapse of the poultrygrowing business following the entry of large firms into the field
in the fifties and early sixties. When some chain stores and feed
manufacturers began entering the livestock-finishing business during the sixties, they excited fears that a similar fate might await
small hog and cattle producers. The fact that some corporations
entered agriculture for the purpose of gaining tax write-offs rather
than for the sake of making profits created further tension since
firms of this type would be willing to see prices fall to the point
where small operators faced ruin.
In essence, then, the NFO came to speak for the more traditional
farmer-the individual who looked to farming not only as a means
of earning a livelihood but even more as a way of life. For these
persons farming meant primarily a family enterprise handed down
from one generation to the next. Ironically enough, in joining the
NFO these traditionalists adopted a modern concept in the form
of collective bargaining. This fact damned them as radicals in the
minds of farm bureau members. The latter individuals continued
to follow the traditional lobbying practices in an effort to obtain
favorable federal farm policies. But while the farm bureau used
more conservative methods and took more conservative political
stance, it represented the real forces of change in farming. By
looking primarily toward cash profits and increased productivity
its members clearly embodied the modern business ideal rather
than rural traditionalism although the latter might linger in rhetorical form. Thus the long-standing division between the businessoriented farmer and the tradition-oriented farm operator persisted
on into the latter part of the twentieth century.29

6. A Revolution in Farm Technology

PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II the level of agricultural productivity in
the Loup country rose relatively little. Once a stable general and
livestock farming economy had developed following the initial
frontier period further changes rarely involved more than minor
shifts in emphasis. Depending upon current prices, climatic prospects, and animal disease conditions a farmer might decide in a
particular year to raise more small grain and less corn or more
cattle and fewer hogs. The next year he might well revert to his
previous pattern of production. Although new strains of seed grain
appeared the declining level of soil fertility largely offset the potential increase in yields. Improvement in the quality of livestock
likewise came very slowly as the glacial rate of progress in the
dairying business amply illustrated.
A significant increase in agricultural productivity could not
occur until two major preconditions had been fulfilled. First the
level of agricultural technology must advance to the point where
a significant enhancement of efficiency became possible. Prior to
1930 the major hindrance to the adoption of agricultural innovations lay in their apparently marginal value. For the most part the
gain achieved from their use did not appear sufficient to justify the
expense of adoption. The major exception to this principle came
in the development of improved strains of small grain which produced notably higher yields. But progress in the area of mechanization remained limited. Before the advent of the farm tractor the
ultimate dependence upon animal muscle strength as the basic
power source fixed a low ceiling on potential field crop productivity.
Even after the appearance of the gasoline-powered tractor the slow
rate of progress in adapting field implements to its use restricted its
practical utility. As the implement manufacturers began to resolve
this problem the onset of the drouth and depression of the thirties
submerged any question of mechanization in the more basic struggle
for survival. When farm profits began to accumulate once more
during wartime, industrial restrictions precluded any significant
acquisition of machinery. Only after World War II did a conjunction of farm profits, rapid technological breakthroughs, and the
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mass availability of machinery pave the way for a major increase
in agricultural efficiency.
But the mere existence of more highly developed machinery and
farming techniques did not of itself ensure their adoption by the
individual farm operator. The farmer himself must feel a need or
desire to utilize the available innovation in his own operation. Here
lay a major problem, for the purchase of new equipment involved
capital expenditures on a much larger scale than had previously
been the case. This particularly applied in later years when the
acquisition of new machinery became linked with the purchase of
additional land. The primary source of difficulty rested in the fact
that a basic dualism had always marked the outlook of the farmer.
On the one hand he obviously wished to make larger profits. At
the same time, however, he also desired a certain degree of security
which usually took the form of holding a clear title to his farm and
remaining out of debt. This inclination invariably militated against
undertaking any new capital ventures.
The balance between the profit-risk or expansionist orientation
and the security orientation altered from time to time during the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries although both always remained present to some degree. During the frontier period of the
1880s the rapid appreciation in real estate values gave added impetus to the profit motive and led to a rapid turnover of farm ownership. But the emergence of a stable agricultural economy with a
stagnant level of productivity reduced the prospects for individual
expansion. This factor together with the drouth and depression of
the 1890's gave the security orientation added force. In the following two decades a high degree of prosperity again offered some
encouragement to those who sought greater profits even if it necessitated taking additional risks. These individuals sought to emulate
the up-to-date urban businessman, abreast of all the latest techniques for maximizing earnings. They adopted new varieties of
seed along with improved breeds of livestock and bought new
machinery in their quest for greater efficiency and profit. This approach influenced only a minority of farmers, however, and the
economic disasters of the thirties threatened to obliterate it entirely.
Following the revival of farm prosperity at the time of World
War II and particularly when the expected postwar depression
failed to materialize, the profit-risk orientation once more gained
ascendency. The availability of vacant farmland due to the heavy
outmigration of the previous decade and a half and the new break-
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throughs in machine technology made farm expansion with significantly higher productivity levels a genuine possibility. Over the
next three decades the expansionist orientation achieved dominance
although a large minority of farmers remained firm in their primary
commitment to security of title. The latter group continued to
carryon general farming operations and in some instances expanded
their holdings slightly, but they soon came to be overshadowed in
the aggregate farm statistics for the region by the expansionists.
As noted in the previous chapter, the two groups ultimately came
to find organized spokesmen for their general points of view in
the NFO and farm bureau, respectively.
Because of these factors the level of farm technology in the
Loup country remained low even as late as 1940. At that date
slightly more than one out of five farms in the region had electricity,
but this power generally came from domestic electric plants and
served only limited household functions. Somewhat greater progress had occurred in the realm of field crop production. By 1940
more than two-fifths of Valley County farmers owned tractors
although many of these were of ancient vintage. While the adoption of the tractor represented a step toward increased efficiency
in crop production most tractor farmers lacked the field implements
needed to realize its full potential. Thus in 1940 farmers carried
out most of the field work in the region using equipment designed
to be drawn by horses. Although the proportion of tractor farmers
had passed three-fifths by the end of 1941 the shortage of new
machinery during the war precluded further progress in mechanization until after mid-decade. 1
Consequently the first major advance toward a new, more productive agriculture came with the development of irrigation during
the late thirties. Farmers in the North Loup and Middle Loup
irrigation districts began receiving water in their fields in the
summer of 1938. The following year almost two hundred Valley
County farm operators irrigated at least part of their cropland
compared with only two a decade earlier. Nine-tenths of these farm
operators received water from the diversion projects while the
remainder pumped directly from rivers or creeks or from their own
wells. Following this initial phase of expansion the irrigated acreage
remained fairly stable for nearly a decade. A dry season in 1943
spurred an increase in the watered acreage the next year, but the
return of rainfall in 1944 caused a decline of interest that persisted
through the remainder of the forties and early fifties as the figures
in table 8 demonstrate.
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TABLE 8
IRRIGATED ACREAGE IN VALLEY COUNTY
1941-1970

Year

Acres Irrigated

Year

Acres Irrigated

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

14,780
15,150
15,890
20,250
18,065
18,347
18,175
16,884
17,205
17,351
17,656
18,900
20,000
21,300
24,980

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

27,615
31,000
32,200
32,800
32,500
33,000
33,400
34,000
34,700
36,700
38,500
39,500
41,200
43,500
47,600

SOURCE:

Nebraska Agricultural Statistics.

Recurring drouth in the mid-fifties produced another outbreak
of irrigation fever. During the two worst years-1955 and 1956dry1and corn yields in Valley County averaged four and six bushels
per acre, respectively. In the same two years irrigated corn averaged fifty-two and sixty-eight bushels per acre. Evidence of this
sort persuaded most farmers of the desirability of irrigation and
the watered acreage rose by more than half in the space of four
years. After a half-dozen years of stability another surge of expansion occurred in the latter part of the sixties. At the same time
that the irrigated acreage expanded the total cropland acreage in
the region declined as farmers shifted marginal land into permanent pasture. Consequently the proportion of total cropland art ifically watered rose from about one-tenth in 1942 to one-eighth in
1950, one-fifth in 1960, and about three-eighths in 1969. The latter
figure included most of the readily irrigable terrain in the area
and as of that date more than two-fifths of all Valley County farmers irrigated at least part of their land. 2
Although these figures clearly illustrate the over-all rise in irrigation activity they conceal a basic change in the source of irrigation water and in the means used to deliver it to the fields. In 1940
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90 percent of the farmers received their water from the two majpr
diversion projects. After the war, however, some farm operators
began sinking their own irrigation wells. The number of registered
wells in Valley County reached 85 in 1956, rising to 137 four years
later. By 1965 irrigators had drilled 150 wells, a figure which rose
to 264 by 1971. Most of the farms with wells lay in the uplands
where their owners could water their fields with sprinklers or gated
pipe but not with diversion ditches. But wells also appeared in
some parts of the river valleys which did not yet have their own
diversion canals. Other farmers along the rivers pumped water
directly from those streams or from creeks flowing into them, but
these constituted a distinct minority in the region. 3
Both of the diversion districts in the Loup country encountered
numerous financial and operational difficulties from the start but
the Middle Loup district proved more successful in resolving them.
The district operated for the first ten years under the auspices of
the RFC which held its bonds. In February, 1949, the latter agency
accepted an offer of $100,000 from the district directors as full
settlement of the remaining indebtedness which at that time totaled $728,000. The directors then established a surcharge of $1.00
per acre on current water rates in order to payoff the debt. They
made the eleventh and final payment in February, 1960, at which
time the district became free of all long-term obligations. At that
time water rates averaged $4.50 per acre including the surcharge
which the directors voted to keep for the purpose of accumulating
reserve funds. These rates proved relatively inexpensive, averaging
only $2.00 per acre above the original 1938 figure. By 1960 the
district included a total of ninety-four miles of canals and over
a hundred miles of laterals along both sides of the Middle Loup
River south of Sargent.4
Another burst of activity on the Middle Loup came in the midfifties as construction began on a second diversion network just
north and west of the Middle Loup district. Congress appropriated
a million dollars to finance the project in 1954 and construction
began shortly thereafter. The new development did not enjoy
unanimous local support, however. Early in 1952 farmers south of
the river filed a petition opposing the project. This was the area
in which irrigation boosters had built a canal in the eighteennineties, resulting in astronomical property tax levies. Farmers
feared a repetition of this episode should diversion canals invade
their area. Largely in response to this opposition the government
postponed indefinitely the construction of a canal south of the
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river. Work on the remainder of the system went ahead as scheduled and construction reached completion in 1957. The new Sargent district included about 17,500 acres of irrigable land between
Milburn to the northwest and Comstock to the southeast. Most of
the project centered north of the river where the Sargent canal
watered about 14,000 acres. 5
The North Loup Irrigation District encountered far greater
difficulty in resolving its financial problems than did its counterpart to the west. The district ceased making payments on its RFC
loan of more than $1 million early in 1942. In the spring of 1950
the RFC filed suit asking that the court order the district to charge
rates high enough to ensure the eventual liquidation of its indebtedness. The district board of directors responded with an offer of
$125,000 to settle all obligations. These totaled more than $1.2
million at the time. The RFC refused the offer and the district
passed into the hands of a receiver in January, 1953. By the spring
of that year the number of farmers using water supplied by the
district had fallen considerably, forcing the rates paid by the remaining users up to $9.65 per acre, more than double the figure
for the Middle Loup district. Fortunately for the North Loup district the severe drouth of 1955-1956 brought farmers back in large
numbers, thus easing the financial pinch and allowing a reduction
in water rates. Fifteen years later the RFC accepted an offer of
$270,000 to settle the district's obligations which by that time had
grown to about $2,150,000. Farmers in the district paid an assessment of $15 per irrigated acre and the debt was liquidated in
the summer of 1972. 6
Midway through the fifties a new crisis loomed which greatly
overshadowed the immediate financial problems of the two irrigation districts then in operation. In May, 1955, the Loup River
Public Power District, a power generating firm situated at Columbus, requested all upstream irrigators to confine themselves to their
legally authorized water quotas. The power company had obtained
its water rights in 1932, prior to virtually all irrigators. Under prevailing state law irrigators took precedence over power companies
in the diversion of water provided they paid the latter for water
used in excess of their authorized quotas. The North Loup district
could legally divert twenty-two thousand acre feet annually from
the North Loup River. However, district officials interpreted this to
mean that they could take the amount needed to deliver twenty-two
thousand acre feet to the fields. Owing to the loss incurred in tran-

A Revolution in Farm Technology

/

109

sit the actual amount diverted came to nearly sixty thousand acre
feet.
As compensation for this excess diversion the power company
demanded that all upriver irrigators including pump irrigators
who obtained their water from creeks and rivers pay $1.25 per
acre foot diverted beyond their quotas. Both the irrigation districts
and individual pump operators termed this figure exorbitant. When
the State Bureau of Irrigation ordered all farmers to stop pumping
from the North Loup River beginning in June local irrigators
vowed to fight to the bitter end, warning that they would carry
shotguns to their fields in order to prevent anyone from shutting
them down. Then in the middle of June certain pump irrigators
offered to settle with the power company at $0.25 per acre foot
for excess diversions. 7
At this juncture the Loup River Public Power District agreed to
delay enforcement of its June sixth cutoff deadline pending a ruling
by the State Bureau of Irrigation. Organized opposition to the power
company weakened when farmers in the Cedar and South Loup
River valleys agreed to pay one dollar per excess acre foot diverted
into an escrow account which would go to the power company
should the courts rule in its favor. In the meantime farmers in
those regions would continue watering their crops as usual. By the
end of July about one-fifth of the North Loup River valley pump
operators had agreed to participate in the escrow scheme and resistance began to crumble. Farmers who met in Scotia late in July
agreed to sign similar contracts but stipulated that they would consider them binding only for the current year.
Both irrigation districts became involved in protracted litigation
before they finally reached an accommodation with the power
company. After losing a court case over diversion allotments the
North Loup district agreed to pay the power company five thousand
dollars in compensation for diversion beyond the authorized quota
through September of that year, plus one dollar per acre foot diverted after that date. The district again drew off an excessive
amount of water and on September seventh the state courts ordered
it to close down its canals immediately. Litigation over the matter
continued for several years amidst numerous charges of bad faith,
but after 1955 the crisis subsided and the issue became a source of
irritation rather than of critical concern on the part of local
irrigators. s
Some time prior to the water rights dispute irrigation enthusiasts developed plans for further expansion in the form of the Twin
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Valleys irrigation project. In 1943 organizers of the scheme requested
the Bureau of Reclamation to carry out the necessary survey. Most
of the land involved lay to the south of the Loup country but large
areas of Valley County were also included. By 1953 the plans called
for the construction of a large dam north of Burwell in Garfield
County with major reservoirs at Turtle Creek and Davis Creek in
Valley County. Following this initial flurry of interest during the
dry year of 1943 apathy returned and for the next decade the proposal remained dormant. Then, in 1954 the Twin Loups Reclamation District took shape. In August of that year farmers residing
within the proposed district voted by a margin of 835 to 307 in
favor of establishing a mill levy to finance preliminary work on the
project. Opposition quickly developed among the farmers of Geranium and Michigan township who objected to the proposed Turtle
Creek reservoir. Given the hilly topography of the area the reservoir
would inundate most of the land suited to crop production. In
1955 these opponents formed the Turtle Creek Protective Association to carryon the fight. In their subsequent campaign they
stressed the impending loss of good farm land, the necessity for
rerouting county roads should a reservoir be constructed, and the
existing abundance of irrigation wells in the area. In the face of
this opposition project designers scrapped the proposed Turtle
Creek reservoir in favor of one situated in the sand hills north of
Burwell which would inundate less farm land and allow for the
irrigation of a larger acreage. 9
At this point boosters of the project began a protracted series
of negotiations with the federal government for approval and
funding of the proposed scheme. In October, 1960, the Bureau of
Reclamation filed a favorable report and proposed to water fiftytwo thousand acres along the North Loup and Loup rivers south
of Burwell. The bureau estimated the cost of the project at slightly
over $44 million. Ten years later as negotiations continued the
price tag reached more than $68 million. However, with the continued expansion of well and pump irrigation in the fifties and
sixties farmers themselves divided more sharply than ever over
the desirability of a new project. Those who had invested heavily
in sinking a well, acquiring a pump and engine, and purchasing
expensive pipelines viewed the project as a political boondoggle.
Thus opposition surfaced during the congressional subcommittee
hearings on the proposed project held in July, 1970. Certainly it
appeared questionable by that date whether the proposed scheme
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would improve the economic position of many of the region's
farmers. 10
The relative desirability of well and diversion irrigation became
the subject of extended debate as both types became firmly entrenched in the Loup country. For the individual farm operator
well irrigation offered several advantages over ditch irrigation from
diversion canals. First, it proved much more flexible. The well
irrigator could increase, decrease, or shut off the flow of water as
conditions warranted. He could get his water when he wanted. In
contrast the diversion irrigator had to wait his turn, even if a heat
wave threatened to burn up his crop. He also suffered from the
disputes over water rights and sometimes experienced losses due
to breaks in canals or laterals between the water source and his
fields. On the other hand well irrigation required a substantial
direct capital investment on the part of the owner who paid not
only the costs of installing his system but also personal property
taxes on his expensive equipment.
Well irrigation costs varied widely from one farm to another
depending on such factors as the scope of operations and topographical conditions. Farmers with a limited ,acreage of level cropland might put down a well, install a pump, and then use ditches
and siphons to carry the water to their fields. Such a system cost
from three to five thousand dollars in the fifties, depending on
the depth of the well, size of the pump, and the like. Costs rose
sharply in the case of uneven terrain which required either land
leveling or the use of pipe. Most well irrigators cropped land of this
nature and had to buy a large stock of irrigation pipe in order to
deliver water to their fields. On sloping land with no surface irregularities farmers could use gated pipe which poured water down
corn rows. On more uneven surfaces or in hay fields they used
various types of sprinkler pipe. During the sixties large sprinkler
devices which could water an area several hundred feet in radius
came into use along with mobile sprinkler lines. For the farmer
who had to buy pipe this meant an additional expense of from
one to three dollars per foot in the fifties and considerably more
in the sixties. On an average-sized farm this could raise the total
cost of an irrigation system to ten or fifteen thousand dollars or
more-one hundred dollars or more per irrigated acre.
A major bone of contention betwen well and diversion irrigators
concerned the relative expense of the two types of operations. Engineers from the Bureau of Reclamation argued that diversion cost
less and produced more economic benefits than did well irrigation.

112 /

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

They based their argument upon the fact that land with water
rights in the irrigation districts had a higher value than did land
watered from wells. They also estimated per acre irrigation costs
for well irrigators at two and a half times the figure for ditch irrigation. In this particular instance both arguments appeared rather
dubious. The actual per acre water rate for diversion irrigators
at the time was double that of the rate calculated by the bureau
spokesmen. In addition, much if not most of the difference in
valuation between diversion watered land and well irrigated land
clearly rested in the fact that the latter included hilly areas with
greater erosion damage and a lower proportion of tillable soil.
The diversion watered land lay in the flat, highly arable river
valleys and thus had an intrinsically higher value.
Another issue in the irrigation controversy concerned water
conservation. In regions to the south of the Loup country intensive
well irrigation had led to a substantial drop in the water table.
Local farmers worried about the possibility of a similar development
which might render their shallower wells useless. To some degree
the proximity of the region to the sand hills alleviated this problem
since that area absorbs nearly all of the moisture that falls there,
thus providing an exceptionally large supply of ground water.
But late in the sixties the water table began to fall in southern
Valley County where farmers practiced well irrigation most intensively. Proponents of diversion argued that such a process was
inevitable and that farmers would do better to trap rain and use
it where it fell. Well irrigators responded with predictions that
diversion reservoirs would rapidly silt in due to the high sediment
content of the area streams. The controversy remains unresolved
although the proposed Twin Loups project continues to inch
closer to federal approval. l1
While these disputes raged the amount of irrigated cropland
continued to rise. The growing significance of irrigation appeared
both in the proportion of farms artifically watered and in the share
of total crop production grown on irrigated land as shown in table
9. During most of the period after 1939 about 80 percent of the
watered acreage consisted of corn, sorghum, or alfalfa. Acreage
yields alone do not tell the whole story since irrigated crop yields
averaged far higher than dryland yields. Ordinarily irrigated corn
yielded two or three times as much as did the dryland variety. In
particularly dry years the ratio was much higher reaching fifteen
to one in 1955-1956. By 1970 the irrigated areas accounted for
about 90 percent of corn production for grain. The expansion in
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TABLE 9
IRRIGATED FARMS AND CROPLAND
IRRIGATED CROP PRODUCTION
VALLEY COUNTY, 1939-1970

Year

Number of
Irrigated
Farms

Percentage of
All Farms

Percentage of
Cropland Harvested Under
Irrigation

1939
1944
1949
1954
1959
1964
1969

198
230
236
260
300
289
280

16.9
20.9
22.4
25.0
35.2
38.3
43.5

8.1
9.0
11.6
12.8
21.6
28.3
38.1

Production, Corn for Grain

Year

Percentage
of Acres
Irrigated

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970

18.2
23.8
38.0
57.4
70.2

Dry1and
Yield
(bu.)

Percentage
of Total
Production,
Irrigated

25
4
25
38
27

34.7
85.6
62.4
77.1
89.6

Dryland
Yield
(tons)

Percentage
of Total
Production,
Irrigated

1.7
0.8
1.5
1.6
1.7

14.0
32.2
19.3
22.2
40.3

Irrigated
Yield/Acre
(bu.)
62
52
81
95
100
Production, Alfalfa

Year

Percentage
of Acres
Irrigated

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970

9.5
11.6
8.1
11.0
24.7

Irrigated
Yield
(tons)
2.6
2.9
2.7
4.3
3.5

1940,1945,1950, 1954,1959, 1964, 1969 Census of Agriculture; Nebraska
Agricultural Statistics.

SOURCE:
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watered alfalfa acreage came more slowly and the irrigated acreage
produced only two-fifths of Valley County's crop in 1970. 12

II

The development of irrigation broke a major bottleneck which
had hindered the adoption of a number of agricultural innovations. With a stable water supply now assured farmers could utilize
practices which they could not economically justify during the
drouth of the thirties. The adoption of hybrid corn in the region
offers the best illustration of this principle. Late in the thirties
county agents in the area experimented with hybrid seed but the
drouth devastated hybrid and local seed corn alike, discouraging
the adoption of the former. However, experiments on irrigated
land showed that hybrid strains out yielded the best home-grown
varieties by 30 or 40 percent. As the war boom lifted prices irrigating farmers quickly adopted the new strains and raised their yields
accordingly. In Valley County the proportion of corn acreage seeded
to hybrid varieties rose from 4 percent in 1939 to 17 percent in
1941, most of the latter acreage involving irrigated land. When the
rains returned dryland farmers quickly adopted the new seed whose
superiority had been so clearly demonstrated. By 1945 four-fifths
of the regional corn crop came from hybrid seed and by the end
of the decade the proportion topped nine-tenths. 13
But the acceptance of hybrid corn provided only the first of
several illustrations of how irrigation encouraged the adoption of
new practices. As the irrigating farmers grew more hybrid corn,
for example, they discovered that their increased yields depleted
the soil more rapidly than formerly. Consequently they began employing commercial fertilizer to bolster their sagging yields. In the
earlier years irrigation constituted a virtual prerequisite for the
use of fertilizer because the nitrogen in commercial fertilizer
usually caused burning in dryland corn unless rainfall proved
abundant. Again the irrigator led the rest of the farmers in adopting the new practice.
Purchases of commercial fertilizer increased rapidly as the
acreage under irrigation rose. In 1939 only two Valley County
farmers utilized commercial fertilizer but by 1954 more than onethird of the farmers in the county were spending an average of
four hundred dollars for that purpose. In that year they applied
fertilizer, chiefly nitrates, to about twenty thousand acres of crop-
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land. Four-fifths of this acreage consisted of cornland while about
one-eighth involved wheat. Altogether about one-fifth of the cereal
crop acreage planted that year received some type of commercial
fertilizer application. By 1959 the fertilized acreage exceeded thirtytwo thousand and the figure doubled during the following decade.
By 1970 regular irrigators added nitrates to their corn fields every
two years while the average farmer in the region spent nearly nine
hundred dollars annually on commercial fertilizer.1 4
In taking up the use of commercial fertilizer farmers in the
Loup country demonstrated a growing awareness of the problem
of soil exhaustion. Local agriculturalists had noted the effects of
erosion and declining fertility even before World War I, but most
of them lacked the resources, experience, and inclination necessary
to undertake conservation practices on their own. This was true
of most farmers in the country at large as well, and the federal
government recognized the fact by the enactment of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. Although intended
primarily to control farm production the measure did provide
cash incentives for the adoption of certain conservation practices.
By the late thirties about seven-eighths of all farmers in the region
participated in this program. During the war much of the land
diverted out of soil-depleting crops into soil-conserving grasses and
legumes went back into cereal grain production. At this time the
federal government shifted its emphasis to other aspects of soil
management. 15
Among the soil-conserving practices now emphasized, the construction of small earth dams on hillsides held high priority. These
dams trapped runoff during rainstorms, thus curbing erosion while
providing stock ponds for watering cattle. Given the hilly nature
of much of the local terrain and the rising number of cattle in the
region'S pastures, this practice proved highly popular, and in the
fall of 1940 alone Valley County farmers constructed more than
four hundred small dams. Contour plowing which had passed
through the experimental stage during the late thirties gained in
popularity since it improved moisture retention and increased crop
yields. In 1940 a Mira Valley farmer became the first in the area
to terrace his fields as a further means of controlling soil erosion.
Under the federal conservation programs operating at this time
farmers received payments of from fifteen to one hundred dollars
for putting these practices into effect. Because of the self-evident
benefits of these measures and the possibility of obtaining cash
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payments for carrying them out, a high proportion of farmers continued to participate in the program throughout the war.
Soil-conserving practices became even more popular following
the organization of conservation districts in the region in 1942. A
farmer in one of the new districts could qualify for assistance in
developing a conservation plan for his farm, and in the three
years following the formation of these districts a third of local
farmers applied for such help. Conservation activity after the war
followed along the same lines laid out during the war. Payments to
Valley County farmers under the ACP and other programs during
the two and a half decades following the war generally ranged
from fifty to one hundred thousand dollars annually. The major
contribution of the federal conservation programs probably lay in
their encouraging farmers to take measures which they would not
otherwise have done. Many, if not most, farmers probably would
not have thought it worthwhile to adopt such practices had not
the federal government resorted to this species of judicious bribery.
Even so, the program came too late to undo the damage caused by
generations of poor farming practices. More than half the topsoil
in the region washed away before anyone sought to stem the destruction. And even after the more progressive operators had put
soil conserving practices into effect many others continued year
after year to overstock their pastures, to crop their hillsides, and
to ignore the erosion processes taking place before their eyes.1 6

III
As the size of the individual farm enterprise grew and as the
farmer increased his inputs of seed, fertilizer, and chemicals as
well as irrigating his fields in many cases, he found it essential to
increase labor productivity if he hoped to make any profit. The
Loup country remained a bastion of family farming operations, and
after World War II the proportion of farms using regular hired
labor never exceeded about 12 percent. On the great majority of
farms the members of the operator's family provided the entire
labor force. Thus as the farm size expanded the ratio of available
labor to the land diminished. Nonetheless, during the same period
commodity production on Loup country farms actually increased.
The major factor responsible for this rise in labor productivity
lay in the adoption of farm machinery which gained new impetus
in the late forties.
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The first step on the road to mechanization came with the
change in power sources used by the farmer. Until he acquired a
tractor he remained dependent upon the muscle power of his draft
animals, a fact which severely restricted his prospects for increasing
efficiency. But once he had acquired a farm tractor with its high
speed and great power the potential for a variety of changes
appeared. Consequently the distribution of tractors offers the most
convenient index of the advance of agricultural mechanization.
Over-all, the proportion of Loup country farmers with tractors rose
from slightly over two-fifths in 1940 to three-fifths in 1945 and
more than four-fifths in 1950. The latter figure included virtually
all commercial operations in the region. But the initial acquisition
of a tractor marked only the first step toward tractor farming. This
was soon followed by the purchase of additional tractors for more
specialized use. This trend really developed only after the war.
Then the average number of tractors per farm quickly rose to l.4
in 1950, 2.2 in 1959, and 2.8 in 1969. Now the farmer used light
tractors for haying, hauling wagons, or light field work such as
rotary hoeing. He bought larger tractors for use in plowing, discing,
or harvesting. The multiplicity of tractors also attested to the
increased value placed on time as the farmer found it too wasteful
to change attachments on a tractor several times a day in order
to use it for different purposes,17
Tractor adoption represented only the first step in farm mechanization. Mechanical improvements generally involved one of two
types of change. The first concerned an increase in scale. The twobottom plow gave way to the four-bottom model or the four-row
cultivator succeeded the two-row type. But new equipment might
also combine previously distinct field process as in the case of grain
combines or field hay choppers. After the war some farmers bought
grain combines, although because of the limited amount of small
grain grown in the region their number was not great. However,
most farm operators did buy mechanical corn pickers which represented a major advance in both time and labor savings. The proportion of farms with corn pickers rose to two-fifths in 1950 and
five-sevenths in 1964. After the latter year the figure began declining for several reasons. Many farmers had reduced their acreage
in corn to the point where owning a corn picker could not be
financially justified. In addition, machinery prices climbed so
rapidly in the sixties that many farmers who did raise corn could
no longer afford such a purchase. Consequently they came to rely
more heavily upon custom harvesting. The same trends marked
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other machinery acquistion as well, and between 1964 and 1969
the average annual expenditure per farm for custom work rose from
a little over two hundred dollars to nearly five hundred dollars. To
an increasing degree the farmer who did invest in expensive new
machinery found himself hiring it out to his neighbors in order
to help pay for it.1 8
As a consequence of the adoption of irrigation, chemical fertilizer, improved soil conservation practices, and new farm machinery,
the volume of farm commodities grown in the region rose even
as the acreage devoted to cropland fell by nearly half. Increased
yields more than offset the decline in acres planted. Wheat yields
rose from an average of 18.8 bushels per acre in 1945-1948 to 27.0
bushels per acre in 1965-1968. More spectacularly, corn yields improved from 27.0 bushels per acre to 71.4 bushels per acre during
the same period. Despite this sharp rise in productivity the Loup
country grew increasingly dependent upon grain imported from
outside the region owing to the large increase in cattle-finishing
activity. But the greater efficiency of local agriculture did serve to
substantially reduce the size of this grain deficit. 19
The mechanization process did not confine itself to the sphere
of crop production by any means. Shortly after the war farmers
began purchasing trucks in large numbers in order to eliminate
the need for hiring vehicles to move crops, animals, or other items
to or from the villages. The proportion of farms with trucks rose
from one-sixth in 1940 to half in 1954 and four-fifths in 1969. As
in the case of tractors, the number of trucks per farm rose significantly as many farm operators acquired a light pickup truck as
well as a larger model for hauling loads of feed or livestock. Among
the farms with trucks the average number per owner rose from
l.04 in 1945 to 1.11 in 1954 and l.47 in 1969. Self-unloading feed
wagons replaced the old fashioned wagon and shovel for livestock
in the fifties and late in the sixties a few farmers installed automated feeding plants. Mechanization thus affected a variety of farm
operations besides field crop production. But not all new farm
equipment depended upon the internal combustion engine as a
power source, for the postwar years also witnessed the diffusion of
electrification across the countryside. 20
Although the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) began
its career in 1934 electricity did not become generally available to
farmers in the Loup country until fifteen years later. Some of the
more prosperous farm operators had installed electric generators
as early as World 'War T. These generators produced a limited
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amount of current used primarily for lighting the house, but in
a few cases farmers also used them to power milking machines or
motors used for farm work. By 1930 about one out of fourteen
farmers in the area used such motors in one capacity or another.
During the next decade electrification ranked well down the list
of priorities among those struggling for economic survival. In 1940
less than one out of four farms had electric lighting and less than
a third of these received their power from electrical lines; the rest
depended upon home generators for their current. 21
Wartime shortages of electrical wire and equipment further
delayed the extension of rural electrification in the Loup country.
But as agriculture revived, the demand for electrical service grew,
and farmers organized the Loup Valleys Rural Public Power District. They received support for their endeavor from village merchants who foresaw the development of a large market for electrical
appliances as well as a short-term boom during the construction
and installation of the power transmission lines. The new public
power district formally incorporated in November, 1945, elected
its officers, and began filing applications for loans from the national
REA.
Despite the initial optimism four years elapsed before electric
power from the district reached the farm. The immediate postwar
period saw a continued shortage of the materials needed for the
construction of power lines. It also required time to process the
applications for federal loans. The district ultimately constructed
902 miles of lines to serve 1,610 customers-three times the number
originally proposed. The first pole went into place in October,
1948, and service to farms began in January of the following year.
More than half the farms initially received their power from the
Ord municipal power plant while the remainder obtained their
current from the Consumers Public Power District of Columbus.
Ultimately in 1957 the district contracted with the Nebraska Public
Power System to obtain its entire supply of electrical current
through high-power transmission lines. 22
As a result of these developments the proportion of Valley
County farms receiving electric power rose from about one-fourth
in 1945 to three-fourths in 1949 and nineteen-twentieths in 1954.
The advent of electricity brought a revolution to the farmhouse
as farmers' wives bought larger electrical appliances such as washers, refrigerators, and stoves. This process contributed greatly toward
diminishing the difference between farm and village living standards. Now the farmer could enjoy the same comforts at home as
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the townsman had possessed since the twenties. More importantly
from the point of view of the agricultural economy, electrification
placed a cheap, reliable power source at the disposal of the farmer
who could now mechanize many of his farmyard operations.
One of the first outdoor uses for electricity involved the operation of pumps to provide water for use in houses and for livestock.
Here it replaced the less reliable windmill with a constant supply
of energy. Electrical current powered some of the irrigation pumps
in the region and also displaced a considerable amount of hand
labor, allowing the substitution of augers and elevators for the
shovel. In the late fifties and sixties many farmers installed electric
arc welders to perform tasks formerly relegated to the village
blacksmith. Thus, while by no means as significant as the tractor,
electrification did play an important role in mechanizing farm
operations and in improving rural living standards. 23

IV
What did all these trends mean for the individual farm enterprise? We have already examined the changes in the production
pattern of crops and livestock in the region, noting the increasing
specialization in beef cattle finishing and the concomitant decline
in other lines of activity. We have also followed the adoption of
TABLE 10
VALLEY COUNTY FARM VALUES
1940-1969

Year

Number
of
Farms

Average
Size
(acre)

1940
1945
1950
1954
1959
1964
1969

1,173
1,101
1,045
1,038
853
754
643

298.4
330.9
351.4
353.3
431.7
485.2
519.0

Value
per
Acre'll
$ 45.81
42.24
45.59
54.50
60.07
85.44
107.38

Average
Value'll

Average
Value of
Sales per
Farm'll

$13,671
13,983
17,270
20,138
25,574
40,628
55,742

$ 2,581
5,605
6,781
6,093
8,104
10,721
17,444

SOURCE: 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969 Census of Agriculture.
* Value expressed in constant 1947-1949 dollars.
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various new agricultural techniques by farmers in the Loup country. But what of farming as a business? Perhaps the most important
development concerned the increasingly capital intensive nature
of the farm operation. Several factors contributed to this change.
Individual farm units expanded greatly in size, absorbing their erstwhile neighbors. Between 1940 and 1969 the average farm grew
more than 73 percent in size. At the same time the average per acre
value of land and buildings more than doubled in terms of constant dollars. As a result the average value of land and buildings
per farm rose by 308 percent in constant dollars during those three
decades. Table 10 reveals the pattern of increase in both farm
size and farm values.
But the value of land and buildings represented only one part
of the increased costs of farming. In 1940 the average investment in
machinery on Valley County farms amounted to $620. Three decades
later the figure had swelled to $11,806 owing to the rise in agricultural mechanization described above. The acquisition of additional tractors and other equipment for operating the larger farm
units made an increase of this type inevitable. Although inflation
affected these figures they still represented an increase of 682 percent in constant dollars-an impressive rise by any standard. In
addition, livestock holdings, particularly those of beef cattle, rose
substantially during this period. The average value of livestock
per farm rose from $1,150 in 1940 to $20,709 in 1969, a gain of
589 percent in constant dollars. The total average farm investment
in land, buildings, livestock, and machinery soared from a figure of
$8,756 in 1940 to $106,986 three decades later. In constant dollars
the increase came to a hefty 367 percent. These totals do not include
the investment represented by feed and grain inventories which
probably involved an additional $3,000 to $5,000 or more per farm
in 1969. 24
As the farming enterprise grew more capital intensive it also
became more fully commercialized in its operations. The last lingering elements of subsistence activity faded away with the decline
of home consumption of poultry and dairy products and the dis·
appearance of home livestock butchering. The rise in cash investments in the farming business proved even more significant. For
example, the growing emphasis upon beef finishing led to higher
expenditures for animals and feed than in previous years. But
other types of expenses also loomed large. Farmers had to pay for
machinery, gas, and oil on a much larger scale than before while
expenditures for irrigation, fertilizer, and other chemicals repre-
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sen ted new types of outgo. Altogether, in 1969 the average farm in
the region had expenses of slightly over nineteen thousand dollars
annually. Of this figure 52 percent involved the purchase of livestock and feed while 10 percent went toward the purchase of gas
and oil and of agricultural chemicals. The remainder included 5
percent for labor and about 33 percent for miscellaneous other
expenses. 25
In a sense the use of figures for an "average" farm misleads the
reader by implying an unreal degree of homogeneity among individual farm units. In actuality, although the trends of the postwar
era favored larger, more highly capitalized units, the smaller farms
did not disappear. In practice the gap between the larger commercial farm and the smaller traditionally oriented farm actually
widened. This does not mean that the larger farms were not family
operated. As of 1969 only five of the 643 Valley County farms represented incorporated enterprises and none of these had more than
ten shareholders. All of them represented family businesses which
had incorporated in order to ease the transfer of property ownership.
But while families operated virtually all of the farms in the region
their operations varied widely in terms of their output. This diversity appears in the distribution of farms according to the value
of agricultural products sold which appears in table 11.
TABLE 11
FARM UNITS BY VALUE OF PRODUCTS SOLD

1944

Value of Farm
Products Sold
Less than $1,000

.$ 1,000-$ 2,499
$ 2,500-$ 3,999
$ 4,000-$ 5,999
$ 6,000-$ 9,999
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000 and over

Percentage
of Farms
1944

14.3
33.2
24.6
13.8
9.0
4.2
1.9
100.0

AND

1969

Value of Farm
Products Sold
Less than $2,500
$ 2,500-$ 4,999
$ 5,000-$ 9,999
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000-$39,999
$40,000-$79,999
$80,000 and over

Percentage
of Farms
1969

13.6
11.9
20.0
22.8
17.8
8.2
5.6
99.9

SOURCE: 1945 Census of Agriculture, Vol. I. 12, p. 159. This set of figures represents the value of farm products raised minus the value of those products fed
to livestock. 1969 Census of Agriculture. Vol. I, part 20, sec. 2. pp. 705-706.
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Many of the farms which produced less than $2,500 worth of
farm products in 1945 represented partial-subsistence operations.
This particularly applied to those units included in the $1,000 to
$2,500 category. By 1969, however, virtually all farms in this class
involved anomalous situations-the presence of semiretired farm
operators, part-time farmers or census farmers. The growing
number of farms in the largest sales classifications stemmed from
the rise of cattle-feeding operations which led to larger investments,
higher operating expenses, and larger sales receipts. The intermediate groupings included most of the smaller livestock specialists
and the smaller categories included cash grain farms together with
the surviving general farms. In the case of the latter two groups
the lower sales figure did not necessarily imply lower net family
income, for those operators did not have to contend with the heavy
expenses of buying livestock and feed. In some instances the general farmer might realize a net income equal to that of the larger
livestock specialist. But he did not expand the scope of his enterprise nor did he accumulate capital gains as rapidly as the larger
operator did. On the other hand he more frequently held his land
free from mortgage than did his larger neighbors. Before further
examining this phenomenon of stable family farms operating side
by side with expanding commercial units, however, we must turn
our attention to the patterns of farmer turnover and persistence
which ultimately shaped the course of farm consolidation in the
region.

7. Farmer Mobility and
Farm Consolidation

W HEN HAROLD FOGHT wrote his history of the Loup country midway through the first decade of the twentieth century, he looked
back upon the previous period with some degree of complacency.
The seventies had brought the trappers, scouts, and first settlers
who blazed the way for future comers. Then followed the great
rush of the eighties which had transformed the region from a wilderness into a productive Eden. But this happy phase had ended
with the drouth of the nineties which seared the crops and struck
fear in the hearts of many residents. The less strong-willed left,
causing a population decline which led to stagnation in the villages.
To Foght these years represented the "critical period" in the region's
history. Fortunately the valiant in spirit remained, and with the
return of the rains they and a new wave of immigrants enjoyed
a golden era of -prosperity amidst a growing number of farms,
bumper crops, and good farm prices. 1
With the passage of time the first three decades of the twentieth
century came to figure in local minds as the "good old days."
Farmers remained on their farms and reaped abundant crops. The
villages flourished and the advent of new inventions such as electric
lights, the automobile, and radio made life easier for farmer and
townsman alike. These halcyon days lasted until 1930 save for a
brief interruption in the early twenties. Then a new series of disasters struck. Drouth and depression drove large numbers of farmers out of the region and the villages shrank as trade dwindled.
Only after irreparable damage had occurred did the war come,
bringing with it rains and high prices. Another decade of prosperity set in only to lapse with the onset of another drouth in the
mid· fifties and with the decline in farm prices characteristic of the
Ezra Taft Benson years. Thenceforth farmers migrated out of the
region in large numbers, and the regional economy continued to
stagnate as population again fell.2
So, at any rate, goes the local tradition. In this chapter the
author will attempt to evaluate the accuracy of this tradition and
of the Foght legend in terms of the pattern of turnover and per125
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sistence among farm operators dwelling in the region. At first glance
the most obvious measures of population change appear to support
these interpretations. The figures for both the total nonvillage
population of the region presented in table 12 and the number of
farms in Valley County given in table 13 changed only slightly
during the teens and twenties in comparison with the abrupt decreases that occurred later. The moderate rise in the number of
farms before 1925 coincided with a slight decline in farm population at that time due to the diminishing size of the average family.
For Valley County as a whole the average size of family fell from
4.68 persons in 1900 to 3.46 persons in 1930. However, simple statistics of the above type can mislead the reader for they represent

TABLE 12
NONVILLAGE POPULATION OF THE

Loup

COUNTRY

1900-1970

Year

Population

Decadal
Change (%)

Year

Population

Decadal
Change (%)

1900
1910
1920
1930

8,337
9,748
9,407
9,298

16.9
-3.7
-1.2

1940
1950
1960
1970

7,156
5,755
4,599
3,543

-23.1
-19.6
-20.1
-23.0

SOURCE:

Census of Population, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970.

TABLE 13
NUMBER OF FARMS, VALLEY COUNTY

1900-1970

Year

Number of
Farms

1900
1910
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940

1,085
1,272
1,295
1,351
1,300
1,371
1,173

Percentage
of Change

17.2
1.8
4.3
-3.8
5.5
-14.5

Year

Number of
Farms

Percentage
of Change

1945
1950
1954
1959
1964
1969

1,101
1,045
1,038
853
754
643

-6.1
-5.1
-0.7
-17.8
-11.6
-14.7

Agriculture Volumes, u.S. Census of 1900, 1910 ,1920, 1925, 1930, 1935,
1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969.

SOURCE:
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net changes, the result of the interaction of a complex variety of
elements such as migration stream flows, changing mortality patterns, and shifting birth rates. Hence they may actually conceal the
nature of population changes rather than elucidating them.
The basic question under consideration here concerns whether
human migration represents the collective response of a population
to changes in the physical and/or socioeconomic environment or
whether it represents an independent variable in human behavior.
To answer this question we may examine the pattern of persistence
and turnover among Loup country farmers over the course of the
last eighty years. Such an examination may reveal whether the migratory behavior of farmers underwent the drastic shifts indicated
by the traditional explanation of regional population decline. In
undertaking this analysis the author has adopted in large part the
basic procedure followed by James C. Malin in his pioneer studies
of turnover among the farm population of Kansas. Since, however,
the period under discussion is one for which agricultural census
schedules are not available certain adaptations have been made
in terms of source materials. 3
First, in place of census schedules the author used the personal
property assessment schedules preserved in the county courthouses
and in the Nebraska State Historical Society in Lincoln. On these
schedules appear the names of heads of households and other individuals reporting property holdings in each precinct together with
descriptions of the property. From this data one may determine
whether a specific individual operated a farm or whether he
merely resided in the precinct. On the basis of this information the
author compiled lists of farm operators a five- and ten-year intervals
for each of six precincts in the region-Arcadia, Enterprise, Geranium, Independent, and Springdale in Valley County and Fish
Creek in Greeley County.
In the six decades following 1910 these six precincts experienced
an aggregate population decline of 64.3 percent compared with a
figure of 62.4 percent for the over-all nonvillage population in the
region. Similarly the rate of change during each of the six decades
proved nearly identical for the six precincts and for the region as
a whole. Of these precincts Arcadia and Springdale include much
farm land lying in the river valleys. Independent and Fish Creek
consist largely of hilly terrain. Enterprise includes a large area of
gently rolling countryside whereas Geranium covers both broken
upland and small rolling areas. Thus the townships offer a reasonable cross section of the topographical and soil conditions which
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characterize the region as a whole. The same applies to the ethnic
composition of the population in those townships. Enterprise has
a largely old stock American and German population and Arcadia
contains old stock Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians. Geranium is heavily Bohemian whereas Fish Creek includes German and
Irish elements. Springdale's population features an admixture of
Bohemians, Scandinavians, and Germans whereas Independent's
consists chiefly of persons of British descent.
Various problems arose in the process of organizing and carrying out this tabulation. First came the question of the completeness of the tax records as a source of names of farm operators. A
thorough compilation of all households in Valley County was made
in order to determine whether such concern was warranted. The
author then compared the number of households counted on the
tax schedules with the number reported in the federal censuses for
the corresponding years. The discrepancies which emerged proved
insignificant. For the five census years in which both the number
of census families and the number of tax households could be
determined the greatest variation amounted to only 1.6 percent.
Clearly, then, the tax records offer a relatively complete guide to
precinct residents. 4
Certain procedural problems proved more serious. First, some
farm operators moved from one farmstead to another within the
same precinct. Studies based on census records may miss this type
of movement and understate somewhat the degree of turnover.
County records proved inadequate to remedy this difficulty. In
some cases personal property tax records bore the wrong section
location numbers while in others no such location number appeared
at all. Since many farmers rented their land, real estate records
offered no solution to the problem. Consequently if the farmer
remained in the township he was counted as persistent no matter
where his residence. Another problem involved the tendency of
some farmers to move out of the area for a year or two and theiI
to return. Fortunately their number proved relatively small. Generally they were counted as present and persistent if present, absent
if their names did not appear on the tax records.
A further difficulty involved ascertaining the point at which
an elderly farmer ceased operating the farm and his grown-up son
who lived under the same roof took over. The decision depended
on individual circumstances in each case. Some fairly reliable guides
on this point included the son's marital status, the relative distribution of property between father and son, and actual age. After
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TABLE 14
GROSS PERSISTENCE RATES FOR FARM OPERATORS

1890-1970

Base Year N

1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960

379
387
451
488
491
496
487
492
483
482
408
377
379
350
322

5 Years

10 Years

20 Years

30 Years

40 Years

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

51.3
61.8
53.9
52.9
61.7
45.2
62.2
61.4
65.6
54.1
59.6
60.7
67.6
62.9
69.4

195
239
243
258
308
227
303
302
243
261
243
229
256
220
224

39.2
44.2
34.4
33.8
35.3
36.0
45.6
46.7
42.9
35.9
42.3
47.7
51.4
47.1
53.6

149
171
155
165
176
189
223
230
207
173
172
180
195
165
173

18.6
22.2
15.8
17.2
21.8
24.4
24.6
23.6
23.9
20.7
24.5
28.4
34.0

71
86
71
84
109
121
120
ll6
ll5
100
104
107
129

6.0
7.5
8.0
10.0
9.8
12.7
10.5
12.0
14.1
12.5
14.4

23
29
36
49
49
63
51
59
68
60
59

1.6
3.9
3.5
4.7
4.8
5.0
4.3
7.1
6.6

6
15
16
22
23
25
21
35
32

SOURCE: Personal Property Tax Assessment Schedules, Greeley County court·
house, Greeley, Nebraska; Valley County courthouse, Ord, Nebraska; Nebraska
State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska.

these difficulties had been ironed out the author compiled the
lists of farm operators and processed them to yield the figures
which appear in table 14. These statistics represent gross persistence
rates-that is, the number and percentage of farm operators present in the base year who resided in the same precinct five years
later, ten years later, and thereafter at ten-year intervals. Since these
figures do not allow for mortality, they do not properly reflect actual
persistence behavior over longer periods. After 1910, however, the
ages of all farm operators appear on the schedules. If we adjust the
figures for those years to reflect mortality the persistence rates at
later intervals rise substantially as table 15 indicates. The author
obtained the adjusted figures by applying the age-specific mortality
rates for Nebraska males to the age distribution of farm operators
for each base year}i
These statistics reveal several important patterns. First, a substantial degree of turnover has always existed among farm operators in the region. In no instance prior to 1950 did more than half

130

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age
TABLE 15
GROSS PERSISTANCE RATES FOR FARM OPERATORS
ADJUSTED FOR MORTALITY, 1915-1970

Base Year

1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960

5 Years

10 Years

20 Years

47.8%
69.8
64.3
68.8
56.7
62.6
64.1
71.3
65.5
74.7

40.5%
55.9
52.2
49.1
41.6
49.4
55.7
57.6
54.7
65.0

33.6%
38.2
33.2
33.6
31.3
38.2
43.1
50.6

30 Years

40 Years

23.5%
23.3
22.9
28.5
27.6
33.0

16.1%
16.8
24.5
25.0

SOURCE: Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules;
Forrest E. Linder and Robert D. Grove, Vital Statistics Rates in the United
States, 1900-1940 (Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940) (Washington,
1943), p. 165; Robert D. Grove and Alice M. Hetzel, Vital Statistics Rates in the
United States, 1940-1960 (Washington: Public Health Service, 1968) p. 358.

the farmers present at a given date remain within their precinct
ten years later, nor did more than one-third of them remain in the
same place for as long as twenty years. Even when adjusted for
mortality, persistence did not far exceed half at the ten-year level
or two-fifths at the twenty-year level until after 1940. Second, persistence rates have not fluctuated nearly as greatly as one would
expect on the basis of the traditional interpretation of population
trends in the region. Indeed, in several instances the limited changes
that did take place followed a direction contrary to that assumed
by most writers. The lowest persistence rate at the five-year level
did not come with the 1935 population stricken by the drouth or
the 1940 population affected by the war boom but with the 1915
population in the midst of the supposedly stable "good old days."
At the ten-year level the 1915 and 1935 populations had virtually
identical turnover rates while at the twenty year level the 1935
group proved slightly less persistent. 6
Third, on the whole persistence levels have shown a tendency
to increase over the years. If we aggregate the data for gross
persistence for twenty-year periods this pattern clearly emerges as
the figures in table 16 illustrate. This appears to directly contradict the over-all population pattern of sharp decline during the
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TABLE 16
GROSS PERSISTENCE OF FARM OPERATORS BY TWENTY-YEAR PERIODS

1890-1970
Base Years

5 Years

10 Years

1890-1905
1910-1925
1930-1945
1950-1960*

55.0%
57.6
60.0
66.6

37.9%
40.9
42.2
50.7

20 Years
18.5%
23.6
24.4

30 Years

40 Years

7.6%
11.2
lO.2

3.4%
5.3

• Fifteen-year period.
SOURCE: Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules.

same period. Why should this have happened? One might logically
assume that the increase reflects a change in the age structure among
farm operators. Migration studies long ago established the axiom
that older persons migrate less frequently than younger ones. Hence
an increase in the average age of farm operators might explain the
recent rise in persistence. Table 17 indicates the age distribution
of farm operators in the six precincts following 1910. Over-all the
average age of farm operators increased substantially. The proportion under thirty-five years of age fell from about two-fifths in

TABLE 17
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM OPERATORS IN PERCENTAGE

1915-1960
Age

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

Under 35

35-44
45-54
55-64
65 & Over

40.7
36.3
16.5
10.7
5.8

36.6
25.9
19.5
13.7
4.3

33.1
28.6
21.5
12.2
4.5

28.2
29.0
22.6
15.1
5.2

29.7
24.9
22.2
16.8
6.2

Age

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

Under 35

2Ll
28.7
25.2
16.4
8.4

21.8
24.7
23.1
20.2
10.3

25.6
23.7
23.2
16.4
ILl

23.7
23.7
24.0
20.6
11.7

21.8
18.3
20.8
23.3
15.8

35-44
45-54
55-64
65 & Over

NOTE: Due to rounding columns may not total 100.0%.
SOURCE: Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules.
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TABLE 18
FARM OPERATOR PERSISTENCE BY AGE
ADJUSTED FOR MORTALITY - 1915-1970
Present
5 Years
Later

Present
10 Years
Later

Present
20 Years
Later

Present
Present
30 Years 40 Years
Later
Later

No.

No.

No.

%

No.

32.4 35
31.2 25
28.7 31
41.4 43
29.8 29
38.8 27
37.7
39.7

21.3
17.6
23.5
37.4
25.2
37.5

10
17
21
27

34.9

27.1

Age/Year

N

No.

%

Under 35
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Average

202
178
163
134
143
86
82
97
83
70

87
111
92
95
67
47
50
58
51
45

43.9
63.4
57.5
70.9
47.8
55.3
61.7
60.4
62.2
64.3
58.7

80 41.2
87 51.2
71 45.2
66 50.0
46 33.6
46 55.4
39 48.8
42 44.2
44 54.3
36 52.2
47.6

60
50
43
53
39
31
29
36

35-44
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Average

130
126
141
140
120
117
93
90
76
59

48.8
75.5
63.0
62.8
59.3
64.3
68.5
73.0
52.0
76.8
64.4

57 47.1
68 58.1
65 48.2
63 48.5
47 42.0
55 49.5
57 64.0
54 62.8
33 45.8
40 71.4
53.7

39 36.5
34 33.7
36 31.0
30 26.1
38 39.2
45 45.9
41 52.6
45 59.2

45-54
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Average

82
95
106
109
107
103
87
88
84
67

62.0
62.6
74.3
71.2
66.0
58.6
64.3
86.9
75.3
87.1
70.8

29
46
62
45
46
33
46
59
51
51

62
93
87
86
70
74
63
65
39
44

49
57
75
74
68
58
54
73
61
55

%

%

22
13
18
15
19
24

40.5

40.3 19 37.3
55.4 32 54.2
66.7 30 47.6
47.4 21 29.7
48.9 19 28.8
36.7 19 28.4
59.7 26 46.4
76.6 35 61.4
69.9
86.4
58.8
41.7

6
13
8
7
10
7

28.6
17.6
19.2
17.8
26.8
33.8

%
8.6
15.6
22.8
32.1

19.8
6
10
5

16.2
20.0
22.2
12.5

23.8

17.7

25.0
50.0
27.6
20.0
33.3
21.2

50.0
1 20.0
4 66.7
0 00.0

29.5

34.2
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TABLE 18 (continued)
Present
5 Years
Later
Age/Year

N

No.

%

55-64
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Average

53
67
60
73
81
67
76
62
72
75

21
40
37
49
45
50
39
43
48
55

43.8
65.6
68.5
74.3
60.8
82.0
56.5
76.8
73.8
80.9
68.3

65 & Over
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Average

29
21
22
25
31
35
39
42
41
51

8
2

Present
10 Years
Later
No.

%

8
22
43
30
56
25
54
31
52
36

26.3
44.0
64.3
54.5
51.8
52.0
50.0
66.0
55.8
64.3
52.9

34.8
3
13.3 o
11 64.7
5
13 65.0
3
11 45.8
5
21 75.0 12
23 74.2 11
17 50.0 9
21 63.6
8
25 62.5 10
54.9

17.6
00.0
38.5
30.0
29.4
75.0
47.8
40.9
33.3
38.5
35.1

Later
Present Present
20 Years 30 Years 40 Years
Later
Later
Later

%

No.

No.

%

%

o
o

3 18.8
4 17.4
7 36.8
11 40.8
6 25.0
8 33.3
9 25.7
12 52.5

00.0
00.0
2 66.7
3 75.0
o 00.0
25.0

31.3

27.8

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

No.

00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0

Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules;
Forrest E. Linder and Robert D. Grove, Vital Statistics Rates in the United
States, 1900-1940, p. 165; Robert D. Grove and Alice M. Hetzel, Vital Statistics
Rates in the United States, 1940-1960, p. 358.
SOURCE:

1915 to about one-fifth in 1960. At the same time the proportion
aged fifty-five and over rose from about one-sixth to two-fifths of
the total. The relative size of the thirty-five- to fifty-four-year-old
group shrank from about one-half the total in 1915 to two-fifths in
1960. To some degree the higher proportion of older farmers
stemmed from increased longevity, but this obviously accounts for
only a small part of the over-all aging of the farm operator group.
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TABLE 19
AGE-SPECIFIC PERSISTENCE OF FARM OPERATORS BY PERIODS

1915-1970
5 Years

10 Years

20 Years

30 Years

40 Years

Age/Period

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Under 35
1915-25
1930-40
1945-60

54.9
5S.0
61.2

45.9
46.3
49.9

30.S
36.7
3S.7

26.S
33.4

15.7

35-44
1915-25
1930-40
1945-60

62.4
62.1
67.6

51.1
46.7
61.0

33.7
37.1
55.9a

21.S
22.S

19.5

45-54
1915-25
1930-40
1945-60

66.3
65.3
7S.4

54.1
44.3
73.2

46.4
29.0
53.9a

34.2
24.S

41.9

55-64
1915-25
1930-40
1945-60

59.3
72.4
72.0

44.S
52.7
59.0

24.3
33.0
39.1a

65 & Over
1915-25
1930-40
1945-60

37.6
61.6
61.3

IS.7
44.S
40.2

Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules;
Linder and Grove, Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1900-1940, p. 165;
Grove and Hetzel, Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1940-1960, p. 358 .
• Data based upon two base periods.

SOURCE:

Although the increase in the average age of farm operators
appears to account for the rising persistence rates in later decades,
a closer analysis of turnover patterns among the different age
groups reveals the hopeless inadequacy of that explanation. The
statistics for age-specific persistence adjusted for mortality appear
in table 18. As in the case of gross persistence, long-term trends
become more evident with the aggregation of data from several
base years into averages for longer periods. Table 19 provides the
mean average age-specific persistence rates for three such periods
including the base years of 1915-1925, 1930-1940, and 1945-1960.
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Among farm operators under thirty-five years of age a general
trend toward slightly higher persistence developed although changes
at the five- and ten-year intervals proved minimal after 1920. The
major rise in persistence at longer intervals began in 1930. This age
group exhibited most clearly the effect of the drouth and depression
of the late thirties and of the war during the early forties. For the
1935 base year members of this class showed notably lower persistence than either their 1930 predecessor or their later successors.
However, persistence among these farm operators at later intervals
did parallel the rates for the same age category in base years prior
to 1930. The thirty-five through forty-four year olds also showed
a general upward trend in persistence, chiefly at the longer intervals.
Here again, the major rise in persistence came after 1930. The
depression and war conditions had scarcely any impact upon this
group's rate of turnover, in sharp contrast with the situation of
the younger farm operators.
Forty-five to fifty-four year olds showed a substantial rise III
persistence, particularly at the longer intervals, following World
War II. On the other hand members of this category exhibited
notably higher turnover rates at longer intervals for the 1930-1940
base years than either before or since. One might conjecture that
these farmers were engaged in expanding their operations at the
time the depression struck and consequently proved especially
likely to lose possession of their farms, resulting in a high degree
of turnover. The two older age groups showed higher persistence
levels after 1925 and, in the case of the fifty-five to sixty-four year
olds, again after World War II. The earlier rise probably reflected
improved health conditions and greater longevity but the latter
did not. Most age groups, then, experienced greater persistence
after 1945. Thus even had the age distribution of farm operators
in the region remained unchanged after 1915, persistence still would
have increased, particularly during the fifties and sixties. Yet this
decline in turnover came at the same time as the precipitous drop
in both the number of farms and farm population. Why should the
population have fallen so sharply if fewer farmers left their farms?
The answer to this question lies in the dwindling flow of
replacement farm operators into the region. The statistics in table
20 illustrate the changes that occurred in this area. While the rate
of turnover diminished, the flow of replacements onto the vacant
farms fell even more rapidly, producing a net outmigration of
farm operators and an over-all population decline. The lack of
replacements also meant a decline in the number of continuing
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TABLE 20
FARM OPERATOR REPLACEMENTS

Period
1890-95
1895-00
1900-05
1905-10
1910-15
1915-20
1920-25
1925-30
1930-35
1935-40
1940-45
1945-50
1950-55
1955-60
1960-65
SOURCE:

Number Number
Number
of
of
of
Operators Operators Five- Number
Present Year
New
Present
of
at
at Con- Per- Operators OperBeginning elusion sisters Departing ators

Percentage of
Rep1acements

195
239
243
258
308
227
303
302
317
261
243
229
256
220
224

104.4
143.2
117.8
101.3
102.7
96.7
102.7
95.3
99.4
66.5
81.2
101.3
76.4
78.5
55.1

379
387
451
488
491
496
487
492
483
482
408
377
379
350
322

387
451
488
491
496
487
492
483
482
408
377
379
350
322
279

184
148
208
230
183
269
184
190
166
221
165
148
123
130
98

192
212
245
233
188
260
189
181
165
147
134
150
94
102
54

Greeley and Valley County Personal Property Assessment schedules.

farm operations. Prior to 1935 the number of farms had either
grown or had fallen only slightly because in each instance at least
95 percent of departing farmers left new residents on their vacated
farms. During the drouth years of the thirties and the war boom
of the forties the number of replacements dropped as the region
lost its attractiveness for potential migrants. By the sixties only
three-fifths of the farm operators who retired or moved out of the
region left replacements behind them. The remaining two-fifths of
the vacated farms passed out of existence as independent operations.
Most of the replacement farm operators came from two basic
sources. On the one hand sons of local farmers looked forward to
taking over their fathers' operations or struck out on their own.
These individuals figured prominently in the ranks of farm operators under thirty-five years of age. Farm migrants from outside the
area, many of them in the middle or older age brackets provided the
remainder of the replacements. Generally speaking the under thirty-
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five age group contributed between two-fifths and half of the replacement operators while the older in-migrants furnished the
balance. The lowest proportion of younger replacements came in
the thirties when older farmers could least afford to retire. Inmigrants outnumbered the native sons in every decade and in
each ten-year period the rate of change proved virtually identical
for both groups.
While the decline in farm operator replacements explains the
downward trend in the number of farms and farm population in
the face of increased farm operator persistence, it does not explain
the latter phenomenon. A significant relationship may exist, however, between the decline in new farmers and the greater degree of
persistence among those in the older age groups. In earlier decades
perhaps the chief factor that determined when a farmer retired
was the presence or absence of an adult son at home who wished
to take over the farm. Usually this came when the son had married
and begun to raise a family, generally in his late twenties or early
thirties. When he could no longer begin farming with a minimal
capital investment the son could rarely afford to go out and begin
farming on his own. Instead, he must wait for a chance to take
over the home place. Hence the presence of an aspiring replacement at home led many farmers to retire once they had reached
their middle or late fifties.
But the attraction of farm life for local youth clearly diminished
over the years. This led to a decline in the number of farmers
under the age of thirty-five. Their number fell from 202 in 1915
to 70 in 1960 and even fewer in 1970. As a growing number of
young men decided not to enter farming they eliminated the major
impetus to early retirement on the part of their fathers. This explains the rather low turnover rate among farmers beyond the age
of fifty-five during the early forties followed by a high rate of
turnover at the ten-year level. During the war farm boys went
into the army or obtained urban war jobs while their fathers continued to farm. With the return of peace a large number of the
younger men returned home and sought to take over the family
farming operation. As the number of these aspiring farmers fell
after the early fifties, the older age groups experienced another rise
in persistence.
This movement of farm youth away from the region not only
reduced the pressure to retire but also eliminated in large part the
possibility of a retired farmer living with his grown children as had
been customary in previous decades. This in turn further encour-
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aged the older farmer to remain on the land while curtailing the
scope of his operations. Generally speaking he could live more
cheaply on the farm than in town since he avoided the cost of rent
and could raise part of his own food supply. This proved particularly true prior to the extension of social security coverage to farmers and other self-employed persons. After this extension came in
the early fifties the rate of persistence among farmers over sixty-five
years of age fell noticeably.
Furthermore, given increased longevity and improved health
conditions together with the changing nature of the farm enterprise one might have expected some increase in persistence even
had these other factors not existed. Most farmers could expect to
remain in fairly good health until their late sixties or early seventies
while, as a result of mechanization, they could carryon the heavier
farm work to a greater age than previously. In addition, as farmers
became more specialized, so did their farms. A farmer who specialized in hog production, for example, might construct an expensive collection of facilities designed expressly for that purpose.
Having undertaken such a heavy investment he would be less
likely to move to another farm which must undergo reorganization
and remodeling in order to suit his production program. The same
applied to other specialists such as cattle feeders and dairymen as
they acquired the expensive equipment required by their chosen
lines of endeavor. Thus the interchangeability of farm units diminished and with this the barriers to easy movement between farms
grew.
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In conclusion, farmer persistence rates in the region followed
the basic curve described in figure 5 for each of the base years
examined. Over-all persistence rose somewhat after 1920, declined
slightly in the late thirties and then climbed to new highs in subsequent decades. The changes that occurred proved limited in scope
contrary to expectations based upon the traditional interpretation
of population changes in the region. At this point let us return to
the basic question underlying this inquiry into farmer persistence
and turnover: Did the propensity for migration among the farmers change in response to alterations in the socioeconomic conditions in the region or did it represent a relatively stable independent
variable of behavior? From the evidence analyzed above one cannot
help feeling more impressed with the limited scope of the changes
that occurred than by the changes themselves. The fact that these
changes did not necessarily take the direction one would have
predicted on the basis of economic conditions supports the conclusion that they played a secondary role in shaping persistence
rates. Clearly such influences cannot be dismissed entirely for in
exceptional circumstances such as the drouth period of the late
thirties they obviously exerted some impact upon persistence levels
for certain age groups. But the data analyzed here suggest that
migration tendencies may not be explained solely in environmental
terms and that intensive further exploration into this problem
area is greatly needed. 7
II

During the three and a half decades after 1935 the number of
farms in the Loup country declined by half. However, this simple
statistic, like those for net population change, obscures a highly
complex process of individual farm consolidation and subdivision.
Table 21 provides a more useful picture of the change in the
number of farms by size. Before proceeding further we should note
the different types of operations represented by the various sized
groupings. Farms of less than 50 acres included several distinct
subtypes. Townsmen living outside the corporate limits of the
villages often appeared in agricultural censuses as farmers. The 1969
agricultural census, for example, listed forty-five Valley County
farms of less than 10 acres in size with an average of slightly under
2 acres each. These represented little more than oversized building
lots and could not properly be considered farms. On the other
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TABLE 21
VALLEY COUNTY FARMS BY SIZE

1910-1969
Size/Acres

1910

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

Less than 50
50-99
100-174"
175-259"
260-499
500-999
1000 & -Over

55
69
427
210
392
108
11

73
56
404
232
424
94
12

87
60
463
231
407
94
9

56
49
445
235
401
104
10

102
71
426
218
438
108
8

59
51
350
167
407
116
23

1,272

1,295

1,351

1,300

1,371

1,173

Size/Acres

1945

1950

1954

1959

1964

1969

Less than 50
50-99
100-174"
175-259"
260-499
500-999
1000 & Over

105
47
236
154
386
141
32

99
49
198
145
355
162
37

121
36
175
150
342
170
44

66
33
130
93
295
177
59

69
28
97
61
246
184
69

67
21
76
39
196
166
78

1,101

1,045

1,038

853

754

643

Total

Total

SOURCE: U.S. Census. Agriculture volumes 1910. 1920. 1930. U.S. Census of Agriculture. 1925. 1935. 1940. 1945. 1950. 1954. 1959. 1964. 1969.
" Size categories of 100-179 acres and 180-260 acres for period from 1940 through

1969.

hand a few semiretired and part-time farmers resided on tracts of
from 10 to 50 acres each. Although they engaged in a marginal
type of operation they did produce some subsistence items such as
dairy products, eggs, poultry, and vegetables while marketing a
few animals or small crops each year. The next larger sized category
of from 50 to 100 acres also included several different types of
operations including semiretirement, part-time, and in a few cases
regular commercial farms, the latter usually consisting of irrigated
land. The 100- to 174- (later 179) acre units included traditional
family farms of a nonexpanding nature. The next two larger categories involved commercialized units which generally included
large acreages of pasture together with cropland. Farms in excess
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of a thousand acres originally comprised cattle ranches but in later
periods came to include substantial areas of cropland as well.
Between 1910 and 1935 the number of farms in the region
remained relatively stable with the greatest rate of change amounting to about 5 percent over a five-year period. During the teens
intermediate sized farms-i.e., those from 175 to 499 acres in
extent-grew slightly at the expense of the next larger and smaller
categories. The early twenties brought a slight movement toward
subdivision which reversed itself later in the decade. The depression of the early thirties halted the outflow of farm youth from the
region and the number of small subsistence units rose substantially-of the seventy-one new farms that appeared between 1930
and 1935 sixty-eight included less than 100 acres. The drouth of
the middle and late thirties eliminated most of these new units
together with many farms in the other categories of less than 500
acres. The number of farms exceeding 1,000 acres rose considerably
as these units absorbed farms vacated by their previous owners. For
the time being much of this land acquisition in the late thirties
involved speculation rather than expansion geared to maximizing
the efficiency of individual farming operations.
War prosperity fostered a dual tendency toward both enlargement and subdivision on Loup country farms during the early
forties. The number of farms containing less than one hundred
acres rose by more than two-fifths as did the number of farms
exceeding a thousand acres in size. The growth of the larger units
marked a continuation of the process of absorbing abandoned farms.
The smaller farmsteads included a few irrigated tracts as well as
some semiretirement operations. In addition, with the revival of
rural prosperity empty farmhouses near the villages acquired occupants from among the town workers whom the census takers classified as farmers. The increase in the number of farms in these
categories came at the expense of the quarter-section farms which
fell in number by nearly one-third during the war. Farms of this
size proved too small for profitable commercial operations unless
situated on unusually favorable terrain.
The immediate postwar decade saw a continuation of these
trends but at a much slower pace than earlier. Then, in the latter
half of the fifties the number of farms containing less than 50 acres
fell by about half. Most of this drop resulted from a change in the
census definition of farm, however. The number of units of this
size remained stable for the next decade. For the most part these
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"farms" represented desirable residential locations near the villages,
well suited for either town workers or retired farmers. In the period
after 1954 the other size categories involving less than 500 acres
experienced heavy losses. Farms in the 100-174-acre class fell by
four-sevenths in number while those in the larger 175-259-acre
class declined by nearly three-fourths. The larger decline on the
part of the latter units grew out of their location in more marginal
farming areas while the persisting quarter-section farms usually lay
in the more fertile, irrigated areas. In addition, many quartersection farms had tradition-oriented owners who preferred to continue their operations on a limited scale rather than incur additional indebtedness. The larger 260- to 499-acre farms began to
disappear after 1950 as technological advances made themselves felt
in the intense pressure toward farm expansion aimed at attaining
the maximum possible operating efficiency. Now the largest farms
came into their own. The number of Valley County farms exceeding 1,000 acres in size doubled during the two decades after 1950
and by the end of that period they accounted for one-eighth of all
farms in the county. In one-fourth of the cases these units had
grown to more than 2,000 acres in size.
While cataloging changes in the number of farms by size gives
us a general picture of farm reorganization in the region it does not
provide a really detailed view of the process. A more intensive
analysis of a smaller cross section of farms offers greater insight into
this complex pattern of change. For this purpose we may turn to
six representative precincts in the region. The author drew a 20
percent random sample of farms from each of the six precincts as
of 1910 and then compiled the ownership and residence histories
of each for a total of 101 individual units. In addition, a residence
map was constructed for each precinct at twenty-year intervals
showing the location of all resident farm operators present in 1910,
1930, 1950, and 1970. This furnished a tool for analyzing further
the pattern of farm consolidation and for tracing residential relocation on the part of expanding farm operators. s
Sixty-one of the 101 farm operators present in 1910 owned their
farms and 2 others shared ownership with brothers. Altogether 38
of the farmers or 37.6 percent of the total were tenants compared
with a Valley County average of 35.4 percent that year. Of those
tenants 16 operated farms owned by their fathers. In many cases,
then, the fact of tenant status per se proved misleading as the farm
actually belonged to the operator's family. The sample farms
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covered a mean average of 196.5 acres compared with an over-all
Valley County average of 26S.9 acres. Two factors explain this
divergence. First, the land included in these farms represented only
the area which the operator or, in the case of tenants, the landlord
owned. In some cases individual farmers rented and farmed other
land, but surviving records do not enable the researcher to measure
either the frequency of this practice or the extent of land involved.
Also, the sample precincts do not include any of the northern tier
of townships in the county. Those townships included much of the
ranching land in the· area and thus accounted for a disproportionate
number of the larger units which raised the over-all county average.
Because of the pastoral rather than agricultural nature of most of
their operations their exclusion is not significant. Among the
sample farms the largest covered 960 acres, another included SOO
acres, and a third totaled one section. Of the remaining units mosti.e., sixty-two of ninety-eight-occupied a quarter section. Eleven
included only SO acres each and one totaled but 60. The mean size
of farm by township ranged from 170.5 acres in Geranium to 250.6
in Enterprise.
Among the sixty-three owner-operators present in 1910 fifteen
had originally obtained most of their land either from the Burlington Railroad or directly from the federal government. Most of
these men had acquired their farms late in the ISS0s. So also had
thirteen of the thirty-eight landlords, ten of whom rented the land
to their sons in 1910. The proportion of original owners varied
widely from precinct to precinct. Thus in Springdale and Independent, both settled in the early seventies, only two out of thirtytwo sample farm owners held original patents or railroad deeds. In
contrast, six out of nineteen owners in Arcadia, eight of nineteen in
Geranium, six of sixteen in Enterprise, and six of fifteen in Fish
Creek belonged to this category. Altogether a total of 27.S percent
of the farm owners still held land obtained either directly from the
public domain or from the railroad. Seven of the remaining owners
were sons of the original patentees. Altogether, then, thirty-five
farmers or 34.7 percent occupied family farms created during the
pioneer period more than twenty years earlier.
During the next twenty years the sample farms experienced little
change. Twenty-two of the 1910 operators remained present on
their farms in 1930, a proportion identical with the over-all farm
operator persistence for that period-21.S percent. In addition the
offspring of eighteen previous owners held land farmed by their
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parents in 1910. Hence a total of 40 or two-fifths of the farms
remained in the possession of the same family in 1930 as in 1910.
Of the 101 units 3 passed out of existence as separate entities. One
80-acre tract in Geranium lost its tenant occupant in the teens and
no replacement ever materialized. One quarter-section farm was
purchased by a neighboring farmer who remained in residence on
his original farmstead. A third owner-operator bought up an additional quarter section and moved there from his original homesite
which then fell vacant. On the other hand five heirs divided up
the largest farm in the sample in 1917 and the home farmstead
shrank from 960 acres to 240 acres. The farm which had originally
included 640 acres went to several different owners and the main
farmstead dwindled in size to a quarter section. The two sons of
the owner of a third farm divided the operation between them.
Five other farms stood vacant in 1930 but all of them acquired
resident operators by 1935. One other quarter-section farm momentarily disappeared when a neighboring farmer bought it. The
consolidated farm went to a corporate creditor in the thirties,
however, and each of its original components acquired tenant operators in the middle of the decade.
Although all of the vacant farms acquired resident operators
early in the thirties the latter part of the decade saw a major constriction in the number of farms. By 1940 another eleven farms had
disappeared, reducing the total number of farm units with resident
operators to eighty-seven. The eleven farms that disappeared included five which went to creditors. Five of the remaining six
became tied up in long-term family estates. These units could no
longer support a resident farm family and either remained idle or
were rented out to farmers residing elsewhere. The last farm to
disappear consisted of a 40-acre tract which an adjacent landowner
purchased. Of the farms that disappeared five included quarter
sections, three contained 80 acres or less, two covered 240 acres each,
and one occupied 480 acres. No particular relationship appeared
between size per se and the likelihood of a farm disappearing as
those that vanished represented a fair cross section of the total
sample.
As the drouth persisted into the early forties the decline in farm
numbers continued. During the decade a total of fourteen more
farms went out of existence. Eight of these had fallen into the
hands of corporate creditors during the preceding two decades.
Eight of the fourteen covered quarter sections, one a half section,
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one three-quarters of a section, and one ninety acres while the
others involved intermediate sizes. Again, size alone did not significantly influence the prospects for farm survival. Two of the
farms which lost resident operators remained in the hands of
creditors in 1950, two others belonged to family estates, and nonresident operators bought the remaining ten. By that date, then,
the number of surviving farms with resident operators present had
fallen to seventy-two. Of the twenty-nine units that disappeared
expanding farmers had purchased eighteen, four remained in the
hands of corporate creditors and real estate brokers, and seven
belonged to estates whose administrators rented them out to nonresident operators.
The effect of foreclosure or forced sale to creditors on the farm
unit's prospects for survival deserves further consideration at this
juncture. Altogether banks and insurance companies or other
creditors obtained title to thirty-five of the ninety-eight farms
present in 1930. Of these forced transfers two occurred in the late
twenties, twenty-eight during the thirties, and five in the early
forties. Eventually new owners took up residence on twenty-two of
these farms, meaning that thirteen or 37.1 percent disappeared. This
compares with only twelve of the sixty-three nonforced transfer
farms or 19.3 percent of those units which vanished. The townships
with the highest forced transfer rates included large areas of hilly
terrain. In those areas much of the land passed into the hands of
creditors when the owners gave up farming because of the drouth
and left the area. Later it proved difficult to find tenants or resident
buyers for these hilly, heavily eroded farms. In contrast, farms in
areas of level terrain and good soil readily attracted new residents.
Since those buying land for the purpose of expansion already operated a farm elsewhere, they did not relocate on their new farmsteads but merely utilized them for cropping and, to an increasing
degree, for pasturing their growing cattle herds. These individuals
showed the keenest interest in acquiring the hilly farms which they
then converted into permanent grassland.
Between 1950 and 1970 the number of sample farms with resident operators fell a further 36.1 percent from 72 to 46. By the
latter date 20 of the 26 farms that disappeared had already merged
into other units while the remaining 6 entered the limbo of family
estates or absentee owned rental units. Altogether by 1970, 43 of
the original IOI farms had vanished entirely while another 12
remained in the hands of absentee owners. On most of the latter
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farms the buildings had deteriorated to the point where no future
resident operator was likely to appear. They remained waiting for
farmers to buy them as permanent additions to operations based
elsewhere. Of the 46 farms with operators present in 1970, 16 or
34.8 percent remained in the hands of the family which owned them
in 1910. Four of the 12 rental units also belonged to relatives of
the 1910 owner. Altogether then, 20 of the 58 surviving farms or
34.5 percent remained in the possession of the 1910 owner's family.
Or, stated from another perspective, 20.8 percent of the families
owning sample farms in 1910 still held them sixty years later.
What factors determined whether a particular farm would survive? First, a farm must include a substantial amount of reasonably
good land. Hilly farms generally disappeared because heavy soil
depletion rendered them unproductive. This applied especially to
the hilly areas of Fish Creek, Enterprise, Independent, and Springdale townships where residence maps reveal the disappearance of
most hill farms. Areas of level terrain and good soil showed far
fewer losses. In addition, the farm must include enough land to
support a family. Small size as such did not necessarily spell doom
if the farm included fertile soil and possessed irrigation facilities.
Thus among the seventeen farms covering less than 160 acres in
1910 six or 35.6 percent survived the sixty year period. Among the
sixty-two original quarter-section farms thirty-three or 53.2 percent
remained in operation in 1970. Of the twenty-two farms that exceeded a quarter section in size in 1910 only seven or 30.4 percent
remained under occupation in 1970. Thus over the long run the
largest farm units showed the lowest survival rates with most of the
disappearances coming after 1950.
An examination of the larger farms which went out of operation
by 1970 nearly all occupied inferior upland locations. The larger
size eventually proved inadequate to offset the deteriorating quality
of the soil. These larger units also experienced a higher degree of
forced transfer during the depression. Overall 47.8 percent of the
farms exceeding a quarter section in size in 1910 underwent forced
transfer compared with 32.0 percent of the smaller units. In some
instances the mortgage debt acquired in the process of buying additional land had proved too great. Investments in cattle and machinery on the larger farms necessitated further borrowing on the
part of their owners. In addition larger farms faced higher cash
expenses for property tax payments than did their smaller neighbors. Hence what John Bennett had called the "conservative
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strategy" of survival and what this writer has termed the "security
orientation" -i.e., the avoidance of mortgages and the expenses of
farm improvements in exchange for greater security-showed itself
well adapted to survival in terms of farm ownership during years
of unfavorable farm prices.9
So much for the farm units that disappeared, what happened
to those that survived? Among the forty-six farms with resident
operators present in 1970 only four had declined in size after 1910three of these being large farms which were divided up among the
heirs of the original owner. Eleven other farms remained unchanged
in size over the sixty-year period. These included an SO-acre tract,
eight quarter sections, a 190-acre unit, and a 240-acre operation.
More than half of these small farms lay in Arcadia township where
they occupied level farmland close to the river. The other units
included superior cropland in other township locations. Not surprisingly the large majority of persisting farms grew. Thirty-one
or 67.4 percent of these enterprises expanded in size. By 1970 the
mean acreage for all remaining farms had reached 470.4 acres, an
increase of 139.9 percent over the 1910 figure. Most of these units
grew after 1940 although a few had added some acreage prior to
that date. The over-all distribution by size for the sample farms in
1910 and 1970 appear in table 22. The acreage figures represent
total land held by the owner including noncontiguous tracts. The

TABLE 22
SAMPLE FARM SIZE, 1910, 1970
(RESIDENT OPERATED FARMS)
1910

Size (Acres)
Less than 99
100-159
160
161-319
320-639
640-959
960 And Over
Total

Number
14
3
62
5
13
3
101

1970

Percent
13.9
3.0
61.4
5.0
12.9
3.0
1.0
100.2

Number

Percent

11
14
7
10
2
46

2.2
2.2
23.9
3Q.4
15.2
21.7
4.4
100.0

SOURCE: Greeley and Valley County deed records, Greeley County courthouse,
Greeley, Nebraska; and Valley County courthouse, Ord, Nebraska.
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1970 figures do not include the twelve absentee owned units with
no farm operators present at that date.
Individual farms expanded or disappeared in various ways but
several basic patterns often recur in these case histories. Relatively
little change occurred prior to the late thirties. As a rule expansion
prior to that date consisted of the purchase of land adjacent to or
very near the home farmstead. Such growth came either when an
operator bought a tract that had fallen vacant or when a son who
had acquired his own farm bought or inherited his father's farmstead. Such cases proved relatively rare. This situation altered
rapidly in the late thirties and early forties as many farms lost their
occupants. Land became readily available to those who wished to
expand but few had the money needed to take advantage of the
opportunity. The return of the rains and the war boom resolved
this difficulty as farmers reaped profits sufficiently large to finance
land acquisition. Furthermore, a farmer could now travel up to
four or five miles away with his tractor to farm cropland while he
might also pasture his cattle a dozen miles or more away from his
residence, making weekly or semiweekly visits to check on fence
conditions and water supplies. Due to the general acquisition of
tractors and farm trucks he could now effectively utilize land some
distance away from his farmsite and such land could now be easily
acquired.
This favorable combination of circumstances contributed to the
rapid increase in farm size as the insurance companies and banks
willingly unloaded their unwanted farmlands at bargain prices.
The process of consolidation slowed down greatly in the postwar
decade, however, as the last of the vacant lands went to expanding
operators and as an increasing flow of replacement operators onto
the farms prevented any more from becoming available. Then with
the increasing reluctance of young men to enter farming after the
early fifties this replacement pressure diminished. As a result large
numbers of farmsteads again fell empty as their owners retired or
moved out of the region, thus providing new opportunities for
expansion. This development combined with further improvements
in agricultural technology, spurred the continued rise in average
farm size during the fifties and sixties, a trend which showed no
indications of abatement with the arrival of the seventies.
Farm absorption itself usually followed a predictable pattern.
Initially the farm supported either an owner operator or a resident
tenant. Eventually the owner operator died, moved, or retired, and
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after an interval of variable length, tenants became impossible to
find. The farm then fell vacant while the buildings deteriorated to
the point of complete disintegration. In some cases this took place
during the long intervals when the land remained tied up in family
estates. In other instances prolonged vacancy came after the land
had passed into the hands of a corporate creditor. After 1930 if a
farmstead fell empty while part of an estate or while in the hands
of a creditor the odds favored its disappearance as a separate entity.
In such cases it was merely a matter of time and convenience until
the nonresident owner or owners found a local buyer willing to pay
a satisfactory price. The land then became part of a new farm
which as often as not involved noncontiguous acreages scattered
about the region.
Farm reorganization thus occurred in a variety of fashions. The
more marginal farming areas lost their occupants and came increasingly to function as pastures for livestock operations based in
the river valleys or other superior cropland areas. The redistribution of farm operator residents in the region that accompanied this
development paralleled the lines described by Carl Kraenzel in his
discussion of residence patterns in the Great Plains. Farm population remained relatively dense in the river valleys and along the
major transportation arteries linking them, notably in south central
Valley County which included much good cropland. By contrast
the hilly uplands underwent rapid depopulation as residents either
left the area entirely or moved to better locations in the river
valleys. In each instance the choice of location by the farmer who
acquired an additional farmstead depended upon such variables as
road conditions, the relative state of farm buildings on each farmstead, the distance to town and to rural schools, and the like. This
movement too appears likely to continue indefinitely as the more
marginal lands continue to shift out of agricultural production. 10

8. Rural Depopulation
and Its Consequences

of the Loup country grew rapidly during the first decade of the twentieth century this trend faded away
before the beginning of World War 1. The 1920 census revealed
an over-all population increase of slightly more than 6 percent in
the teens compared with a rise of nearly 30 percent the previous
decade. Even Ord, the largest town in the region, gained only 183
residents between 1910 and 1920. Faced with these unimpressive
statistics the editor of the Ord Journal wrote:
ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION

This figure seems very small to Ord people who have lived here the past years
and who are acquainted with the actual facts. The school census would indicate a much larger population than this, but as long as the figures are official
we shall have to accept them.
It is certain, however, that if the census were taken again today the report,
if covering everyone now here, would show a large [r] figure. We had hoped
for a larger increase but shall have to swallow the dose.

In a society that gauged progress in terms of quantitative expansion such slow growth rates exerted a depressing influence. This
applied particularly to the village merchant who saw in each individual another potential customer for his goods or services. Fortunately for their peace of mind village observers in 1920 had no
inkling of the demographic trends that would characterize the region in the succeeding half-century.l
In terms of absolute numbers the population of the Loup
country reached its peak in 1920. The farm population had already
begun to decline during the teens, however, and in the course of
the next fifty years the total population fell by nearly half as the
figures in table 23 illustrate. The relatively stable figures for the
teens and twenties mislead the reader in that they mask a substantial flow of outmigration from the region that nearly equalled
the natural increase in population during the former decade and
exceeded it in the latter. The abrupt fall in population in the
thirties, therefore, did not stem from a sudden rise in outmigration
as one might expect, but resulted chiefly from a combination of
reduced migration inflows and declining birth rates. Table 24
151
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TABLE 23
TOTAL POPULATION, THE Loup COUNTRY
1900-1970

Year

Percentage of
Change

Population

1900
11,020
14,147
1910
1920
15,019
1930
14,650
1940
12,411
1950
10,775
1960
9,471
1970
8,183
Total Change, 1920-1970

28.4
6.2
-2.5
-15.3
-13.2
-12.2
-13.5
-45.4

SOURCE: V.S. Census, Population, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960. 1970.

TABLE 24
BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND NET MIGRATION
VALLEY COUNTY, 1920-1970

Decade
19205
19305
19405
1950s
19605

Births

Deaths

Natural
Increase

Actual
Change

Net Migration

Rate
(%)

2,007
1,552
1,450
1,547
971

758
752
724
783
821

1,249
800
726
764
150

-290
-1,370
-911
-662
-807

-1,539
-2,170
-1,637
-1,426
-957

-15.6
-22.8
-20.1
-19.7
-14.5

SOURCES V.S. Census, population, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970. Nebraska
Department of Vital Statistics, Lincoln.

gives the net migration rates for Valley County in each of the five
decades after 1920. Since effective registration of births and deaths
in the state did not begin until 1917 it proved impossible to obtain the data necessary for calculating net migration during the
teens. In all probability the net migration rate at that time closely
paralleled that of the twenties. But the higher birth rates in the
teens more than offset outmigration while the lower rates in the
twenties did not.
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Where did this stream of outmigrants originate? Clearly the
countryside lost a higher proportion of residents than did the
villagers. The high level of fertility among farm families ensured
that a large number of farm youth would have to migrate in order
to secure employment. But while some farmers moved directly out
of the region a complex pattern of internal migration within the
Loup country also developed. Many farmers moved to town upon
retirement in order to enjoy the amenities of village life. At the
same time village youth and some adults migrated to urban centers
outside the region. Few small-town youths could expect to secure
employment or to take over a family business at home. Furthermore, the gulf between town and city did not loom so large as that
between farm and city. The townsmen who moved to the city
could often find employment similar to that which he had practiced before-as a store clerk, laborer, or professional man. Since
the inflow of elderly farmers largely offset the outflow of younger
people the actual number of village residents declined much less
rapidly than did the farm population. The dual migration process
did, however, lead to major changes in the age-sex structure of
the village population as we shall see below. 2
On the basis of general demographic principles one would expect younger people to figure predominantly in the net outflow of
population from the region. Owing to the crudeness of the published census data for 1910 and 1920, however, one cannot determine the exact age-sex distribution of net migration in the teens
and twenties. In the latter decade members of the age ten through
nineteen years group in 1920 did account for 33.3 percent of net
migration although they included only 22.8 percent of the population in that year. The population pyramids for 1930 which
appear in figure 6 (p. 158) further support the hypothesis that
migration in these years particularly affected young people. In
comparison with the national distribution of population the Valley
County pyramid showed a noticeable deficit in the twenty-five to
forty-four years of age category, the usual consequence of heavy
outmigration among those in their twenties during the two previous decades. 3
We can determine the age-sex specific distribution of net migration with some degree of precision for the decades after 1930.
The figures· which appear in Table 25 are based on the known
age-sex distribution of the Valley County population during census years. The author calculated the number of survivors for each
decade by applying age-sex specific state mortality rates to these
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TABLE 25
NET MIGRATION BY AGE AND SEX
VALLEY COUNTY,

19305
male female
(%)
(%)

19405
male female

(%)

(%)

-18.4
-24.8
-39.1
-41.4
-27.6
-17.2
-16.2

-11.5
-20.9
-36.5
-35.7
-27.9
-18.4
-16.9
-20.5
-16.3
-9.1
-6.6
6.0
13.0

-18.4
-28.0
-48.0
-40.2
-32.9
-21.5
-20.6
-22.4
-18.3
-13.7
-6.0
-6.5
16.8

-6.2
19.0

Age
Group
0- 4

5- 9

10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
-17.2
45-49
50-54 -17.8
55-59
0.4
60-64
65-69
70-74
-4.5
75-79
80-84
85 & Over

-7.8
-22.7
-37.3
-39.6
-29.2
-16.8
-19.1
-17.2
-15.9
-5.3

1930-1970
19505
male female
(%)
(%)

-16.3

-7.8
-19.9
-61.4
-51.0
-24.6
-13.5
-12.6
15.2
-11.7
-8.9
-8.5
6.3
9.2
0.0
-18.8

-16.7
-33.2
-46.0
-38.3
-10.2
-14.0
-19.6
-13.2
-7.5
-14.8
-1.0
3.7
-4.6
-5.0
-30.1

-25.0

-29.7

15.0

19605
male female
{%)
(%)
-10.0
-29.2
-68.3
-26.7
-16.7

-10.0
-27.6
-56.2
-26.2
-14.5

-4.8

-6.2

-0.5

-4.3

-3.0

-4.2

-8.2

3.9

-5.2

-2.2

-4.5

Those born
during the
decade

(both
sexes)

-10.0

0.0

-12.5

-4.1

SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Census, Population, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970:
Linder and Grove, Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1900-1940, p. 165;
Grove and Hetzel, Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1940-1960, p. 358;
information from the Nebraska Department of Vital Statistics, Lincoln.

population distributions. However, in the process of compiling
these estimates a serious problem developed. The Nebraska Depart.
ment of Vital Statistics furnished statistics for age at death for the
decade of the sixties. For the three previous decades, however, the
application of state mortality tables yielded an excess number of
deaths compared with the actual figure, reflecting the unusually
low mortality level in the region. Excess deaths totaled 8.4 percent
for the thirties, 8.l percent for the forties, and 4.9 percent for the
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fifties. We may assume that most of these fictitious deaths occur in
the older age brackets, some of which show imr.robable net immigration. Thus one should view the estimates for age groups in
excess of fifty-four years with caution. For the younger age groups,
and this is where most of the migration took place, these figures
represent reasonably accurate estimates given the small number of
deaths likely to occur. 4
In the years following 1930 the composition of the stream of
net outmigration underwent several significant changes. The most
striking characteristic of these migrants in the thirties lay in their
wide distribution across the age spectrum. The ten- through twentyfour-year-old group experienced the highest rates of outmigration
as one would expect, but the more sedentary thirty-five through
forty-four and forty-five through fifty-four-year-old age groups also
sustained high net outmovement rates of more than 17 percent. In
the thirties and early forties, then, the migration stream comprised
not only young individuals but also a number of family units
including persons of all ages. During the thirties the number of
families in Valley County fell by about one hundred and fifty or
nearly 8 percent as a result of this type of outmigration. This trend
did not grow out of any new mass movement away from the county
so much as it reflected the virtual cessation of movement into the
drouth stricken area by new families. Judging from the farm operator persistence data examined in chapter 7 it appears that the
actual stream of migrants leaving the region in the thirties did
not greatly exceed that of previous decades.
The frequency of net family outmigration diminished in succeeding decades as the migration process became increasingly ageselective. The proportion of all net outmigrants concentrated in
the ten- to twenty-four-year-old age group rose from 48 percent in
the thirties and 49 percent in the forties to 61 percent in fifties and
more than 71 percent in the sixties. Ultimately this selective trend
exerted a profound influence on the age structure of the residual
population in contrast to the earlier migration which had had
much less impact. During the sixties this selectivity became particularly acute as less than one-sixth of net outmigrants exceeded
twenty-four years of age at the beginning of the decade. The fall
in outmigration on the part of young married couples (i.e., age
twenty-five through thirty-four years) during the sixties also resulted in decreased outmigration rates among children born during
the decade.
Several factors accounted for this change in the age composition
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of the stream of outmigrants. Those who had not migrated previously had developed strong ties in the region which presumably
strengthened still further with the passage of time. Consequently
one would expect increasing persistence on their part for those in
their age groups likely to move away had already done so. Furthermore, as they grew older they would become less mobile due to
the factor of age alone. At the same time the fifteen- to twenty-fouryear-old category became particularly critical in terms of career
decision. Prior to the fifties a high proportion of young people did
not complete high school. In Valley County, for example, fewer than
half the seventeen and eighteen year aIds attended school in 1930
and only about five-eighths in 1940. By 1950 the figure had risen
to 75 percent and by the late sixties more than 90 percent of the
region's youth completed high school, generally at the age of
eighteen. At that point the new graduate found himself forced to
decide upon his future career. He might continue his education,
enter the military, or seek a job either within the region or elsewhere. This decision largely determined the course of his future
career and social activity. If he remained home in the region for
more than a few years, he formed attachments which could not
easily be overcome. If he left he rarely returned except in a few
instances after completing military service. 5
This marked a major change from the pattern of earlier decades. Before high school graduation became the norm large numbers of rural children left school as soon as they reached the
maximum compulsory school attendance age. Often several grown
sons remained home on the farm even though it became evident
that only one of them would eventually take over the operation.
Likewise many farm girls remained home for several years after
leaving school, helping with the housekeeping and family chores.
These children might move to the city in search of employment
at any time between age sixteen and the middle twenties. The
property tax records of the teens, twenties, and thirties reveal the
presence at home of large numbers of these unmarried offspring.
Later, as local conditions grew less tolerable and urban opportunities opened up many of these young adults left. By the end of World
War II their number had fallen greatly and the practice of remaining at home for several years after completing high school largely
disappeared after the fifties.
Another major change in the composition of outmigrants involved their distribution by sex. In the thirties the incidence of
migration for males and females in the various age categories
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proved quite similar. But in the forties women left with perceptibly
higher frequency than men, a trend particularly noticeable in the
ten- to fourteen-year-old age group. The fifties saw a reversal of
this shift as males in the ten through twenty-four age groups had
noticeably higher rates of outmigration than did females. The explanation for these changes appears to lie in the economic conditions influencing the male decision to enter agriculture. In both
the forties and fifties female migration rates remained fairly stable,
reflecting the presence of widespread employment opportunities
in the cities. But the agricultural boom of the late forties and early
fifties encouraged many young men to enter farming at that time,
leading to a somewhat lower net outmigration rate. In the less
prosperous later fifties entry into agriculture declined and net
male outmigration again picked up. After 1960 rates for the two
sexes again converged at a very high level of over-all outmovement.

II

Six decades of continuous heavy outmigration profoundly altered the structure of the population residing in the Loup country.
Figure 6 shows the age-sex distribution of population in the region
compared with those for greater Omaha and for the United States
as a whole. These population structures did not differ greatly in
1930 although the variations which did exist foreshadowed future
trends. Two decades of substantial outmigration had given the
Loup country a deficit in the twenty-five- to forty-four-year-old age
groups. Conversely Omaha gained from immigration by young
people and had an unusually high concentration of residents in
those age categories. Omaha's population also contained a high
proportion of females, reflecting the attraction of the city for rural
women who came to fill positions as store clerks, secretaries, and
the like. The relative profiles of the three populations did not
change greatly in the thirties since the loss of migrants from the
Loup country cut across all age-sex groupings. The major change
during the decade came with the steepening of all three pyramids
due to the sharp decline in birth rates at that time.
After 1940 the increasingly age-selective migration pattern gave
rise to a major divergence between the structure of the Loup
country's population and those of both Omaha and the nation at
large. Owing to the high rural fertility level of the forties, fifties,
and early sixties the relative proportion of persons under age
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Figure 6. Changing Age-Sex Structures.

fourteen did not differ greatly among the three populations. However, the regional cohorts for ages fifteen through forty-four shrank
significantly compared with those of the other populations causing
a top-heavy age structure to develop. By 1970 this structure had
clearly begun to take the shape of an inverted pyramid, the reverse
of the normal pattern of age distribution. With the fall in regional
births after 1960 the youngest age cohorts also began to shrink.
The two extreme age cohorts provide the best illustration of the
growing divergences that developed. In the Loup country children
less than five years old accounted for 6.8 percent of the total population in 1970 compared with a figure of 8.7 percent for greater
Omaha and 8.4 percent for the country as a whole. By contrast,
those over age sixty-five that year included 19 percent of Loup
country inhabitants compared with less than 9 percent of Omahans
and 10 percent of all Americans. The median age of population
offers another convenient yardstick for measuring changes in differ-
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ent population structures. The median age of Valley County residents rose from 24.4 years in 1930 to 32.7 years in 1950 and 38.2
years in 1970. In the corresponding period the national median
age rose from 26.4 years to 30.2 years, then fell to 28.1 years. Thus
while the county population averaged two years younger than the
national population in 1930, forty years later it had aged to the
point where it averaged ten years 0lder.6
Even as the over-all age-sex structure of the Loup country
population diverged from that of the nation at large differences
within the area persisted. Figure 7 illustrates the changing age-sex
distributions of the farm and village populations within the region. Already by 1930 the villages contained a substantially greater
proportion of older residents than the countryside, reflecting the
movement of retired farmers to town as well as the lower village
fertility level. Four decades later this top-heavy distribution had
become so great that the resulting population structure assumed
the character of a mushroom. By the sixties, though, even the
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farm population showed signs of aging and only the relatively
high level of fertility among farm women kept the lowest age
cohorts from shrinking to a degree comparable to those of the
towns. The villages also exhibited a substantial surplus of females
over males in direct contrast to the predominantly male farm population. Two factors accounted for this phenomenon. First, farm
operators often included single men but almost never single or
widowed women. On the other hand a number of single women
operated businesses or worked in the villages. Second, the village
population included a large number of older women, chiefly the
widows of retired farm operators. Indeed, to cite an extreme case,
the median age of women in the village of Comstock averaged 65.5
years in 1970. This concentration of women in the upper age
brackets grew out of the seven-year differential in life expectancy
between males and females.

TABLE 26
FERTILITY LEVELS
VALLEY COUNTY, 1920-1969

Year

1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1969

Number of
Females Age
15-44

2,086
2,163
1,809
1,371
1,054
916

Number of
Births

Fertility
Rate

U.S. Average
White Females

230
181
137
169
128
68

1l0.3
83.7
75.7
123.3
121.4
74.2

115.4
87.1
77.1
102.3
113.2
87.6*

SOURCE: U.S. Census. Population. 1920. 1930. 1940. 1950, 1960. 1970; Nebraska
Department of Vital Statistics. Lincoln .
.. All Females

Another noteworthy divergence between regional and national
demographic characteristics came in the area of fertility. Unfortunately one can calculate fertility levels for Valley County only
in census years although the number of births reported each year
provides a guide to changes occurring within each decade. The
county and national fertility rates for census years appear in table
26. Given the usual tendency for rural fertility to exceed that of
urban areas the low Valley County rates prior to 1950 may appear
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somewhat surprising. However, the fact that each of those years1920, 1930, and 1940-came during agricultural depressions partially accounts for this phenomenon. Also, some underregistration
of births probably affected the 1920 rates since registration in the
state only began in 1917. During the thirties the level of fertility
in Valley County fell below the national level but the return of
prosperity in the forties led to an upsurge in births. By the end of
that decade the county fertility rate exceeded the national average
by one-fifth. Late in the fifties both national and local fertility
began to decline but county rates fell perceptibly faster. By 1960
the difference between the two amounted to only half of the 1950
figure and by 1970 Valley County fertility had dropped considerably below the national level.
Several elements contributed to the over-all decline in rural
fertility after 1950. The availability of more effective contraceptive
techniques furthered this trend as did changing attitudes toward
the desirability of large families. In earlier years a large family
represented an economic asset given the inefficient use of labor
characteristic of most family farming operations. But as the utilization of farm labor grew increasingly efficient additional children
ceased to represent an economic advantage. Indeed, as the cost of
raising and educating children climbed they came increasingly to
represent a financial liability. This in turn caused a sharp decline
in the number of farm families with more than three or four
children. But this does not in itself adequately explain why regional fertility should have fallen well below the national level
by 1970.
That phenomenon resulted in large part from changes in the
age structure of the Loup country's population due to continued
heavy outmigration. As a result of the increasingly age-selective
nature of that outmigration, the proportion of the total population
represented by women of childbearing age (fifteen through fortyfour years) shrank substantially. From a figure of 22.4 percent in
1930 the proportion fell to 19.0 percent in 1950 and only 15.2 percent in 1970. Thus had fertility rates in the region remained constant throughout the forty-year period the crude birth rate still
would have fallen by one-third. Furthermore, the age distribution
among the women of childbearing age also altered significantly.
By 1970 only 24.9 percent of Valley County women in this category
belonged to the twenty- through twenty-nine-year-old age group,
compared with a national average of 36.2 percent for white women.
This group normally accounted for most births since its fertility
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rate averaged more than double that for any other age group in
the childbearing category. Thus the over-all fertility level of the
county would have remained below the national average even if
age-specific fertility had equaled or slightly exceeded the national
rates. In all probability the age-specific rates in the region did somewhat exceed those at the national level although the differences
doubtless were minor. Here again the operation of a highly ageselective migration process produced unanticipated results among
the population remaining in the region.
Declining fertility in the middle and late fifties foreshadowed
the appearance of natural decrease in the following decade. In
the twenties Valley County births had outnumbered deaths by a
margin of nearly three to one owing to a combination of high fertility and a young population subject to relatively low mortality.
The decline in fertility after 1920 accounted for part of the declining number of births in later years, but changes in the age-sex structure of the regional population also played a key role in this development, as noted above. Thus the combination of declining
fertility and an aging demographic structure subject to higher
mortality eventually resulted in a higher number of annual deaths
than births in the area. The annual statistics for births and deaths
in Valley County appear in table 27. Even had the county experienced no net outmigration during the latter half of the sixties
its population still would have declined for this reason, and over
the next several decades the process will undoubtedly accelerate.
A decline in average family size paralleled the decrease in population that marked the Loup country in the twentieth century. The
shrinkage in the average size of family antedated the general population decline as it began with the census of 1890. In that year the
average Valley County household included 4.86 persons. Over the
next three decades this figure declined at a steady rate, reaching
4.39 in 1920. The significant drop in fertility in the twenties
together with a substantial outmigration of young people brought
the average down to 3.46 in 1930. Unfortunately, the published
census data for 1940 do not include the number or average size
of households, but by 1950 the latter figure had fallen to 3.15.
The high fertility level of the fifties slowed the rate of decrease
during that decade as the median fell to 3.07. But in the sixties
it again plunged sharply, reaching a figure of only 2.62 in 1970. 7
If decreased fertility accounted for most of the decline in family
size prior to World War II, this did not apply so much in later
decades. The constriction in the postwar period arose primarily
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TABLE 27
BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND NATURAL INCREASE
VALLEY COUNTY, 1920-1969

Year

Births

Deaths

94
73
62
68
72
60
72
80
105
72

136
155
169
150
128
126
108
115
63
99

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

169
159
182
163
164
169
140
147
129
125

78
85
80
69
78
62
90
68
86
87

91
74
102
94
86
107
50
79
43
38

2,007

758

1,249

1,547

783

764

181
203
168
141
165
146
162
129
136
121

74
77
87
76
85
63
90
73
66
61

107
126
81
65
80
83
72
56
70
60

128
129
120
106
104
84
82
70
80
68

82
74
92
72
87
79
66
97
79
93

46
55
28
34
17
5
16
-27
1
-25

1,552

752

800

971

821

150

Births

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

230
228
231
218
200
186
180
195
168
171

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

Natural
Increase

Natural
Increase

Year

137
128
140
131
139
139
150
159
167
160
1,450

Deaths

59
69
59
75
92
62
89
81
76
62
724

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

78
59
81
56
47
77
61
78
91
98
726

SOURCE: Nebraska State Department of Vital Statistics, Lincoln.
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from the outmovement of young people of childbearing age and
from the rising proportion of small, older households. As the
population of elderly people grew the number of widows and
widowers also increased significantly, producing a sharp rise in
the number of one person households. In 1930 only 206 of 2,392
households or 8.6 percent of the Valley County total consisted of
one person. By 1970 the figure had reached 457 or 22.6 percent
of all households. The presence of such a large number of isolated
individuals pulled down the size of the average household even
when fertility levels remained stable. 8
Despite the over-all decrease in family size the differences between farm and village households persisted. In 1930 Valley County
farm families averaged 3.94 persons each compared with a figure
of 2.91 for village families. The difference arose in part from higher
fertility among farm women and in part from the concentration
of elderly people in the towns. Substantial differences in this area
remained visible throughout the period. Among married women
thirty-five to forty-four years of age present in 1970, farm women
had borne an average of 4.13 children compared with a figure of
3.29 for village women. And, while the average size of farm families
ranged widely from one precinct to another, on the whole they
still averaged about one-third larger than village families in 1970.°
A considerable degree of diversity characterized the patterns of
population decrease among the various farm precincts and villages.
Net population changes for the six sample precincts appear in
figure 8. The aggregate rate of change in those townships almost
exactly equaled the average for all farm precincts, but as the
graph reveals, different precincts lost population at different rates.
Whether a particular precinct experienced a greater or lesser decline in population over time depended largely upon the factor
of soil depletion. Given the high rate of population turnover noted
in the previous chapter, continued replacement of departing farmers was necessary in order to maintain population stability. Townships in the hilly uplands included a large number of farms which
deteriorated to the point where they no longer attracted resident
operators and thus lost population most heavily. But which precinct experienced the greatest decline in any given decade depended upon other factors as well.
For example, during the thirties the township of Geranium
sustained an over-all population loss of only 6 percent compared
with 33 percent in Fish Creek and 45 percent in Independent. The
general farming pattern characteristic of the Bohemians in Gera-
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Figure 8. Population Change in Six Selected Farm Townships, 1890-1970.

nium proved much more adaptable to drouth and depression conditions than the more highly commercialized operations in the
other precincts. Hence only one-eighth of the farm land in Geranium went to creditors compared with two-fifths or more in the
other two townships. But this picture changed drastically in the
forties as the rate of population decline reached 33 percent in
Geranium compared with 15 percent in Fish Creek and virtually
no change in Independent. The relatively low level of living on
general farms had had its attractions in the midst of the depression
but with the war boom this appeal dissipated. The elimination of
most marginal farming units in Fish Creek and Independent the
previous decade meant that most of the remaining farms in those
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precincts could secure replacements if their operators moved elsewhere in the forties. But now the process of consolidation affected
Geranium for the first time. Continued farm expansion in the
fifties affected all the townships in the region except for Enterprise
which actually enjoyed a 2 percent increase in population that
decade. This resulted from a combination of an abundance of
fertile land together with the general adoption of well irrigation
in the area which resulted in a stable number of farms. With the
sixties, however, even Enterprise experienced a 25 percent population decrease. Now, because of heavy net outmigration and farmer
replacement at different times in the past, the various farm townships diverged substantially in terms of their age structures. By
1970 median ages in the rural precincts ranged from nineteen years
in Liberty to thirty-eight years in Springdale. The former precinct
included predominantly farmers in their thirties and early forties
with at least several children at home in most families. By contrast
Springdale included a disproportionate number of families consisting solely of a couple more than fifty-five years of age. This in
turn meant a perpetuation of differences in precinct population
change rates. Farm consolidation would advance more rapidly in
areas with a high proportion of farmers approaching retirement
age, replacing them with younger personnel while the youthful
population in other precincts would decline less rapidly.lO
Although the farm population began falling after 1910 the
number of village residents continued to rise during the teens in
response to the business boom associated with farm prosperity. The
more difficult twenties brought decline to some of the smaller villages and even Ord's population grew less than 4 percent during the
decade. The thirties saw substantial losses in most villages. Smalltown decline continued throughout World War II but halted temporarily as a major influx of population developed in 1946 and
1947. This inflow of former servicemen and war industry workers
precipitated a short-term housing crisis which was not resolved until
late 1947 when another major outflow of migration from the area
developed. The momentary postwar construction and business
boom which resulted from the unleashing of consumer savings
accumulated during the war soon dwindled and the pattern of stagnation had largely resumed by 1950. During the relatively depressed
fifties the smaller towns experienced heavy population losses and
economic deterioration due to a combination of fewer customers
and lower farm income. These conditions remained general into
the early sixties when a degree of stabilization developed on the
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heels of a large migration of retired farmers to town coupled with
readjustments in village business operations.H
TABLE 28
REGIONAL VILLAGE POPULATIONS

1910-1970
V!illage
Arcadia
Comstock
Elyria
North Loup
Ord
Sargent
Scotia
Total
SOURCE: U.S.

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

618
323

745
450

711
450

519
1,960
651
328
4,399

637
2,143
1,078
559
5,612

657
2,226
834
474
5,352

663
408
77
567
2,240
847
453
5,225

574
302
87
526
2,239
818
474
5,020

446
235
89
453
2,413
876
350
4,862

418
144
55
441
2,439
789
354
4,640

Census, Population, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970.

On the whole the village population declined much less than
did the farm population- 17.3 percent between 1920 and 1970
compared with a figure of 62.3 percent for country residents. The
statistics for net population changes in the towns appear in table
28. As a result of this disparity the proportion of Loup country
residents who lived in the villages rose from 31.4 percent in 1910
to 46.6 percent in 1950 and 56.7 percent in 1970. This change in
the internal distribution of population had major implications for
the region's political complexion and for the distribution of political power within the area as will be seen below (pp. 177-178).
Total village population figures are somewhat misleading in that
the actual rate of change varied widely from town to town. Ord,
as the largest town within a radius of forty miles had a secure
commercial position which was reinforced by its role as a county
seat which provided a further stabilizing force. Consequently it
experienced an aggregate population increase of about one-fifth
between 1920 and 1970. The smaller villages found themselves in
a more precarious position and lost three-eighths of their 1920
population over the course of the next half century. The fate of
the small hamlet of Horace north of Scotia provided a bleak illustration of the fate that might await the small village. During the
town's golden age in the late teens and early twenties it had boasted
a lumber yard, railroad depot, barber shop, two stores, post office,
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bank, and town hall together with stockyards and county road
maintenance shops. During the late twenties and thirties virtually
all of these enterprises disappeared and by 1970 only a farmhouse
and rural elementary school remained standing in the area. 12
Individual country towns experienced varying degrees of economic stagnation or depression depending upon a variety of
factors such as location, the rate of decline in the nearby farm
population, village entrepreneurial leadership, and the like. The
village of Comstock in Custer County experienced the sharpest
decline and appeared well on its way to hamlet status by the end
of the sixties at which time its population totaled less than one-third
of the 1920 figure. The major factor responsible for the decline lay
in the village'S unfavorable location. While useful as a commercial
center in the days of railroads and poor dirt roads, the town could
not survive the transportation revolution that began in the twenties. Farmers in the vicinity drifted away to Ord, Sargent, or Broken
Bow, now easily accessible by graveled or hard-surfaced roads. By
contrast, Sargent's location thirty miles from any other town of
comparable size made it a natural trade center while the construction of a large irrigation project in the vicinity gave added stability
to the farm population. Nonetheless, in the mid-sixties even that
village began to lose population. In this particular instance vigorous efforts by the village business community probably helped to
reduce the speed and extent of economic decline.
Arcadia, North Loup, and Scotia each lost more than one-third
of their population during the decades following 1920. As in the
case of Comstock each village lost business to larger towns up and
down the highways-to Loup City, Ord, and St. Paul, especially
during the fifties. Some degree of stability developed in these villages in the early sixties due to a shift in the nature of their basic
economic orientation. This change arose from the movement of
increasing numbers of retired farmers to the towns rather than from
any rise in the economic viability of the business centers themselves.
Village merchants came to deal increasingly with retired residents
rather than with the shrinking number of farm dwellers. Farm
services remained quite significant but grew fewer in number. Thus
the towns came to function as a combination of farm service centers
and retirement colonies rather than as simple agricultural trade
centers. Given the advanced age of the population moving into
the villages at this time the stability that developed appeared foredoomed to disappear within the next two decades as the pool of
potential farm retirees continues to shrink. 13
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III
Commercial disintegration in the small towns followed lines
similar to those of farm abandonment. A high degree of turnover
characterized small-town businesses and replacements became increasingly difficult to secure. In some instances merchants concluded
that they could not continue to operate profitably and simply liquidated their holdings. Professional men such as doctors and dentists
moved to larger towns and their offices remained empty. Retailers
of more specialized and expensive items such as automobiles, furniture, jewelry, and large appliances found survival very difficult outside of Ord due to the limited number of potential customers. Consequently specialized stores largely disappeared from the villages.
Firms which retailed basic consumption items or provided services
to farmers remained in operation albeit in reduced numbers. These
included businesses such as grocery stores, lumber yards, service
stations, and the like. In most villages at least one of each type
of these basic enterprises could survive given the universal demand
for their goods. But in the smaller towns the number of such
establishments dwindled until only one or occasionally two businesses of the same type remained. Thus while most towns had several grocery stores and two or more service stations they usually
retained only one restaurant, drug store, or hardware dealer. Given
the limited volume of turnover and high fixed overhead expenses
this meant that retail prices remained relatively high. Prices of
consumption goods such as groceries tended to rise above those
current in the larger urban centers although other living expenses
in the region such as rent and labor services remained relatively
low.1 4
Firms which provided services to the farmer remained in operation although their number diminished. Machinery and seed dealers
continued to carry on business after many retailers had left while
grain elevators flourished in most of the towns. The number of
farm implement dealers declined due partly to rising prices and
competition and partly to the desire of parent manufacturers to
reduce the number of franchises to one per county. In other
instances changes in local agricultural conditions or deficient management led to the decline of certain types of businesses, most notably the creameries, the majority of which discontinued operations
in the fifties. Obviously a variety of factors determined the nature
of commercial change in each individual town. But after these
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changes most merchants discovered themselves increasingly reliant
upon village customers as the farm population continued to falP5
As the Loup country's population growth slowed in the teens
members of the business community viewed the situation with increasing alarm. Soon after World War I they began casting about
for some means of encouraging village growth independently of
population trends in the surrounding countryside. In 1921 the farm
columnist of the Ord Quiz outlined a plan for economic development which presaged the direction of efforts of this type for the
next half century. First, he suggested harnessing the hydroelectric
potential of the North Loup River to supply power for future
industry. Then home-town entrepreneurs might establish packing
plants, followed by tanneries, shoe factories, butter and cheese factories, and alfalfa mills. Eventually the irrigation development
linked to the hydroelectric project would foster sugar beet production and truck farming which in turn would lead to the growth
of canneries and sugar refining plants. Although this grandiose
scheme never got off the ground it differed only in scope from most
later proposals for economic development in the region. 16
The search for industry as a panacea for the problem of declining population lagged during the remainder of the first half of
the twentieth century as other problems diverted the attention of
Loup country residents. But the results of the 1960 census which
revealed the extent of the population loss of the previous decade
galvanized businessmen into action. In June of that year merchants from the various towns joined to form the Loup Valley
United Chamber of Commerce. Boosters of the new organization
explained that it represented a means of obtaining a fair share of
government plums for residents of the area. In evaluating the
human resources available for industrial development the organization uncovered an enormous amount of underemployment in the
region. Many farmers operated small enterprises which required
labor only on a seasonal basis, leaving the owner with time on
his hands during the remainder of the year. The proportion of
women available for work also proved high. Thus when the Ord
Chamber of Commerce prepared a brochure advertising its attractions for industry it found 225 persons or one-tenth of the town
population available for work in any new industry which might
locate there,17
Unfortunately for the proponents of industrialization several
major obstacles existed which eliminated any realistic prospects of
attracting large-scale industry into the region. Although some de-
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centralization of industry did occur in the fifties and sixties the
rural areas which benefited generally lay within fifty to seventy-five
miles of major metropolitan areas. Or, they were situated along
major transportation arteries which made it possible to transport
raw materials and finished goods quickly and cheaply. The Loup
country lay nearly fifty miles away from the nearest such transportation artery-the Platte River route which includes U.S. Route 30,
Interstate 80 and the transcontinental Union Pacific railroad line.
While the towns and villages along this route often prospered and
grew, transportation linkages with the Loup region deteriorated,
particularly with respect to railroad facilities.
Prior to the thirties the Union Pacific and Burlington had maintained daily train service on their spur lines in the region. In the
middle and latter parts of that decade they curtailed their services
as crop failures eliminated potential outshipments. Although the
roads partially restored service during the war they soon eliminated
passenger trains. Late in the forties and throughout the fifties and
sixties they continued to curtail their services in the face of mounting competition from truck lines. Ultimately in 1970 both lines
closed down all of their depots in the region, substituting mobile
shipping agents for the displaced employees. Train service in the
region now included only twice-weekly freight service on each line.1 8
If the region'S isolation and lack of rail shipping facilities raised
one barrier to the introduction of industry, the absence of any
large urban center posed another. The largest town had fewer than
twenty-five hundred inhabitants in 1970 while none of the others
exceeded eight hundred residents. This did not provide a sufficiently
large labor pool to support any major industrial plant and after
seeing a few dreams on the subject shattered local representatives
gave up trying to entice this type of operation into the area. Another difficulty arose from the fact that most other small towns in
the state joined in the search for industry, thereby providing a formidable degree of competition. Urban firms seeking rural locations
had a choice of towns with much better locations and more available labor than any Loup country town could boast. Given these
conditions the campaign to lure industry could not realistically be
expected to produce striking results.
As part of the search for small industry, village business leaders
set up the Valley County Rural Development committee to co-ordinate activity and prevent intracounty rivalries from hindering the
effort. North Loup and Arcadia soon disclaimed interest in the
type of meat-packing plant that Ord boosters sought to obtain. Un-
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fortunately the region lacked the supply of animals necessary to
make a beef-packing plant feasible while the smaller towns lacked
the water and sewage facilities required by pork-processing plants.
Finally, in 1967, Ord scored the only success in the long campaign
when a small farm equipment manufacturing company moved
there from Neligh, about fifty miles away. Ironically this, the only
successful importation of industry, came at the expense of another
small town likewise engaged in the struggle for survival.1°
When small-town businessmen realized that the region could
not seriously expect to attract industry they began looking elsewhere in search of enterprises that might bolster the area's economy.
Soon they came to focus their attention upon the possibility of
acquiring new service type institutions. Some looked into the feasibility of obtaining a state junior college or technical school which
could bring a considerable amount of money into the area. Ord
interests also made a concerted effort to obtain the proposed new
State Game and Parks Commission headquarters to be built somewhere in the central part of the state. Town representatives met
with various state legislators who agreed to support their scheme.
Then the state senator from Ord introduced a bill into the Unicameral providing for the consolidation of the commission's offices
and their removal to Ord where the Ord Development Corporation
would provide the necessary facilities. This campaign failed when
westerners who wanted to move the commission's headquarters to
Alliance at a later date joined with easterners to pass a bill that
kept the commission's offices in Lincoln for the time being. 20
The major service institutions to ultimately appear in the region
included hospitals at Ord and Sargent and a nursing home at the
latter village. To a considerable degree the presence of these agencies mirrored the growing proportion of elderly residents in the
region who required medical and nursing home facilities. Difficulties in obtaining basic medical care had begun some time earlier
when both Arcadia and North Loup constructed health centers in
order to attract physicians. Arcadia built a $24,500 health center in
1950-1951 through a combination of private subscriptions and a
municipal bond issue. In North Loup the Lions Club and the
American Legion sponsored the drive for a health center which
they financed through the sale of ten-dollar shares to the public.
The problem of obtaining replacements for doctors who retired,
died, or left the region proved even more formidable than in many
other rural parts of the country. Th~ search for physicians by the
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village of Sargent during the sixties illustrates the depth and complexity of this problem. 21
In September, 1961, the only physician in Sargent died. The
village chamber of commerce quickly undertook a search to secure
a replacement. The recruiting committee soon discovered that most
doctors disliked the idea of settling in a town which lacked another
doctor for consultation purposes and for sharing emergency duties.
In January, 1962, the committee found a medical school intern who
expressed interest in moving to Sargent, but he changed his mind
shortly thereafter. Eventually they succeeded in attracting a new
medical school graduate from California. He bought the equipment
left by his deceased predecessor and launched his own practice.
Two years later, however, he decided to leave. In their search for
a new physician the recruiting committee encountered endless difficulties. Doctors lacked interest in positions situated in isolated
villages when they could secure posts in larger towns with relative
ease. The expense of purchasing the equipment needed to set up
business for himself proved excessive for most recent medical school
graduates. Even if a physician did look favorably upon the idea
of taking up general practice in a small town his wife usually opposed it. The departing physician urged the town to resolve the
difficulty by establishing a clinic to be staffed by several young
doctors. This would eliminate the problem of having only one
doctor available and would further benefit the town by providing
improved medical services and by bringing in other business.
This suggestion won endorsement from the Sargent editor who
thought that it might offer a "juicy enough plum" to induce a team
of physicians to establish themselves in town. Soon civic leaders
launched a drive to construct a new medical clinic. They found
ammunition for their campaign in a study carried out under the auspices of the Sears Foundation which reported that Sargent area
residents had spent about fifty-five thousand dollars for medical
services and travel expenses to other towns the previous year. In
addition, those who traveled to other towns primarily for medical
reasons also spent an estimated eighty thousand dollars for other
items while in those towns. Presumably the establishment of a
clinic could bring most of this money back home. In April, 1965,
the village electorate passed a bond issue in support of the proposed clinic, but no bids for construction materialized and the
town had to satisfy itself with reopening the old hospital when
it finally obtained a solitary physician late that year. 22
Several years later boosters began another campaign for the
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construction of a new hospital. The passage of federal legislation
lequiring the provision of full-time ambulance service added
impetus to the movement. Traditionally village funeral homes had
provided ambulance service on an emergency basis but they could
not possibly hope to meet the new federal standards. As a result
it became necessary to set up hospital districts to provide such
services as well as for the support of hospitals themselves. In July,
1969, the hospital bond issue passed by a wide margin. This issue
authorized the expenditure of nearly four hundred thousand dollars
for construction. This time construction bids appeared and work on
the structure began without delay. The new facility finally opened
in 1970. In the same year work began on a new nursing home
financed by a combination of federal funds and village bonds. Thus
both major additions to the town's commercial sector during the
decade involved health care. 23
Ord also acquired a new hospital in the sixties. In 1961 the
largest convalescent home in Valley County closed, leaving a number of county residents in need of convalescent care for which no
facilities existed. The Ord hospital also found itself operating in
a financially precarious position at that time. In December the
county electorate voted to issue bonds to finance part of the cost
of building a new hospital, the remainder of the funds coming from
the federal government under the Hill-Burton program. The vote
followed the usual localistic pattern as Ordites voted two to one
in favor of the project while Arcadians and North Loupers strongly
opposed it. Residents of south central Valley County favored the
new hospital while the rest of the farm areas opposed it. The decline
in farm population had given the Ord vicinity a majority of the
county electorate, however, fundamentally altering the local balance of political power. The new hospital eventually opened in the
summer of 1964 with wings for both regular and long-term convalescent care. 24

IV
As the economic structure and orientation of the villages altered,
the depopulation process exerted a growing impact upon the political and social institutions of the Loup country. Per capita costs of
county and local government rose sharply, leading to periodic
financial crises coupled with public outcries for county consolidation to save money. Although these proposals for consolidation pro-
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duced no tangible results political units below the county level
underwent considerable modification. In 1958 Valley County abolished the township road maintenance system after forty years of
debate on the subject. In the mid-sixties Greeley County abolished
the sixteen voting precincts in favor of new units centering upon
the four villages. The state law requiring three poll watchers from
each party in each voting precinct had created an untenable situation in Homestead Precinct which had only a dozen resident voters
left by mid-decade. Several years later Valley County followed suit
and reduced its number of voting precincts by hal£.25
State action aimed at standardizing political institutions led to
further local problems. The most significant of these concerned
school district reorganization which will be explored at length
in the following chapter. But other measures had a wnsiderable
impact as well. In the mid-sixties the state raised the legal minimum
salaries for county officials while restricting the use of part-time
personnel. Counties with fewer than five or six thousand residents
found it increasingly difficult to justify retaining full-time officials
on the basis of the amount of work actually done. Both Greeley
and Valley counties lost the office of clerk of the district court
when their populations fell below the eight thousand minimum
figure required by state law. Thereafter the county clerk assumed
the functions previously filled by that official. 26
But minor structural changes of this type could not resolve the
problems arising from a small tax base and shrinking population.
Since county revenue came almost entirely from property taxes,
real estate and personal property tax levies continued to mount.
Moreover, the relatively stable village population could now control county elections and force the approval of expensive new programs such as the Ord hospital, designed to benefit the towns.
Consequently the old antagonism over taxes revived and a good
deal of anti-town rhetoric again arose from among the farmers.
In this as in other areas state legislation further complicated matters. Under state law individual counties could not raise their tax
levy above 14.28 mills without the approval of the voters in a
special election. In 1967 a change in the sponsorship of various
state programs forced Greeley County to add special levies of five
and three-fourths mills. This forced the tax levy above the legal
maximum but county residents voted down the proposed increase
in the tax ceiling. As a result the county commissioners eliminated
the county bridge fund for the year and sharply curtailed road
maintenance operations. In subsequent years the commissioners
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found themselves facing an almost insurmountable task in keeping expenditures down so as to prevent a recurrence of this situation. 27
School districts, townships, and counties were not the only institutions to suffer from the effects of population decline. The number of farmer's clubs, 4-H organizations, and women's extension
clubs also fell rapidly, especially during the fifties. In most cases
farm residents found themselves compelled to go to town if they
wished to continue participating in voluntary associations. Women
might join the women's clubs or auxiliary organizations while their
spouses drifted into the various clubs, lodges, and service organizations. This proved particularly true after the disappearance of the
rural schools which had provided the focal point for farm society.
In earlier years country churches had shared this function but a
long process of consolidation and attrition eliminated most of
them, and by 1970 the region counted only one-fourth as many
rural churches as a 'half century earlier.
Various forces influenced the pattern of church closings and
consolidation at different times. For example, the German Methodist church southeast of Scotia disappeared as a result of declining
ethnic cohesion among second- and third-generation German-Americans in the area. In some instances the competition for members
together with the shortage of ministers led country churches to
close down even before the population of their neighborhoods
began to fall, as in the case of the Presbyterian church in Mira
Valley which consolidated with its Ord counterpart in 1926. The
Mira Valley district eventually lost five of the six churches which
had been active there in 1920. The two Methodist and two United
Brethren churches eventually consolidated into a single Methodist
church following the depopulation of the thirties and gas rationing
of the early forties. In 1950 the parishioners in the local Lutheran
church voted to move to Ord and construct a new church there
since they could not hope to increase their membership if they
remained in the country.
As a result of this sequence of closings and moves the Mira
Valley area contained only one active church by the mid-fifties.
Most of the younger churchgoers in the vicinity gravitated to that
church, but many of the older residents stopped attending after
their own neighborhood church had ceased functioning. Among
the churches that remained in operation in the region sagging membership and financial constriction forced an increasing degree of
co-operation. Thus the Methodist churches in North Loup and
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Scotia supported a single pastor and combined some of their youth
organizations in the fifties and sixties. Other churches in the region
also shared ministers. The eight Methodist churches in the area
joined with several in adjoining regions to form a Loup Valley
Parish organization. This institution promoted co-operation among
its members in their efforts to resolve the problems of obtaining
ministers, combating declining memberships, and sponsoring evangelical crusades. The new organization would ultimately pave the
way for further church reorganization and consolidation. 28

V

If the process of depopulation produced such tangible changes
at the institutional level it also gave rise to a more generalized
psychological trauma for local residents. Not only did the Loup
country decline in population and, in some ways, in economic wellbeing, but its decline appeared all the greater in comparison with
the rising fortunes of the city. Following World War II, for example, village retailers in the area lost a growing share of their business to stores in Grand Island and Kearney to the south of the
region. This development naturally rekindled the earlier hostility
toward roadbuilding programs which would facilitate the flow of
trade to the larger cities. 29
On a broader level antagonism toward the city took the form
of opposition to "centralization" whether it involved highway construction, school reorganization, retailing or political institutions.
Merchants fought the chain store which threatened to drive the
traditional family-owned store out of business. Similarly the policy
of farm implement manufacturers of reducing their number of
franchises to one per county led to charges that urb'ln centralizers
aimed to destroy the small town. But these issues paled into insignificance compared with the controversy that arose over legislative
reapportionment. For such a major redistribution of political
power as reapportionment implied could not fail to affect the
individual citizen no matter how lowly his position.
The problem of legislative reapportionment in Nebraska was
complicated by the existence of a unicameral legislature. The traditional rule of geographical representation in one house and proportional representation based on population in the other did not
apply. The senatorial districts varied widely in population with
the largest about three times as populous as the smallest in 1962.
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Following the 1960 census urban forces began agitating for the
use of population as the sole basis for representation. This provoked
a counterattack by rural forces who sponsored a constitutional
amendment providing that redistricting should proceed on the
basis of a formula giving 70 percent weight to population and
30 percent weight to area. Just how this formula would work was
not clear but obviously the proposition would strengthen the longterm position of rural areas. The proposed amendment carried
the Loup country handily in the wake of warnings by local residents that "once put the Legislature of Nebraska on a strictly
population basis for redistricting purposes and we'll face the prospect of an ever widening deadly desert from the grain producing
valleys to the cattle producing sandhills. Economic growth in the
sparsely populated central and west will freeze." To the consternation of some observers, a number of village residents actually voted
against the measure. For these individuals had accepted the notion
of political representation based on population, a concept which
meant not only urban domination of the state and nation but
also village control of the county.30
Two years later the Baker v. Karr decision effectively nullified
this rural victory and touched off another editorial uproar. The
significance of this decision was not limited to representation at
the state level for it also rekindled the old tax controversy by giving a larger share of political power in the county to the villagers.
Counties now had to reapportion their commissioners' or supervisors' districts on the basis of population. This development generated a bitter contest in Custer County when farmers demanded
continued favoritism in county apportionment, arguing that since
they paid the bulk of county taxes they should have more influence
in determining how the money was spent. The unevenly distributed
population in Greeley County proved impossible to organize on
the basis of equal representation, and county officials there eventually resolved the difficulty by providing for the election of county
commissioners at large. 31
Thus the residents of the Loup country found their world
changing rapidly due to the operation of both internal and external forces. As the population continued to diminish most of
the region'S inhabitants came to view the process as inevitable, if
undesirable. But this sense of fatalism did not preclude the persistence of antagonism against the increasingly dominant urban
sector of American society. At irregular intervals new issues arose
which brought the older rural tradition into direct conflict with
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new trends just as had happened in the teens and twenties. And,
as in the previous decades, local divisions proved nearly as deep
as those between the rural and urban sectors of the larger society.
A classic illustration of these internal divisions as well as of the
larger conflict between new and traditional values appeared during
the contest over school district reorganization in the fifties and
sixties, a conflict whose echoes still linger in the region.

9. Institutional Change in Rural Education

of the teens had supsided interest in educational reorganization gave way to general
apathy. During the twenties farmers viewed their schools almost
entirely in terms of the property taxes which went to finance them
and which invariably seemed too high. With the onset of the depression the basic problem of survival took precedence over all
others and school budgets underwent drastic reductions. Teachers'
salaries fell precipitously while new construction and plant improvement virtually ceased. In the course of the thirties the rural high
schools which had sprung up during the teens and twenties closed
down as farmers found the cost of maintaining them excessive.
Henceforth only the village schools provided instruction beyond
the elementary level.
The thirties also witnessed a significant demographic transformation which would playa major role in future educational organization problems. Under the impact of sharply declining birth
rates and of heavy outmigration among farm families the number
of school age children began to fall. This trend continued into
the forties as heavy outmigration persisted under the stimulus of
the urban war boom. At the same time, however, the number of
elementary school districts in the area remained unchanged. Consequently the number of children of school age per rural district
fell from an average of 30.6 in both Greeley and Valley counties
in 1920 to 13.3 and 14.1 respectively in 1950. This meant that the
number of children of elementary school age per district dropped
from an average of about twenty in 1920 to about nine in 1950.
Because of the uneven spatial distribution of these population
changes, actual enrollments varied considerably from one district
to the next. Upland areas had steeper declines in student population than did the relatively flat regions in the river valleys. Consequently the already substantial variation between districts in terms
of the number of pupils, the value of taxable property, the mill
levies needed to finance school operations, and per pupil costs increased considerably.
Following World War II social conditions in the Loup country
returned to some degree of normality and the subject of school
ONCE THE SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENTS
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reorganization once more gained public attention. In the fall of
1948 the Ord Quiz responded to this growing interest with a series
of articles surveying conditions in the rural elementary (K-8) districts of Valley County. Two of the sixty-nine rural school districts
had no children of elementary school age present that year. Hence
their only tax burden consisted of the 4.30-mill free high school
tuition levy required of all districts by state law. Among districts
maintaining elementary schools or contracting, levies ranged from
8.69 mills to 29.42 mills. The total taxable property valuation
varied from slightly over $45,000 in the smallest district to over
$400,000 in the largest. Per pupil costs, one of the favorite indices
of the professional school administrator, ranged from about $80
in the wealthiest district to nearly $240 in eight small districts with
a county average of about $160. Some idea of the conditions prevailing in these schools may be gleaned from the fact that only
eleven of the fifty-nine operating rural schools had telephones.
The highest teacher's salary did not exceed $1,900 and, despite the
existence of a state law requiring each district to spend a minimum
of $5.00 annually for new library books, the sixty-nine districts in
the county had spent a total of only $94.80 for that purpose in
1947-1948.
Ten of the country-school districts in Valley County contracted
with other districts for instruction during the 1948-1949 academic
year. Although rural districts had long followed this practice it
gained considerable momentum during the thirties and forties. The
primary factor responsible for this development lay in the difficulty
in obtaining teachers for country schools. Although the state teacher
certification standards remained undemanding-virtually anyone
could obtain an emergency teaching certificate-potential teachers
showed limited interest in such positions. One reason for this apathy
lay in the absence of job security since rural teaching contracts
were issued on an annual basis with no provision for automatic
renewal. In addition, the poor condition of roads in the winter
and spring made it difficult for teachers to travel far in order to
reach their schools. The usual solution to this problem involved
boarding with a family in the district but few farm families wished
to take in boarders. Evidently the miniscule salaries did not deter
young women from the profession since even rural teachers earned
more than did the girls who worked in the village stores.1
Under the state laws governing the school contracting system
as of 1945, a district might, by majority vote at the annual meeting, contract with other districts to educate its resident pupils. It
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would send its students to other schools, paying a fiat per pupil
rate to defray the cost of instruction. This system provided an ideal
solution to the problem of keeping taxes low in a district with
only a handful of children since it eliminated the expense of
actively operating a school. The existence of this practice discouraged any movement toward school district consolidation by providing a third alternative for districts faced with a choice of operating an expensive school or merging with adjacent districts in order
to reduce taxes. 2
II

In 1949 the Nebraska legislature passed an enabling act which
included provisions for county-level school consolidation. One section of the new law, the first state action on the subject in nearly
thirty years, established a four-mill tax levy on property lying
within all Class I (elementary) school districts in the state. This
measure sought to prevent certain school districts from escaping
taxation, such as when no children of school age were present. The
legislature also provided a controversial formula for redistributing
the funds accumulated from this levy. Districts which included
fewer than five pupils could not receive any of the funds unless
the county superintendent ruled that their operation was necessitated by extreme distances and / or the presence of natural barriers.
The money raised under the tax would be distributed among districts with five or more pupils-two thirds on a fiat per district
basis and one-third on a per pupil basis. Ultimately the state supreme court overturned this tax provision and the legislature
found it necessary to approach the problem of school reorganization
from a different direction. 3
Despite this failure a few stirrings did appear in the Loup
country following the passage of the 1949 act. Voters in each county
elected an advisory board to consider plans for reorganization on
either a county-wide or partial county basis. As stipulated by state
law, a majority of the members on these boards came from rural
school districts. Efforts by foes of reorganization to block the enforcement of this provision of the 1949 law failed when the state
supreme court upheld its constitutionality in 1954. Despite the
creation of these boards and the sporadic meetings that ensued
neither the Greeley nor Valley county committees made any progress and meetings soon lapsed. This pattern of inactivity recurred
across the state, and spokesmen for the Nebraska State Educational
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Association, the major teachers' organization in the state, predicted
that progress in this area would not come until the state adopted
compulsory redistricting legislation. 4
Most of the impetus behind state and local school reorganization efforts came from two sources. Professional educators and administrators concentrated their influence at the statehouse level.
Most of them wished to raise the standards for admission into their
profession as a means of upgrading its status. The fact that in 1950
a Nebraska high school graduate could obtain an elementary teaching certificate and begin teaching in country schools without
further training revealed how far they had to go in order to
achieve this objective. Educational administrators sought to bring
order to the chaos arising from the operation of countless small
districts with differing tax levies, school facilities, student-teacher
ratios, and per pupil operating costs. These professional educators
won a major victory in the early fifties when they secured the
passage of a constitutional amendment making the office of state
superintendent of public instruction appointive rather than elective.
Henceforth an elected State Board of Education and appointed
superintendent would shape the state's educational policy.
As a trained educational administrator the superintendent embodied the aspirations of professional educators, and in his official
capacity he sought to rationalize and standardize educational practices in the state. The State Board of Education usually followed
his lead, thus coming to support such professional goals as the raising of teacher certification standards, school consolidation, and
stricter requirements for high school accreditation. As this pattern
became evident the superintendent found himself the target of
intense hostility on the part of the "save the rural school" organizations which sprang up during the consolidation controversy.
Ultimately this led to several campaigns aimed at restoring the
superintendent's office to its original elective status. 5
While professional educators provided the major backing for
school redistricting at the state level most of the rural support for
consolidation emanated from the villages. Because they supported
the operation of costly high schools, village districts incurred a
much higher educational expense than did rural districts. This
resulted in high tax levies, and in 1948 when rural Valley County
school taxes ranged from four to twenty-four mills the figure
reached thirty mills at Ord, thirty-one mills at Arcadia, and thirtynine mills at North Loup. Consequently village residents took up
the cry for consolidation as a means of increasing the property
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valuation of their districts and reducing their tax rates. With the
passage of time village support for reorganization became increasingly intense, for in the mid-fifties state educators began directing
greater attention toward the small towns and their often inadequate
high schools. As accreditation standards rose and the possibility
of losing their high schools became real, villagers sought to expand
their districts to include as many resident students of high school
age as possible. Thus consolidation became essential for the very
survival of the school system which usually represented the small
town's largest business operation.
Initially the opposition to school reorganization proposals and
policies came almost entirely from farmers. The root issue in most
of the proposed consolidation schemes involved taxation. The persistent failure of the state to adopt a sales or income tax together
with its refusal to provide any significant aid to education left the
individual school district dependent upon property taxes for about
90 percent of its income. The farmers had long expressed their
grievances against the system which forced them to pay taxes on
their capital equipment as well as their personal goods and correctly assumed that consolidation would mean a substantially
higher tax bill. Naturally they strongly opposed reorganization of
this type although they occasionally supported merger with other
rural elementary districts as a means of reducing taxes. 6
A less concrete but nonetheless very real issue which loomed
large in the school reorganization controversy revolved about the
threatened loss of rural autonomy. Most opponents of redistricting
paid at least lip service to "local control" of education as opposed
to control from the outside-i.e., by the professional educators or
other urban-based elements. To many farm parents the reorganization proposals amounted to a demand that they surrender control
over their own children to distant forces which sought to lure
them away from home. Villagers regarded the slogan of "local control" with some skepticism, pointing out the willingness of its supporters to contract with other school districts, thereby surrendering
their control over educational policy as it affected their own children. For the farmer, however, this practice meant retaining at
least the appearance if not the reality of continued autonomy,
something no longer possible once the country district dissolved
and merged into the village school.
The issue of "local control" then, arose from an awareness of
and hostility toward the process of cultural homogenization then
taking place in American society. This standardization process had
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already affected mass communications such as the movies, radio,
and television which all shared a fundamentally urban viewpoint.
The appearance of the automobile had weakened cultural as well as
physical barriers and with the improvement of rural roads the
process accelerated. Now the farm neighborhood itself appeared
endangered as its basic institutions gravitated to the town. Already
the country churches had largely disappeared together with most
farm social organizations. Thus the rural school came to represent
the last bastion of neighborhood autonomy as opposed to absorption into the new spatially extended, village-based community. The
country school educated farm children, providing them with a
sense of personal and neighborhood identity. It also performed
other social functions, serving as the focus for community social
and recreational meetings as parents gathered there with their
children for picnics, holiday programs, and school business sessions.
Now all of this appeared threatened. Some opponents of consolidation grasped this point clearly and directed their criticism toward
centralization, concluding that this trend constituted an evil in
and of itself. Others who saw the problem less distinctly sought
explanations in terms of conspiracies involving socialists, communists, despotic educators filled with a lust for power, and the like.
Hence as the controversy wore on an element of hysteria increasingly colored the dispute. But all this could do little more than
delay a process which was inevitable, given the direction of change
in the larger American society.7

III
Six years of legislative inaction followed the passage of the
school reorganization act of 1949 and the number of school districts in the state declined at a glacial pace. In most instances what
consolidation did occur came in response to unusually intense
demographic or tax pressures in the districts involved. The county
reorganization committees generally failed to act and after a few
halfhearted meetings usually advised against making any changes
and disappeared from sight. But as the influence of professional
educators mounted in the mid-fifties demands for compulsory school
redistricting legislation increased. This process occurred throughout the midwestern agricultural region, and Nebraskans could look
to reorganization laws in neighboring states for guidance in the
matter. The legislature steadfastly avoided coming to grips with
the problem however, and after persistent lobbying by state educa-
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tional organizations contented itself with passing a measure that
required county reorganization committees to either submit plans
for county-wide redistricting within two years or else to dissolve
themselves. In the latter event the county voters would elect a new
committee to deal with the question. s
After this law went into effect each county in the Loup country
elected a new committee to tackle the redistricting problem. This
time they began seriously considering the problem with the intent
of recommending changes which might later be implemented. The
Greeley County committee commissioned a survey of buying habits
among farmers in order to determine the boundaries of the trade
areas of each of the four villages in the county. This would provide
a useful guide to potential future school district boundaries. But
after taking this step the committee voted against recommending
any reorganization plan. This decision resulted in part from the
continued heavy outmigration of farm families which made it
difficult to project long-term enrollments. In addition, many local
residents evidently did not grasp the concept of multiple schools
operating within a single district-assuming that a K-12 (kindergarten through twelfth grade) district could only support a single
elementary school whereas the State Board of Education favored
the continued operation of a curtailed number of rural elementary
schools within the enlarged K-12 districts. The county study of
village trade areas concluded that any new K-12 districts must
include land outside of the county limits in order to reach the
state approved minimum valuation levels. Here the committee
raised a more legitimate objection, for the state legislation governing intercounty districts made such reorganization difficult to
implement.9
After reaching these conclusions the Greeley County committee
lapsed into apathy, but as the deadline for submitting a new plan
approached some of its members bestirred themselves. The board
then hired a reorganization study committee from the University
of Nebraska to survey the county and submit a redistricting plan.
The study group released its findings in January, 1959, recommending the consolidation of the entire county into a single district
centered upon Greeley. Alternatively, the Scotia village district
might consolidate into Valley County while the rest of Greeley
County formed a single new district. For all the uproar few of
the county's residents took the study very seriously and it was
never implemented. 10
Valley County's reorganization committee proved more active
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than its Greeley County counterpart. At the urging of the committee
four members of the University of Nebraska Teachers College
faculty inspected the county's schools and offered several redistricting proposals. First they suggested combining all districts in the
county, save for a few near Arcadia and in the northwest corner
of the county, into a single district based upon Ord. The new
district would include a high school at Ord and elementary schools
at Ord, North Loup, and in several rural locations. The northwestern districts should then consolidate into the Burwell district
in Garfield County to the north whereas those near Arcadia could
either merge into the Ord district or combine downriver with the
Loup City district in Sherman County. The Valley County redistricting committee adopted these recommendations as a long-range
blueprint for county-wide consolidation but remained powerless
to put them into effect. l1
Even before the Valley County committee adopted these recommendations village residents saw that school consolidation must
eventually come. This realization touched off a round of frantic
redistricting efforts on the part of the towns which sought to annex
nearby rural districts before their rivals could do so. The smaller
villages launched intensive campaigns while the Ord district remained relatively inactive in this sphere. Since all the proposed
county reorganization plans would ultimately benefit Ord on account of its size and central location, Ordites felt that they had
little to lose by waiting. In contrast, Arcadians proposed a consolidation scheme involving twenty-one nearby districts in Valley,
Custer, and Sherman counties as early as 1954. The proposal fell
through when its sponsors discovered that they must proceed
through an almost impenetrable maze of intercounty school district laws in order to achieve their objective. Three years later
another Arcadia group proposed a consolidation with seventeen
country districts, but like its forerunner this plan quickly came
to naught.1 2
Late in 1956 as the Valley County reorganization committee
began seriously considering various reorganization proposals the
Comstock village editor warned his readers against postponing consolidation unless they wished to find the entire region redistricted
into the Ord and Broken Bow school systems within five years. In
January, 1957, the Comstock school board revealed a plan to combine twenty-one country districts into the village district. As this
proposal circulated heated opposition developed among farmers in
the vicinity. As one infuriated countryman wrote:
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It looks as though they are out to break the small farmer, from [Secretary of
Agriculture Ezra Taft] Benson right on down to the small town citizen.
While we are at it why not go a little farther and break the small towns
at the same time? If the small farmer isn't needed any more maybe the small
town isn't ei ther.
If the farmer's children have to go to larger schools and put in long hours
each day riding busses, why not do as Ord suggests? Just have one large school
in each county. Put all property in the county in one large school district.
Let the small towns as well as the farmers junk their schools, and help pay
for new school buildings, school busses, and drivers.
Let the town children ride with the farm children long distances to get to
school too. Let the small town people go broke as have so many of the farmers
so we can see vacant buildings in town too, as we do so many in the country
going to rot.

This letter provoked the editor to countercharge that the town
actually subsidized farmers whose children attended high school
and only paid a small fraction of the cost under the free high
school tuition system. This in turn precipitated a heated debate on
the question of taxation. 1s
This exchange revealed the persistence of the old town-country
hostility which had flared up so intensively at the time of World
War 1. It also demonstrated how some farmers perceived the movement toward school consolidation as one more aspect of the general social and economic tendency toward centralization which
strengthened the larger farm and town at the expense of the
smaller, less efficient farms and villages. At times the expression of
this theme approached the paranoid, particularly when it involved
the broad proposals of professional educators whom many farmers
regarded as small-time czars seeking to expand their autocratic
powers. This attitude prevailed among small farmers to a much
greater extent than it did among the larger operators who had
adapted themselves to the new order of things. Thus, while the farm
bureau which spoke for the larger farmers opposed compulsory
school reorganization it also supported the practice of appointing
the state superintendent of public instruction. In contrast most
small farmers vehemently opposed this practice which they regarded
as akin to the establishment of an absolute dictator in charge of
education throughout the state. 14
Shortly after the publication of the proposals for school reorganization in Valley County, the North Loup village district
launched a consolidation campaign. Wayne Hagmann, the North
Loup superintendent charged that the proposed county plan would
simply shift Ord's tax burden to the remainder of the county
without benefiting the average student. In February, 1957, repre-
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sentatives of the North Loup school met with spokesmen from a
dozen rural districts to discuss merger. Those present favored reorganization by a lopsided margin and set up a commission to map
out further action. Two weeks later thirty of the thirty-eight voters
in one rural district and thirty-four of the forty-five voters in another signed petitions opposing consolidation. Hagmann promptly
accused the Ord city superintendent of circulating these petitions
in order to block any expansion on the part of the North Loup district, thus paving the way for adding these country districts to his
own bailiwick. Whether Ord forces actually organized the petition
drives remains unclear but obviously rural sentiment strongly
opposed immediate consolidation. This proved the case in every
instance when a grandiose reorganization scheme came to light.
Those who favored redistricting-a faction that generally included
from 10 to 25 percent of the voters in a given rural district-attended
preliminary meetings in town and voted in favor of consolidation.
Those opposed to change ignored the meetings only to turn out at
school elections or to sign petitions blocking the proposed mergers.!5
As the controversy heated up foes of redistricting formed their
own organizations to carryon the battle against centralization.
The Nebraska Small School Association appeared first but soon
gave way to the Nebraska School Improvement Association
(N.S.I.A.). This group sought to preserve the rural schools in the
state by whatever means necessary. The most obvious target lay
in the office of state commissioner (formerly superintendent) of education and the N.S.I.A. launched a drive to return the position to
elective status. The question did not appear on the state ballot
until November, 1964, however, at which time the N.S.LA. suffered
a crushing defeat. While the proposition carried Greeley County
by a substantial margin, it failed to carry Valley County despite
the violent feelings aroused there by reorganization. Voting followed a predictable pattern as Ordites favored keeping the office
appointive by a margin of more than two to one. North Loup,
which had lost its high school, and Arcadia, whose high school faced
an uncertain future, both favored election by slight margins. In
the southeastern part of the county where rural districts had either
consolidated with North Loup or continued to operate relatively
strong elementary schools the vote was very close. On the other
hand the northwestern part of the county, particularly the Bohemian areas favored election by more than three to one with
Eureka township supporting election by a margin of fifty-eight to
two. Over-all the areas dominated by small general farmers showed
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heavy support for the N.S.I.A. while the areas dominated by larger
commercial farms leaned slightly in the opposite direction. The
similarity of this voting pattern with the earlier voting on whether
to abolish the position of county extension agent appears quite
striking and underlines the basic gulf dividing the farm population of the region. 16
The N.S.I.A. also undertook other efforts to protect rural schools
in the state. It lobbied against the passage of legislation requiring
college training for elementary teachers. Instead, the organization
urged that emphasis be given to "knowledge of subjects and natural
teaching ability," a phrase never very clearly defined. The N.S.LA.
also crusaded against a variety of educational practices loosely
lumped together under the rubric of "progressive education," urging a return to the "basic" subjects such as phonics, reading, and
arithmetic. During the fifties the local organization showered the
Greeley County reorganization committee with praise for its policy
of inaction.n
As the debate over redistricting continued a notable breakthrough occurred when District Five in Greeley County merged
with the Scotia district in 1957, marking the first addition to that
district since its initial consolidation in 1919. In the same year
residents in the North Loup and Scotia vicinities began considering
the possibility of combining their village school systems since the
two towns lay only four miles apart on a hard-surfaced state highway. Early that year the Scotia Community Club entertained a discussion of plans for a joint school system utilizing both the North
Loup and Scotia facilities and during the county redistricting meetings held that year various individuals from each district offered
proposals for unifying the schools.1 8
In the summer of 1958 Superintendent Hagmann left North
Loup following several major differences of opinion with the village
school board. At the same time the state reduced the North Loup
high school's accreditation status from full accredited to minor
accredited due to the lack of courses and instructors there. After an
unsuccessful search for a new superintendent the school board
arranged for the new Scotia superintendent to serve half days at
North Loup. The new superintendent and board members in each
district then began polling residents on the desirability of consolidating the two districts. Enrollment in both schools had dwindled
over the years and the four-year high school in North Loup had
only sixty pupils-Scotia had eighty-four. In September, 1958, the
two school boards instructed an Ord attorney to draw up petitions
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for merging the two systems. Under the new plan North Loup
would operate the elementary school, Scotia the junior and senior
high schools. The projected tax levy of thirty-four mills equaled
the current Scotia rate but marked a substantial reduction from
the forty-seven mill rate in force in North Loup,19
Despite a generally favorable reaction to the proposed merger
some opposition soon surfaced. This hostility centered in the North
Loup area, particularly in the village which stood to lose its high
school. Some foes warned that the proposed unification would not
reduce taxes appreciably while Hagmann, the former superintendent, warned against selling the community down the river. A
major source of antipathy toward the consolidation evidently lay
in the manner in which it occurred. The redistricting action resulted from the joint efforts of the two school boards with the
approval of the state and county reorganization committees. School
patrons themselves had no opportunity to vote for or against the
proposed change, a fact which even some proponents of merger
found disconcerting. Despite this the new system began operating
in the autumn of 1959 and the tax levy remained at thirty-four
mills. Although transportation expenses rose appreciably savings
on faculty salaries more than offset them. North Loup emerged
from the consolidation without a high school but with a substantially enlarged elementary school and a major tax reduction of onefourth from the level of the previous year. 20
School redistricting in the countryside finally got under way
in the middle fifties and advanced at an accelerating rate despite
the failure of the state to adopt mandatory redistricting legislation.
Statistics for Greeley County school districts appear in table 29.
Valley County underwent a less rapid reorganization partly because
of the absence of any village center to serve as a focus for consolidation in the northwestern corner of the county, and partly because
it experienced a less rapid decline in the number of school age
farm children than did Greeley County. Rural consolidation began
very slowly and not until mid-decade did the number of districts
begin to decline appreciably. Once the process began it accelerated
for various reasons and by 1971-1972 only three rural schools remained in operation in Greeley County compared with forty-eight
such schools twenty years earlier.
The major factor responsible for the decline in rural school
numbers lay in the difficulty that they experienced in recruiting
teaching personnel. This problem arose largely as a consequence of
the actions of the state legislature. For obvious political reasons the
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TABLE 29
SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND CONSOLIDATION TRENDS
GREELEY COUNTY, 1945-1971

Year

1945-46
1950-51
1953-54
1956-57
1959-60
1962-63
1965-66
1968-69
1971-72

Total
Districts

63
62·
60
56
47
29
23
19
10

One
Districts Change in
Graded
Village Schools Teacher Contract- Number
of Districts
ing
Districts (Rural) Schools

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

1
0

I

2
2

48
48
46
41
33
19
II

3
2

10

8
10
10
9
5
6
10
3

-1
-2
-4
-9
-18
-6
-4
-9

SOURCE: Annual reports of the Greeley County superintendent, County Superintendent's office, Greeley County courthouse, Greeley, Nebraska.
"' One district had no pupils of school age in 1950--1951, hence appears in none
of the subclassifications.

predominantly rural members of the Unicameral avoided acting
directly upon the sensitive issue of school reorganization. Eventually, however, the solons approached the question in an indirect
fashion. Because the state lacked any significant system of aid to
public education it could not exert the kind of leverage on individual school districts that most states could. Ultimately the state
senators began applying pressure on the two most critical points
in the existing system of rural school operations-minimum teaching qualifications and school district contracting regulations.
The rise in minimum teacher certification requirements came
about largely as a result of efforts by the educators themselves.
Their professional organizations lobbied in the State Department
of Education and sought to influence the state commissioner of
education who recommended legislation to the Unicameral. The
process of upgrading teaching standards proved a long and tedious
one spanning more than half a century. As of 1910 an eighth-grade
graduate could qualify by examination for a certificate which
allowed him to teach in rural elementary schools. In theory, after
1925 a new teacher must have completed a normal training course
in high school as well as passing a state examination, but teachers
already practicing could continue to do so even if they had only
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an eighth-grade education. A 1953 law specified that beginning in
1956 new teachers must earn twelve college credits and later laws
raised this figure to two full years of college training. Again, however, loopholes provided for the continuation of teaching on the
part of those already holding certificates. Finally in 1963 the U nicameral authorized the State Board of Education to establish rules
governing the issuance of teaching credentials, thus taking the
matter entirely out of the hands of the legislators. After that date
teaching certification requirements rose as the consequence of administrative decisions rather than of legislative action. By 1970 the
state required an associate's degree of new teachers while practicing
teachers who had less than two years of college training found
themselves forced to attend summer courses in order to remam
active. 21
This gradual upgrading of standards combined with general
demographic trends in the fifties to produce a major shortage of
qualified teachers. Even the villages experienced difficulty in obtaining teaching personnel due to the general demand created by
the baby boom of the preceding decade. Most graduates of teachers
colleges could easily secure employment in cities or towns and
lacked interest in rural school teaching. The local populace could
not provide an adequate supply of teachers, for the natives who
left for college rarely returned. This scarcity of teachers eventually
forced many rural school districts to contract with other schools in
order to provide instruction for their students. Under earlier state
regulations they might have carried on this practice indefinitely.
But as the fifties wore on the legislature began amending state
school laws to discourage the practice of perpetual contracting.
A 1953 law required county superintendents to dissolve any district
which contracted with another district for five consecutive years.
A 1967 measure prohibited a contracting school from resuming
operations unless it had a minimum of five pupils present. Finally,
in 1969, the state reduced the maximum time limit for contracting
with another district to two years. It also prohibited mergers between K-8 districts, requiring them to consolidate into K-12 districts once they could no longer operate their own school or continue contracting. 22
Despite these developments some rural elementary schools continued to operate in the Loup country during the seventies. Most
country school teachers now held bachelor's degrees while the school
physical plants conformed with rising state requirements. The establishment of a state aid to education program in the late sixties
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gave the State Department of Education greater leverage for imposing and enforcing higher standards in these schools. Thus the
country school did not disappear from the scene although it did
become an increasingly rare phenomenon. But whereas the issue
of rural school consolidation subsided, the controversy over the
general question of educational reorganization continued unabated.
Now the problems of the smaller village high schools became increasingly prominent. As a rising proportion of rural youth decided
to attend college or to migrate to the city in search of employment
the availability of strong college preparatory and vocational education curricula became highly essential.
Usually the village school dilemma involved one or both of
two major components-tax rates and / or high school accreditation.
If the district failed to consolidate extensively enough taxes might
reach intolerably high levels. If the school lost its accreditation its
graduates experienced some difficulty in gaining admission to college. Furthermore, the loss of accreditation would drive away nonresident youths whose tuition made up an important part of the
village school budget. The merger of the North Loup and Scotia
school systems in 1959 illustrated one possible solution to the problem. Since the two schools operated in towns of about equal size
separated by only a short distance, the consolidation did not entail
any great sacrifice on the part of either one. But for the remaining
schools in the region the specter of Ord loomed unpleasantly above
the horizon. Its high school had a secure future, giving it a commanding position in any negotiations with the smaller villages concerning reorganization. In such a situation the village must inevitably lose its high school. This meant a major loss not only in terms
of business activity in the small town but also with regard to village identification and aspirations.
Comstock's village district offers a case in point of how conditions could eventually force the dissolution of the high school. In
the middle fifties the district's total valuation did not exceed a
half-million dollars and efforts to resolve the problem through a
major consolidation with rural districts failed. The high school
experienced increasing difficulty in recruiting personnel while the
tax levy began to mount. In 1958 rumors circulated that the district
would not operate a high school. These rumors frightened away
potential nonresident high school students, thus adding further
to the district's budgetary woes. In 1960 two rural districts consolidated into the village system but this did not suffice to offset
the rising expenses of operating the high school. By 1963 the vil-
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1age school levy had reached sixty-five mills and showed no signs
of stabilizing. Realizing that the situation was rapidly becoming
untenable the school board met with its Arcadia counterpart to
discuss possible merger. Several weeks later the Comstockers met
with the Sargent school board to explore the possibility of a Comstock-Sargent or Arcadia-Comstock-Sargent consolidation. These
negotiations collapsed over the question of whether elementary
students from contracting rural districts near Comstock should
continue attending school in Sargent or whether they must go to
Comstock. The crisis deepened in the summer of 1964 when the
Comstock high school's accreditation status fell from minor accredited to approved due to low enrollment and the lack of guidance
counseling. Then, just two days before the beginning of the school
year the mathematics instructor died in a traffic accident and the
district found it impossible to secure a replacement.
After these blows had fallen Comstock began making overtures
toward the Ord school board. The two boards met and worked
out an arrangement whereby Comstock retained its elementary
school while consolidating into the Ord district. The new amalgamated district had a single school board and provided transportation for high school students traveling from Comstock to Ord.
This proposal passed review by the county and state reorganization
committees and went into effect in the fall of 1965. For Comstock
residents the merger meant a fall in the village school tax rate
from 72.96 mills to 37.14 mills. On the other hand the action generated much hard feeling against the Arcadia and Sargent school
boards whose intransigence had driven the village into the arms of
Ord. It also led to some unhappiness in the Sargent area whose
school board had missed a major opportunity to bolster its own
school's position. The consolidation further fanned suspicions
among farm residents between Comstock and Ord that the latter
town intended to gobble up all the districts in that part of the
county.23
The demise of Comstock's high school stimulated other villages
to step up their expansion efforts lest they meet with the same
fate. Residents of those towns grew especially apprehensive in the
late sixties when the State Department of Education commissioned
yet another of its studies. This particular report recommended a
drastic reduction in the number of school districts, the location of
most high schools in towns of more than twenty-five hundred population, and a minimum high school class size of one hundred students. The appearance of this study set off a new wave of vocifera-
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tion but the outcry diminished as the legislature followed its usual
pattern of inertia on the matter. Nonetheless a considerable degree
of bitterness over redistricting continued to pervade the countryside
for the new K-12 school district taxes averaged substantially higher
than those of the old elementary school districts. Thus while the
new schools may have provided superior educational facilities for
farm children, they did so at a considerable cost. For those concerned with the passing of a basic way of life this seemed a poor
bargain indeed. 24

Conclusions

T HE FIRST TWO-THIRDS of the

twentieth century witnessed a series
of radical transformations in the agricultural society of the Loup
country. A technological revolution occurred in the areas of communications and transportation. The appearance of radio, motion
pictures, and television helped to break down the cultural barriers
between town and country while the spread of electrification diminished the difference in living standards between those two social
sectors. The automobile annihilated the distance between farm
and village and between the region itself and the cities lying beyond
its boundaries. These developments had a significance reaching far
beyond the simple elevation of living standards because they provided the means for effecting basic alterations in the social institutions and attitudes of the rural population. For as the Loup country became increasingly integrated into the larger American society
it came to share in the national trends toward centralization,
bureaucratization, and standardization.
American economic institutions had undergone the process of
centralization well before the dawn of the twentieth century. Terminal markets at Chicago and other major cities determined the
prices for agricultural commodities which meant profit or loss for
the local farmer. Wholesaling practices in the metropolitan centers
could spell success or failure for the village merchant. The availability of credit at home-town banks depended upon decisions
made in New York and Washington. But the centralization of
power had progressed much less rapidly in the political and social
spheres. The federal government continued to playa minor role in
the life of the average citizen until the coming of the depression.
Likewise, the state government in Nebraska contented itself with
performing a few limited functions such as road construction and
the maintenance of a few educational and welfare institutions. The
primary political concern of the individual focused upon the county,
township, and school district levels which most directly affected
him both in terms of services performed and with respect to taxation.
After 1930, however, the centralization of political authority
increased greatly. Individual farmers found themselves linked di199
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rectly to Washington through the operation of the AAA and subsequent agricultural policies. New programs such as social security
directly affected countless other individuals and families and added
to the general tax burden. The increased role of the military establishment after 1940 meant a sharp rise in public spending while
the adoption of peacetime conscription directly touched most rural
families. Much the same course of events took place at the state
level as the government of Nebraska began to assume additional
responsibilities. Conversely the lower levels of government began
to atrophy as their relative importance declined. Townships melted
away and school districts consolidated, looking up to the state and
federal government for increasing financial support. Even counties
lost their previously sacrosanct character and began to appear dispensable in favor of larger regional units of government.
At the beginning of the twentieth century decision-making
powers remained widely diffused among the social institutions of
the region as churches, voluntary associations, schools, and the like
enjoyed a substantial degree of local and regional autonomy. But
with the passage of time regional and national bodies came to
play an increasingly important role within these organizations. Regional institutions such as chambers of commerce and multiplechurch parishes sprang up as residents of the smaller villages set
aside their traditional localism in order to co-operate in the search
for community survival. At the same time the basic social unit of
the countryside, the farm neighborhood, began to disintegrate. In
earlier days the rural school and church had provided the major focal points in the farm community. But with the general adoption of
the automobile the physical isolation which had fostered the growth
of these institutions began to break down. Eventually the churches
and schools consolidated into their village counterparts and the
resulting neighborhoods spread out over a far larger area than had
their predecessors. These new "rurban" communities as some
have called them included the remnants of many old farm neighborhoods centered upon a village nucleus. But with the expansion
of population that occurred with the enlargement of these communities, the new neighborhoods lacked much of the sense of closeness and cohesion that had marked their more compact predecessors.
This movement toward increased centralization promoted the
growth of bureaucratic structures which provided the necessary
linkage between the remote centers of decision-making power on
the one hand and the grass roots community and individual citizen
on the other. Hierarchically organized channels appeared which
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facilitated the flow of information and funds up and down between
those two levels. The farmer quickly became aware of this process
in his day-to-day relations with the federal government in connection with various commodity production and soil conservation
programs. A county committee initially processed his application
which then passed through the hands of a chain of higher administrators for approval before any funds appeared. School administrators found themselves confronted with multiple forms and reports
to be furnished to an array of bureaucrats including county superintendents, State Office of Education officials, and federal Office of
Education personnel. Church workers waded through mounting
floods of paperwork as they provided growing amounts of data to
regional conferences and offices. Even the village retailer had to
complete a multiplicity of questionnaires providing information to
governmental agencies, franchise or chain store officials, and the
like. Hence bureaucratic structures and procedures became firmly
entrenched within the regional as well as national society.
These basic tendencies combined with the general revolution
in technology to produce a growing degree of standardization or
homogenization within American society. The mass media brought
new urban ideas directly into the home of the most isolated country dweller. New types of mass-produced consumer goods flooded
into farm and city households alike, largely obliterating the difference in life styles between the rural and urban populations. Even
as living standards converged the rise of bureaucratic structures
gave added emphasis to standardization in the area of social
organization and practices. In order to function properly these
structures required the use of standardized procedures and concepts
of operation, even in the most diverse sectors of society. Because
of this fact the growth of bureaucracy inspired efforts to restructure
local institutions in line with the national norm so as to eliminate
potential administrative uncertainty and inefficiency. This impulse
influenced the campaign to reform the system of taxation in the
state. It spurred on the drive to reorganize the chaotic administration of elementary and secondary education. It figured prominently
in the rise of chain stores and franchise operations which led to
the appearance of increasingly identical main streets in rural towns
across the face of the country. But the advance of standardization
or homogenization did not confine itself to the sphere of institutional structure for it also influenced the attitudes and values of
rural residents once the protective isolation of earlier days had
disappeared.
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At the beginning of the twentieth century the inhabitants of
the Loup country had shared a fundamentally agrarian outlook. For
most of them the basic social values remained the traditional ones
of financial independence, a strong community spirit, and the preservation of the established social order. Farming constituted a mode
of existence rather than simply a means of making money and farm
life itself appeared morally superior to urban living. But as the
twentieth century progressed and the physical and cultural isolation of rural areas diminished, farming lost much of its distinctive
character and increasingly assumed the aspects of a business enterprise. The older emphasis upon partially subsistence farming with
production for home consumption, the avoidance of debt, and the
use of the family as a labor force gave way to an emphasis upon
productivity and profits, an attitude that ultimately implied the
development of agricultural specialization. These changes undermined the older values which appeared less relevant in the new
conditions and into their place seeped new values of a previously
urban orientation-those of efficiency, stability (in a dynamic sense),
and standardization.
Technological advances in agriculture, particularly after 1940,
spurred a sharp rise in labor productivity and fostered a change in
basic outlook among many farm operators. Now they could substantially expand the scope of their enterprises and by boosting their
efficiency reap greater profits. Such an expansion program generally
required a high degree of specialization based upon a greatly
enlarged capital investment in land and equipment. On the other
hand a farmer might choose to avoid the extensive borrowing required to put such a policy into effect, sacrificing potential growth
and profits in favor of the traditional goal of security of tenure.
For the progressive farmer efficiency became the key to profits and
as such a basic factor in his more general outlook onto the world.
The traditional farmer eschewed any overriding interest in enhanced operating efficiency but shared in the progressive's desire
for stability. To the traditionalist stability meant the continuation
of customary values and practices into the distant future. For
the progressive farmer, however, stability possessed a dynamic character. One could actively promote stability by eliminating elements
of uncertainty from the farming operation-i.e., through the adoption of irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and soil conservation practices which eliminated the hazards of water supply and soil depletion. In a similar fashion federal agricultural programs might ultimately act to stabilize farm prices. With these elements of uncer-
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tainty eliminated the farmer could rationally design his expansion
program so as to reduce his risk to a minimum. Hence stability
provided the basis for accelerating change. A somewhat different
process took place in the towns. Some merchants continued to adhere to the long-established progressive orientation, seeking to
expand their trade through the adoption of new sales techniques,
the addition of extra services, specialization, and the like. Others,
however, adopted a policy of gearing their trade to the local clientele, accepting a limited volume of trade and low profit margin
in exchange for the traditionalist goal of security and freedom
from debt.
The substitution of new values for old ones did not come
easily, nor did the new ideas entirely displace their predecessors.
The process of ideational change that occurred generated a high
level of tension which contributed to the protracted social and
political conflict that marked the region. The division between
progressives and traditionalists had initially coincided to some
degree with the distinction between town and country. But in the
teens certain farmers came to admire the urban businessman as a
model of efficiency and the original alignment soon broke down.
Traditionalists appeared in the villages, especially after the cessation of economic expansion in the teens, and by the end of the
period the towns may well have included a higher proportion of
traditionalists than did the countryside. Thus cleavages developed
within previously unified social categories such as farmers, villagers,
and members of the various ethnocultural groups. As these cleavages deepened the older group cohesion distintegrated and two
distinct types of individuals emerged, each committed to a different
world view.
At the level of individual consciousness the exchange of ideas
proceeded slowly and unevenly. Many rural dwellers experienced
confusion and uncertainty as components of both systems blended
together in their minds. Some farmers who greatly admired certain
qualities in the urban businessman led the Nonpartisan League
attack upon the city. During the thirties many farm buearu members who supported the AAA joined the hostile Farmers Holiday
Association because of an overriding concern with saving their
farms. Many progressives in later years opposed school district reorganization which affected their own children although they subscribed to the basic values which school consolidation represented.
Even today many individuals in the Loup country share contemporary urban values and conceptions while retaining a sense of per-
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sonal identification with a romanticized image of rural America
free from the afflictions which characterize the cities.
To what extent did the course of events in the Loup country
during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century parallel similar
trends in the remainder of the rural United States? On the whole
the changes that took place followed much the same pattern everywhere and in this sense the region may be considered typical. The
major variations that transpired stemmed from the fact that these
shifts occurred in different places at different times. The chief
determinants of the rapidity of change lay in the distance between
a particular farm region and the nearest urban center and in the
political influence of cities within the state involved, for cities
provided the focal points from which these changes spread. For
example, school reorganization and tax reform came relatively late
to the sparsely populated plains states of Nebraska and the Dakotas.
Such changes appeared a decade or more earlier in the prairie
states. Those states contained a number of large cities which could
influence the policies of their governments. They also included a
sizeable population which combined the roles of part-time farmer
and city worker, a factor of vital significance in transmitting urban
ideas and practices into the countryside.
Although social and cultural change in the Loup country followed the same lines of centralization, bureaucratization, and homogenization as did other farming areas, it differed from many of
them with respect to the phenomenon of depopulation. In most
agricultural regions of the eastern and north central states the
presence of small- and medium-sized cities allowed many individuals
to remain actively engaged in farming on a part-time basis. The
more fertile soil and abundant resources of the corn-belt region
meant that farm consolidation there came much more slowly than
in marginal farming areas and that farm population declined
much less rapidly. Many of those who did leave the farm moved to
small cities in the same vicinity so that the population of counties
and regions remained stable or even increased as the farm population diminished.
On the other hand, large sections of the rural United States
did experience substantial depopulation. These included the transitional farming zone on the Great Plains and the marginal farming areas along the fringes of the corn belt in northern Missouri
and in southern Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. The cutover farming
districts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan also lost population heavily after 1940 as did large subregions in the southern
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Appalachians and the Deep South. Many counties in these areas
experienced even greater population losses than did the Loup
country with aggregate declines exceeding 60 percent. In some of
these localities the median age of the population had climbed to
the early or mid-forties by 1970. There the same processes of farm
consolidation followed by village decline had occurred. There
businessmen had unsuccessfully sought to attract industry. There
many country schools closed in the face of dwindling enrollment
while the aging population severely overloaded the available health
care facilities.
Thus the trends which characterized the Loup country during
the early and mid-twentieth century had a significance extending
far beyond the boundaries of the three counties involved. To be
sure, the process of integration into the national society remains
incomplete as many residents cling to the traditional way of life
and its values. Traces of the old ethnocultural and town-country
divisions persist albeit in weakened form. Resentment of the domination of American society by the great cities still smolders and
the village press continues to praise the traditional virtues of rural
living. No one can now foresee how much farther rural society will
continue to evolve along the lines etched out over the first seven
decades of the twentieth century. For the present, however, the
inhabitants of the Loup country and of most of rural America find
themselves in a society undergoing a painful process of transition
into an uncertain future.

Appendix

PRICES PAID AND RECEIVED
AND PURCHASING POWER OF NEBRASKA FARMERS

1910-1970

Year

Nebraska Farm
Prices

Prices Paid
by Farmers

Purchasing Power
(Parity)

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920

101
87
100
103
108
105
122
197
215
226
200

98
102
99
101
100
105
124
149
175
200
194

103
85
101
102
108
100
98
132
123
113
103

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

108
112
113
127
145
150
142
142
146
120

150
146
149
150
154
153
151
153
152
144

72
77
76
85
94
98
94
93
96
83

1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

88
62
62
84
121
121
136
105
99
103

130
112
109
120
124
124
131
124
123
125

68
55
57
70
98
98
104
85
80
82
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Year

Nebraska Farm
Prices

Prices Paid
by Farmers

Purchasing Power
(Parity)

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

131
166
190
189
198
238
307
304
272
288

133
152
171
182
190
208
240
260
251
256

98
109

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

341
3Il
277
272
244
237
258
279
256
253

282
287
277
277
276
278
287
294
298
300

121
108
100
98
88
85
90
92
86
84

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

254
261
249
237
270
292
270
272
307
303

302
307
312
313
321
334
342
355
373
390

84
85
80
76
84
88
80
77
82
78

III

104
104
Il9
125
125
108
113

SOURCE: H. Clyde Filley, Effects ot Inflation and Deflation upon Nebraska Agriculture, 1914-1932, University of Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station
Research Bulletin No. 71, p. 12. Nebraska State Department of Agriculture,
Nebraska Agricultural Statistics (annual), passim. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (annual), passim.
NOTES: Indices based upon 100 equal to the average for 1910--1914.
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14. Biennial Report oj the Secretary oj State, 1886, p. 192; U.S. Census
Qffice, Report on the Population oj the United States at the Eleventh Census,
1890, part I, pp. 227, 229, 234. The figures for 1885 appear in the manuscript
state census of that year preserved in the archives of the Nebraska State Historical Society in Lincoln.
15. Figures for the native-born appear in the U.S. Census Office, Statistics
oj the Population 01 the United States at the Tenth Census, June 1, 1880, p. 519.
For the foreign-born see the Eleventh Census, 1890, part 1, pp. 508, 642, 644.
For the distribution of ethnic population consult Shaver, "History of Valley
County," p. II-4-II-8.
16. Foght, Trail oj the Loup, pp. 102-109, 138-144, 148-152, 180-185; Shaver,
"History of Valley County," pp. 1-27, III-9; Edith Swain McDermott, Pioneer
History oj Greeley County, Nebraska (Greeley, Nebr.: 1939), pp. 92-100; Andreas,
History oj the State oj Nebraska, p. 928; Butcher, Pioneer History oj Custer
County, pp. 295-298, 339-342; Gaston and Humphrey, History oj Custer County,
pp. 215-217, 180-183.
17. Statistics in the table appear in the federal censuses: Tenth Census, 1880,
Agriculture, pp. 126, 163, 198; Eleventh Census, 1890, Agriculture, pp. 164-165,
219, 298, 338, 376; Tweljth Census, 1900, Vol. V, part 1, pp. 104-105, 288, 460-461,
61I, 654; Thirteenth Census, 1910, Vol. VII, pp. 38, 47, 56. The correspondent's
letter appeared in the Valley County Journal, April 19, 1881.
18. Foght, Trail oj the Loup, pp. 223-226; Gaston and Humphrey, History
oj Custer County, p. 155; Shaver, "History of Valley County," pp. III-9, III-18,
IV-16.
19. Gaston and Humphrey, History oj Custer County, pp. 386--388; Shaver,
"History of Valley County," p. III-9. The Nebraska State Board of Agriculture's
Annual Report for 1895 (pp. 150-151) reported 37.75 miles of irrigation ditches
completed in Custer County and 48.55 miles completed in Valley County.
20. Shaver, "History of Valley County," p. III-18; North Loup Loyalist,
September 22, 1892; August 16, 1894.
21. Generally speaking major technological advances in farm machinery did
not affect the region's agriculture until the period of World War I. See chapter
2 and chapter 6 below.
22. The average value of land and buildings in Valley County rose from
$4.26 per acre in 1880 to $11.88 in 1890 and $10.1I in 1900. This suggests the
degree to which farming operations required an increasing volume of capital
investment. 1880 Census, Agriculture, p. 126; 1890 Census, Agriculture, pp.
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Chapter 2
I. Crop acreage statistics appear in Census, 1910, Vol. VII, p. 47; and in the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture, Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, annual
volumes for 1914, 1919, 1924, 1929, passim.
2. In October, 1916, an Ord implement dealer reported that he had sold
fifty-seven seed drills that fall, one indication of the impact of the shift to
small-grain production upon the acquisition of farm machinery. Ord Quiz,
October 5, 1916; April 15, 1915; January 10, 1918; Nebraska State Board of
Agriculture, Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, 1920, pp. 44.
3. The statistics for mechanization appear in the federal census, 1910, Vol.
VII, p. 38; 1920, Vol. VI, p. 698; 1925, Census of Agriculture, part 1, p. 1147;
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VI, p. 698; 1925 Census oj Agriculture, part 1, p. 1147.
7. Monthly prices for farm commodities appear in the Nebraska Department
of Agriculture publication, Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, Historical Record,
1866-1954 (Lincoln, 1956), pp. 139, 141, 156. Tenancy rates appear in Census,
1920, Vol. VI, p. 698, and 1925 Census oj Agriculture, part 1, p. 1133.
8. Farm tenancy stood at 44.7 percent in 1930. In the same year mortgage
debt averaged 43.1 percent of the actual value of farms for the 64.7 percent of
owner-operators who owed money on their farms. Census 1930, Agriculture,
Vol. II, part 1, p. 1278.
9. Comstock News, January 25, 1917; Ord Journal, January 12, 1922. Between
1919 and 1929 the Valley County acreage devoted to corn production rose by
more than one-third while wheat production fell by five-sixths. Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, 1919, 1929, passim.
10. Comstock News, December 16, 1910; 1930 Census, Agriculture, Vol. II,
part 1, p. 1268; Ord Quiz, January 23, March 13, 1930.
II. Comstock News, March 22, 1928; Ord Quiz, March 12, 1914; June 26,
1924; April 12, 1928; November 7, 1929; VCAR, 1929, p. 19; 1925 Census of
Agriculture, Vol. II, part 1, pp. 1159; Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part I,
p. 1268.
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News, March 22, 1928; CCAR, 1929, p. 9; VCAR, 1929, pp. 23-24.
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14, 1911; March 3, 24, 1910; August 1, 1912; August 29, 1918; January 23,
February 20, 1930. Ord Journal, June 5, July 10, 1913; North Loup Loyalist,
March 24, 1911. Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, 1930, p. 18.
14. Arcadia Champion, July 19, 1912; June 11, 1914; Sargent Leader, May 2,
1912; Comstock News, March 31, 1911.
15. Ord Quiz, February 5, 12, 1914; Comstock News, August 12, 1913.
16. Ord Quiz, June 10, 17, 24; September 9, 16, 23; December 30, 1926;
January 6, December 15, 1927.
17. Ord Quiz, February 25, 1926; VCAR, 1926, p. 11; VCAR, 1928, n.p.;
Census, 1910, Vol. VII, pp. 38, 47; Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part 1,
p. 1231; Vol. III, part 1, p. 951.
18. Census, 1910, Vol. VII, p. 47; Census, 1920, Vol. VI, p. 707; 1925 Census
oj Agriculture, part 1, p. 1159; Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part 1, p. 1273.
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19. Census, 1910, Vol. VII, p. 38; Census, 1920, Vol. VI, p. 707; 1925
Census of Agriculture, part l, p. II59; Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part I,
p. 1231; Ord Journal, February 5, 12, August 21, 1913; January 9, May 22, 1919;
Ord Quiz, August 21, 1913; May 16, November 21, 1918; VCAR, 1919, p. 2. A
later outbreak occurred in 1928, Ord Quiz, December 13, 1928.
20. Ord Quiz. January 15, 1914; August 15, 1918; February 22, 1923; February
16, 1928.
21. Census, 1910, Vol. VII, p. 38; Census, 1920, Vol. VI, p. 707; 1925 Census
of Agriculture, part I, p. II59; Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part I, p. 1231;
CCAR, 1918, p. 6; 1922, p. 15; VCAR, 1919, p. 2, 1922, pp. 9-10; 1924, p. 19;
1927, p. 14; 1929, p. 20.
22. Ord Journal, August 6, 1914; Ord Quiz, February 8, 1923; January 29,
1927; VCAR, 1923, p. 10; CCAR, 1935, pp. 33-34.
23. Ord Quiz, February 24, 1910; March 7, 1912; Sargent Leader, March 7,
1912; Annual corn yields calculated from Nebraska Agricultural Statistics, passim.
24. Ord Quiz, April II, 1929; CCAR, 1919, p. 2; 1929, p. 4; 1931, p. 9; VCAR,
1920, p. 6; 1921, p. 6; 1922, p. 17; 1923, p. 22.
25. Ord Journal, October 22, November 6, 1914; Ord Quiz, May 22, 1913;
July 26, 1923.
26. Sargent Leader, April 17, 1924; VCAR, 1919, pp. 4-5; 1920, p. 5; CCAR,
1926, p. 3.
27. The spatial distribution of different types of farms described here remains
evident today. That it was also the case in 1930 is confirmed by the precinct
level statistics for the value of land, value of machinery and acreage in cropland
which appear in the Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. I, pp. 380, 384, 394.
28. This process has been described above as it affected the dairying and
poultry·producing sectors. Unfortunately the incomplete census statistics make
it impossible to ul)dertake a similar analysis of the growing commercialization
of livestock production.
29. Ord Quiz, November 27, 1924.
30. Ibid., March 7, 1912; March 27, 1913; January 30, 1919; October 10,
1929; North Loup Loyalist, November 29, 1912.
31. Ord Journal, December 24, 1914; March 14, 1918; Ord Quiz, February 8,
1917; Scotia Register, August 21, 1924; Annual Report of the Greeley County
Extension Agent, 1934, p. I (hereafter cited as GCAR); CCAR, 1918, p. I; VCAR,
1918, p. I.
32. VCAR, 1924, pp. 1-2.
33. North Loup Loyalist, January 5, 1923; November 14, 1924; VCAR, 1924,
pp. 1-2.
34. Arcadia Champion, June 16, 1910; December 8, 19II; Comstock News,
April II, 1913; North Loup Loyalist, August 13, 1915; July 27, 1917; Ord
Journal, March 10, 1910; November 9, 19II; Ord Quiz, June 6, 1912; October
8, 1914; April 26, 1917; Sargent Leader, August 4, 1921.
35. Ord Journal, March 2, 16, 1916; May 31, 1917.
36. Ord Quiz, April 26, 1917; January 16, 1919; May 3, 1923; April 24, 1924;
May 5, July 21, 1927; North LOup Loyalist, August 24, 1917; September 10, 1920;
Scotia Register, May 13, 1920; April 10, November 20, 1924.
37. Sargent Leader, October 22, 1914; Comstock News, December 27, 1928;
North Loup Loyalist, October II, 1929.
38. Ord Quiz, January 8, 1925; Sargent Leader, January 8, 1925; Ord Journal,
November 3, 1927.

Chapter 3
I. Historians and sociologists alike have tended to overlook social conflict

within rural areas in their examination of the broader rural·urban conflict. For
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example, Don S. Kirshner in his City and Country: Rural Responses to Urbaniza·
tion in the 1920's (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1970) deals almost exclusively
with competition between Chicago and a few large Illinois and Iowa cities on
the one hand and downstate Illinois and rural Iowa on the other. Although he
notes that smaller cities which tended to side with larger ones on certain
economic issues such as taxation or highway construction sided against them on
social issues such as prohibition, he fails to explore the implications of this fact.
Similarly, Harlan Hahn in his Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics oj Change
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971) focuses upon rural-urban conflict at such
a general level as to miss much of the conflict which marks small· town-country
relations. Another fairly recent study by several sociologists focuses primarily
upon relations between the rural community and the large city although it does
give some consideration to local conflict, particularly to friction arising out of
differential structural locations with respect to individual relationships with the
larger mass society. See Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in
Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community, rev. ed. (Prince·
ton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
Not all scholars have neglected this area, however. As early as 1915 researchers
in Minnesota reported the development of a high degree of social differentiation
between farm and village society in the Red River Valley. In that cash.grain
farming region country people avoided mingling with villagers and expressed
bitterness over the "snobbishness" of those residing in the towns. Some differ·
entiation had also occurred in a corn-belt farming township in southern Minne·
sota, causing farm and town people to limit their social interaction to lodge
membership and church going. However, farmers in that area still felt at ease
with merchants in the smaller villages, many of whom themselves owned farms.
At a third location in the cutover farming district of northeastern Minnesota
differentiation between town and country did not develop. Most merchants
there farmed on a part·time basis while many if not most farmers worked part
time as laborers or craftsmen in the villages. This overlapping of roles prevented
the development of any sharp economic conflict between the two groups. See
Louis D. H. Weld, Social and Economic Survey oj a Community in the Red River
Valley, University of Minnesota Current Problems Series, no. 4 (Minneapolis,
1915), and Gustav P. Warber, Social and Economic Survey oj a Community in
Northern Minnesota, University of Minnesota Current Problems Series, No. 5
(Minneapolis, 1915), together with Carl W. Thompson and G. P. Warber, Social
and Economic Survey oj a Rural Township in Southern Minnesota, University
of Minnesota Studies in Economics, no. 1 (Minneapolis, 1913).
For a more recent survey of town·country conflict in the Kansas cattle town
area in the late nineteenth century see Robert Dykstra, "Town Country Conflict:
A Hidden Dimension in American Social History," Agricultural History, vol. 38
(1964), pp. 195-204. The existence of town-country conflict and ethnocultural
divisions in late nineteenth-century Nebraska are examined by Frederick C.
Luebke in "Main Street and the Countryside: Patterns of Voting in the Populist
Era, Nebraska History, vol. 50 (1969), pp. 257-275; by Stanley B. Parsons in The
Populist Context: Rural Versus Urban Power on a Great Plains Frontier (West·
port, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973) and by David F. Trask in "A Note on the Politics
of Populism," Nebraska History, vol. 46 (1965), pp. 157-161.
2. Ord Journal, January 16, 1913; North Loup Loyalist, June 14, 1912; Comstock News, January 17, 1913.
3. Sargent Leader, January 2, 1913; January 28, 1926; North Loup Loyalist,
December 12, 1913; Ord Journal, September 13, 1917; Ord Quiz, May 14, July
19, 1928.
4. Ord Journal, August 31, 1916.
5. Ord Quiz, October I, 1914; April 2, 1925; July 19, 1928; Comstock News,
January 8, 1925; Ord Journal, January 10, 1918.
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6. Ord Quiz, October I, 1914; October 27, 1932; Ord Journal, August 25,
1910; January 10, 1918; July 30, 1925; Comstock News, March 10, 1921; Sargent
Leader, January 28, 1926.
7. Ord Quiz, December 14, 1922; Sargent Leader, October 22, 1914; Comstock
News, December 27, 1928; North LOup Loyalist, October II, 1929.
8. North Loup Loyalist, April 20, 1920; Comstock News, March 3, 19II;
Sargent Leader, January 25, 1912; Scotia Register, January 19, 1922; Ord Quiz,
January 31, February 7, 1918.
9. Ord Quiz, March 10, 1921; Comstock News, March 17, 1921; Sargent
Leader, March 17, 1921.
10. Scotia Register, June II, September 24, 1925; North Loup Loyalist,
March 2, 1928; Ord Quiz, June 10, 24, 1926.
II. Ord Journal, January 7, February II, March 4, 1915; February 26, 1925;
Ord Quiz, January 7, March 4, 1915; January 20, 1916; January 25, 1917; May 6,
1920; July 19, 1928; January 30, 1930.
12. Sargent Leader, January 29, 1920; January 14, 1926; April 4, 1929; Com·
stock News, March 8, July 19, August 2, 16, 1928; January 10, 1929; Ord Quiz,
January 25, 1917; August 7, 14, 21, September II, 1930.
13. North Loup Loyalist, May 10, 1918; Ord Journal, May 27, 1915.
14. Ord Journal, March 15, 1928; Ord Quiz, December II, 1919; June 8, 1922;
December 26, 1930.
15. Comstock News, May 12, 1921; Arcadia Champion, January 9, 1920.
16. North Loup Loyalist, January 6, 1922.
17. Comstock News, November 18, 1920; December 3, 1925; Sargent Leader,
October 13, December 22, 1921. The Ord Quiz aptly summarized the negative
image of the city in its issue of June 8, 1922, when it asked, "What would
anyone want to live in a dirty, smoky, ill smelling city for where there are
thugs and crooked policemen and shisters [sic] of all kinds."
18. Twenty-Ninth Biennial Report of the State Superintendent to the Governor of the State of Nebraska, 1927, p. 211. North Loup Loyalist, July 3, 1914.
Of the forty-five pupils who completed the normal training course of study in
the North Loup high school in 1924--1928, twenty-nine entered teaching for an
average of slightly over seven new schoolmarms annually. Ibid., February 17,
1928.
19. Scotia Register, February 15, 1923; August 28, 1924; Ord Journal, January 26, 1928.
20. Scotia Register, November 6, 1924.
21. For an extended discussion of the general forces involved in the school
reorganization controversy see chapter 9. The viewpoint of farmers favoring
consolidated rural schools appears in the Ord Quiz of December 4, 1913. In
that year Governor Morehead established a school law commission to study the
subject. In 1915 the legislature enacted a minor voluntary school redistricting
law, then in 1919 it passed a mandatory reorganization act. The 1919 measure
required each county to set up a three-man commission to redraw school district
boundaries within the county. This act led to a flood of protests and the
procedures for reorganization following public hearings were never implemented.
General Laws of the State ot Nebraska, 1919, pp. 1006-1010. Ord Quiz, December
18, 1913; July 17, August 21, September II, 18, December II, 1919; January I, 8,
1920.
22. Ord Quiz, December I, 1921; Scotia Register, November 6, 13, 1924.
23. Ord Quiz, November 27, December 4, 1913; April I, 1915; Twenty-Ninth
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent, pp. 47, 49, 56.
24. Robert L. Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 19161922 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), pp. 26, 87-96.
25. Ibid., pp. 201-215; Ord Quiz, December 27,1917; Ord Journal, October 18,
1917; Sargent Leader, October 4, 1917.

214

/

Agricultural Change in an Urban Age

26. Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, pp. 25-31. Initially the league had frowned
upon county· level organizations but it reversed this policy at a later date. Ord
Quiz, March II, 1920.
2:7. Ord Journal, February 14, 1918; North Loup Loyalist, April 26, May 10,
1918. One critic charged that half the membership fee went to the organizer
who signed up the individual farmer. Sargent Leader, December 16, 1920. Under
a later arrangement dues rose to eighteen dollars of which seven remained in the
county league treasury. Ord Quiz, March II, 1920.
28. Ord Journal, April 18, May, 16, 1918.
29. The errant miller on the council was Herbert E. Gooch, publisher of the
Lincoln Star and known to farmers as "short weight Gooch." For a discussion
of the conflict between the Nonpartisan League and the state council of defense
see Robert N. Manley, "The Nebraska State Council of Defense and the Non·
partisan League," Nebraska History, Vol. 43 (1962), pp. 229-252. Scotia Register,
May 31, 1917; Ord Quiz, July 18, October 31, 1918.
30. Ord Journal, June 13, 20, July 4, 1918; Ord Quiz, June 13, 20, July 4,
1918; North Loup Loyalist, June 21, 1918.
31. Ord Quiz, June 20, July 18, 25, 1918; Ord Journal, July 18, 1918.
32. Ord Quiz, May 9, July 18, 25, 1918.
33. Ibid., May 12, 1921; February 7, July 18, 1918.
34. North Loup Loyalist, May 10, 24, 31, 1918. Editor Davis had already
attacked the "Bolshevists" in the league some time earlier. Ord Journal, April
25, 1918.
35. North Loup Loyalist, October 4, 1918; Ord Quiz, July 25, October 31,
November 7, 1918. The precinct vote appears in the latter issue.
36. North Loup Loyalist, November 7, 1919; Ord Quiz, November 6, 1919.
37. Ord Quiz, July 15, September 30, November II, 1920; December 8, 15,
1921; February 23, March 16, April 20, geptember 11, 25, November 9, 16, 1922.
Ord Journal, September 25, 1922.
38. Ord Quiz, November 16, 1922; May 3, 1923. Supporters of the farm
bloc had earlier claimed credit for the passage of various legislative measures
dealing with the Federal Land Banks, packer controls, and grain exchange regulation. The fact that members of the bloc met at the farm bureau offices in
Washington added to the impression that the bureau had an effective voice in
national affairs. Ibid., January 26, 1922. A similar farm bloc grouP organized
in the Nebraska legislature in 1923. Ibid., July 5, 1923.
39. Ibid., February 17, 1921; August 12, 1920; November 16, 1922; May 17,
1928. Sargent Leader, January 20, February 10, 1921. The 1922 farm bureau
and Nonpartisan League platforms appear in the Ord Quiz of June 8 and
June 22, 1922, respectively. See also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, p. 350.
40. Ord Quiz, August 17, November 9, 1922.
41. Ord Journal, May I, 1924; Ord Quiz, October 16, 1924; Sargent Leader,
July 31, September 18, 1924; North Loup Loyalist, September 12, 1924; June 18,
1926.
42. Ord Quiz, March 12, 1925; Ord Journal, March 12, 1925; Sargent Leader,
September 10, November 5, 1925; Scotia Register, November 19, 1925; North
Loup Loyalist, July I, 1924.
43. North LOup Loyalist, October 19, November 2, 1928. Votes appear in
the Abstract of Votes Cast in the county clerks' offices at Ord and Greeley.
44. For a discussion of the decline in the difference in living standards
between town and country and the concomitant decrease in the differential
in satisfaction levels among village and farm housewives see Lowry Nelson, The
Minnesota Community: Country and Town in Transition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), pp. 72-75, and Marvin J. Tawes, "Farm Versus
Village Living, A Decade of Change," Rural Sociology, vol. 17 (1952), pp. 47-55.
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Chapter 4
1. Annual price index figures appear in the Appendix.
2. Census, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part I, p. 1278.
3. Ibid., pp. 1222, 1278. 1940 Census at Agriculture, Vol. I, part 2, pp.
584, 639.
4. Mortgage statistics appear in the Index at Instruments Filed in the
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sale appeared in the North Loup Loyalist of October 18, 1935.
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9. Ibid., June 15, December 7, 1933; January 9, 1936.
10. Ibid., November 24, 1932; February 16, 1933; February 23, 1938.
11. Ibid., September 22, October 16, 13, 1932; May 31, November 6, 1954.
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Instruments Filed in the county clerks' offices in Greeley and Ord. Of the
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May I, 1934, 94.3 percent went to refinance debt. Ord Quiz, May 31, 1934. Prior
to World War I most farm mortgages in the region involved loan brokers or
mortgage companies such as the Conservative Investment Company of Crete.
These firms disappeared during the land price debacle of 1919-1921 and were
largely superseded by the insurance companies and banks. After 1933 most farm
loans came from federal credit agencies, thus completing a major shift in the
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13. Statistics were calculated from data in the Index at Instruments Filed.
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Quiz of February I, 1939. In the summer of 1937 insurance companies, loan
companies and nonresident landowners held 125,265 of the 356,585 acres of farm
land in Greeley County. Scotia Register, April I, 1937. The proportion undoubtedly climbed substantially over the next three years.
14. 1940 Census at Agriculture, Vol. I, part 2, p. 639.
15. Ord Quiz, March 10, 24, 31, April 7, 21, May 12, 19, 1932; March 9,
1933; Scotia Register, March 15, 1934; Comstock News, April 6, 1933. The
Comstock editor reported that half the farmers in Custer County obtained seed
through the federal government in 1935. Comstock News, March 28, 1935.
16. Ord Quiz, July 27, August 24, 31, 1933; Comstock News, September 14,
1934; Scotia Register, October 3, 1935; December 26, 1933; VCAR, 1933, pp. 7-9.
17. Ord Quiz, March 22, October II, 1934; Scotia Register, March 8, October
II, 1934; October 3, 1935; CCAR, 1934, pp. 28-30; GCAR, 1934, pp. 4-5, 9-23;
VCAR, 1934, pp. 8-16.
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Scotia Register, October 31, 1935; November 4, 1937; April 4, 1935; CCAR, 1935;
pp. 30--34; GCAR, 1935, pp. 9, 10, IS, 17, 28; UCAR, 1935, pp. 5-46.
19. Scotia Register, April 9, 1936; April 6, 1939; Ord Quiz, April 2, 1936;
December 28, 1938; January 4, March 29, 1939; January 17, April 17, 1940;
CCAR, 1936, p. 26; 1938, pp. 31-32; GCAR, 1936, p. 24; 1937, p. 25; 1938,
pp. 19-20; 1939, p. 27; VCAR, 1936, pp. II-17; 1937, p. 17; 1938, pp. 21-23;
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1939, p. 25. Comstock's editor reported that 91.4 percent of Custer County
farmers participated in the second AAA in 1939. Comstock News, December 28,
1939.
20. Ord Quiz, March 9, November 23, December 14, 1933; Comstock News,
December 14, 1933; Scotia Register, December 28, 1939; November 28, 1940.
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Chapter 7
1. Harold Foght, Trail oj the Loup, pp. 221-225.
2. This interpretation has dominated local newspaper writing and oral
tradition for the last forty years. On a more general scale it persists in the
literature dealing with the regional problems of the Great Plains area. See
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Carl F. Kraenzel, The Great Plains in Transition (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1955), pp. 138-141, 144-145, 160-161; and, more recently,
Howard W. Ottoson et aI., Land and People in the Northern Plains Transition
Area (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 35-38, 49, 90-91, 220-230.
On page 230 of the latter volume the author notes that 164 out of a sample of
356 farmers remained on their farms during the ten years from 1946 to 1956.
This he calls "a rather surprising mobility of farm people." Actually the rate
of 46.1 percent persistence given here is very close to the figure of 47.7 percent
for the sample precincts in the Loup country between 1945 and 1955. The lack
of historical perspective illustrated here characterizes most literature dealing
with recent rural depopulation.
3. Malin's chief contribution appears in "The Turnover of Farm Population
in Kansas," Kansas Historical Quarterly, vol. IV (1935), pp. 339-372. Summaries
of this and other research appear in his The Grassland of North America,
Prolegomena to its History (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith edition, 1967), pp.
278-191. A. D. Edwards of the Farm Security Administration basically replicated
Malin's work in his Influence of Drought and Depression on a Rural Community:
A Case Study of Haskell County Kansas, Farm Security Administration Social
Research Report no. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1939). The material specifically concerned with farmer turnover and persistence appears on pp. 17-26.
The most noteworthy among other studies of farmer persistence is Merle
Curti, The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of Democracy
in a Frontier County (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). In this examination of Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, Curti reported farm operator
persistence rates of 32 percent for the decade beginning in 1860 and 40 percent
for the decade beginning in 1870. Among the 264 farm operators present in
1860 forty-nine or 18.6 percent remained on their farms twenty years later. He
found little difference between age groups or between those owning different
amounts of property. Curti also analyzed persistence among nonfarm groups
which proved somewhat higher than among farmers. His findings appear on
pp. 65-77 of the study. Several students of Iowa history have also looked into
the problem of persistence among farmers. See Allan G. Bogue, From Prairie
to Corn belt: Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth Century
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 25-27; William L. Bowers.
"Crawford Township, 1850-1870: A Population Study of a Pioneer Community,"
Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 58 (1960), pp. 1-30; and Mildred
Throne, "A Population Study of an Iowa County in 1850," ibid., vol. 57 (1959),
p. 305-330.
4. The actual discrepencies between census and assessment schedule family
numbers for each decade are:

1910
1920
1930

-0.3% (excess of census
families)
0.4% (excess of assessment
families)
-1.0%

1940

(no census families
published)

1950

-1.6%

1960

-0.1%

In a few instances due to difficulty in finding the records (many were loosely
strewn about a courthouse attic or buried in several vaults) assessment schedules
for the proper year proved impossible to obtain. In such cases the author
employed schedules for the preceding or succeeding year: Geranium in 1899
instead of 1900; Enterprise in 1904 rather than 1905 and in 1939 instead of
1940; and Springdale in 1941 rather than 1940.
5. The major methodological difference between this study and the work
of Malin and Edwards lies in the definition of persistence. This author deals
with the persistence of individual farm operators. Malin and Edwards both
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defined persistence in terms of family. If an operator retired or died and was
replaced by a son Malin and Edwards would consider the new farm operator
persistent, but this writer would not. Since it proved impossible to calculate
family persistence in this study one cannot compare the rates obtained here
directly with those of Malin. However, Malin reported a relatively limited
degree of change in ownership within the family during any initial twenty-year
period, so that up to that time interval the figures are roughly comparable.
6. The difference in persistence between one base year and another might
be partially explained through the use of a two populations concept. That
is, one assumes that among those who migrated once the prospensity for
migrating again would be higher than among nonmigrants. If we break down
the population of each base year into those who had resided in an area for
at least five years and those who had not, we obtain an average five-year persistence rate of 71.3 percent (mean) or 73.3 percent (median) for the former
together with a mean of 43.0 percent and median of 46.8 percent for the latter.
The figures for each period appear in the table.

Year

Persistence
Five-Year
Residents

Persistence
New
Residents

1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930

76.4%
71.5
63.8
64.0
57.1
80.1
73.6
76.2

46.9%
34.4
41.9
61.4
26.6
46.7
41.8
48.1

Year

Persistence
Five-Year
Residents

Persistence
New
Residents

1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965

65.4%
66.3
70.8
78.6
76.2
73.3
77.2

33.3%
47.6
42.5
50.7
30.6
60.8

Among those present in a given area for less than five years changes in economic conditions might easily lead the newcomer to move again. Those resident
for a longer period would have closer social and economic ties to the region
and would move less often. The far more extreme fluctuation in persistence
rates among new residents compared with five-year residents appears to lend
support to this hypothesis.
7. In evaluating these data one observes a singular lack of correlation
between the rate of turnover, which remained relatively stable over time, and
net migration which changed drastically. This points to a major weakness in
the current literature of migration theory. For example, in his discussion of
rural farm family migration from Oklahoma, Otis D. Duncan defined five
categories of factors leading to the decision to migrate. At first glance this
seems reasonable, but it fails to account for the relatively stable rate of farm
operator turnover during the most widely disparate socioeconomic conditions.
Why, for example, should turnover during the sixties differ only in slight degree
from that of the supposedly stable twenties?
Similar problems arise with the more general theory of migration advanced
by Everett S. Lee. Lee uses the analogy of the balance scale to explain the
decision to migrate. Thus when the attractions of the destination outweigh
those of the point of origin the individual decides to move. The presence of
intervening obstacles such as the expense of moving may delay the decision,
but when the scale becomes heavily imbalanced, such obstacles are overcome.
This theory assumes that the decision to migrate results from perceived conditions both at the point of origin and at the destination. Thus it explains more
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the direction and specific object of movement rather than the actual decision
to move as such. The real question here is why an individual begins to
consider moving and whether the destination point influences this initial
decision, or whether it enters the picture only after the decision to move has
already occurred. In other words Lee's theory explains the flow of net migration
streams, but it does not adequately explain the basic mechanism responsible for
general human mobility and why the rate of mobility remains relatively stable
in the most varied conditions. See Otis D. Duncan, The Theory and Consequences oj Mobility oj Farm Population, Oklahoma Agriculture Experiment
Station Circular no. 88 (May, 1940). This paper also appears in Joseph J.
Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan, Population Theory and Policy (Glencoe:
Free Press, 1956), pp. 417-434. Everett S. Lee, "A Theory of Migration,"
Demography, vol. 3 (1966), pp. 47-57.
Recent students of urban history have also discovered evidence of high
turnover rates and relatively stable persistence patterns over time in several
American cities during the nineteenth century. See Howard P. Chudacoff,
Mobile Americans, Residential and Social Mobility in Omaha, 1880-1920 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 35-110; Peter R. Knights, The Plain
People oj Boston, 1830-1860: A Study oj City Growth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 48-77; Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social
Mobility in a Nineteenth-Century City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1964), pp. 80-114; Stephan Thernstrom and Peter R. Knights, "Men in
Motion, Some Data and Speculations about Urban Population Mobility in
Nineteenth Century America," Journal oj Interdisciplinary History, vol. I
(1970), pp. 7-36.
8. Statistics in this section were compiled from the Mortgage and Deeds
volumes in the office of the county clerks at the Greeley and Valley county
courthouses.
9. John W. Bennett, Northern Plainsmen, Adaptive Strategy and Agrarian
Life (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 204-245, especially 227-233.
10. Kraenzel, The Great Plains in Transition, pp. 194-211.

Chapter 8
I. Ord Journal, August 12, 1920.
2. Unfortunately the tax assessment schedules for the villages appear incomplete for the period 1930-1950, thus precluding a study of turnover and
persistence patterns comparable to that for farm precincts.
3. These migration figures are necessarily crude inasmuch as no figures for
sex distribution appear in the federal census. Census of population, 1920, Vol.
III, p. 603.
4. During most of the twentieth century rural areas had notably lower
mortality rates for the population under seventy years of age than the state
average. Consequently in applying state rates the author allowed a 10 percent
reduction for age groups in that bracket. Nonetheless, due to the unusually
long life expectancy in the region an excessive number of deaths still appeared.
5. Census oj Population, 1930, Vol. III, part 2, p. 99; Census oj Population,
1940, .vol. II, part 4, p. 613; Census oj Population, 1950, Vol. II, part 27, p. 79.
6. Census of PoPulation, 1930, Vol. III, part 2, p. 81; Census oj Population,
1950, Vol. II, part 27, p. 28; Census of Population, 1970, Vol. I, part 29, p. 126;
Census oj Population, 1970, General Population Characteristics, United States
Summary, sec. 1, pp. 276-277.
7. CenSus of Population, 1890, part I, p. 924; Census, 1920, Population, Vol.
III, p. 603; Census oj Population, 1930, Vol. VI, pp. 800, 806; Census, 1950, Vol.
55, part 27, p. 79; Census, 1960, Vol. I, part 29, p. 203; Census Of Population,
1970, Vol. I, part 29, p. 48
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8. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. VI, p. 806; Census, 1970, Population, Vol. I,
part 29, p. 136.
9. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. VI, p. 806; Census, 1970, Population, Vol. I,
part 29, pp. 367, 383. In 1970 the average family size in the farm townships
ranged from a high of 3.96 in Liberty to a low of 2.83 in Davis Creek. On the
whole farm families in the county averaged 3.35 members compared with a
figure of 2.56 for the city of Ord. Ibid., pp. 48, 100.
10. Ibid., p. 100.
II. Scotia Register, November 22, 1945; August 7, 1947; Ord Quiz, March 14,
21, October 31, 1946; May 27, 1948.
12. Scotia Register, March 17, 1960.
13. The Scotia editor noted the changing composition of village population
when discussing the closing of the town's largest farm service firm in 1965.
Scotia Register, October 14, 1965. For a discussion of the multiple and changing
functions of the rural village see T. Lynn Smith, "The Role of the Village in
American Rural Society," Rural Sociology, vol. 7 (1942), pp. 40-52.
14. A prolific body of literature deals with the problem of small-town
economic decline. The first outburst came during the twenties when the concept
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February 9, May 18, 1961; July 31, 1969; December 17, 1970; Comstock News,
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29. Ord Quiz, June 24, 1954; February 23, 1956.
30. Ibid., August 30, November 8, 1962; Sargent Leader, August 23, November 1, 1962.
31. Scotia Register, November 26, 1964; Sargent Leader, February 22, 1969.

Chapter 9
I. Figures for school age population appear in the Nebraska State Super-

intendent of Public Instruction, Biennial Reports, passim. Ord Quiz, September
26, 1946; June 26, 1947, November 18, 25, December 2, 9, 1948.
2. General Laws of the State of Nebraska, 1945, pp. 624-626.
3. General Laws, 1949, pp. 673-679; Ord Quiz, September 19, 1949; May 4,
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General Laws, 1953, pp. 1053-1063; Ord Quiz, November 25, 1948; February 5,
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disputed, but the trouble is no one wants their own school to be the one
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recommendations. At the first large delegations attended from the villages of
Spalding, Wolbach, and Greeley while poor roads kept many rural patrons home.
Those present at this meeting voted 75 to 18 in favor of some type of redistricting and approved the concept of a single county high school by a margin of
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15. Ibid., February 14, 28, March 7, 1957.
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17. Ord Quiz, November 6, 1964.
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pp. 1204-1214; Ibid., 1959, pp. 1370-1375; Ibid., 1963, pp. 1569-1573.
22. General Laws, 1953, pp. 1005-1007; Ibid., 1969, pp. 2703, 2726. A 1967
law established the five-pupil minimum requirement for reopening contracting
district schools. Ibid., 1967, p. 1773.
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23. Comstock News, July 17, September 3, 1958; January I, 1959; February
18, March 3, 1960; January 18, 1962; December 12, 1963; January 9, February 27,
March 16, 1964; February 25, 1965; Ord Quiz, February 18, 25, March 4, 25, 1965.
24. The N.S.LA. assailed the study as the "mein kampf" of the despotic
state educators. That November the embittered Comstockers voted 95 to 35 for
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Position. Comstock News, October 24, November 7, 1968.
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